Exchange Rates as a Determinant of the Balance of Payments by Yongskulrote, Phot
EXCHANGE RATES AS A DETERMINANT OF 








Master of Science 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
1974 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
December, 1976 
Thesi::, 
I '17LP D 
Y 5'7e 
C(lp.~ 
EXCHANGE RATES AS A DETERMINANT OF 
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Thesis Approved: 
Thesis Adviser 




The author expresses his indebtedness and sincere appre-
ciation to his major adviser, Dr. Rudolph W. Trenton, for 
his careful, painstaking assistance to the entire study, his 
suggestions for the improved presentation of many topics, and 
his continued encouragement and interest in this study. 
Appreciation is also expressed to the members of the 
committee: Dr. James Ang, Dr. Michael R. Edgmand, and Dr. 
Gerald M. Lage. A special gratitude is extended to Dr. John 
D. Rea for his guidance and criticism on the statistical 
analysis in this study. 
In addition to my advisory committee, appreciation is 
extended to Dr. Richard H. Leftwich, Regents Professor, Dr. 
Alan Rufus Waters, Head of the Economics Department, and the 
faculty members of the Department of Economics for their 
encouragement and for creating a working atmosphere conducive 
to study and research. 
Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. and Mrs. Glenn w. 
Todd for their moral support, encouragement, and friendship 
throughout my study in Stillwater. 
Finally, special gratitude is extended to my wife, 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION. 
Purpose and Scope of the Study • • . . • . . 
Methodology. • . • • . • • . • • . . . • 
Outline of the Thesis. . •...•. 
Data Sources • 








Determinants of Foreign Exchange . • • • 7 
Choice of Variables. • • • . . • . . . • • . 9 
A MODEL OF THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE. • . • • 16 
The Demand and Supply of Foreign Exchange. . 17 
Measurement of the Variables . . . • • • 22 
The Spot Exchange Rate (R) . . . . . 22 
The Ratio of Export to Import 
Values (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 23 
Economic Growth as Expressed by the 
Index of Industrial Production (G). . 23 
The Ratio of Domestic to Foreign 
Interest Rates (I) . . . . . . . • • • 24 
The Ratio of Domestic to Foreign 
Price Inflation Rates (P) . . . . • • 25 
Data Sources . • . • . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Statistical Method Used in the Analysis. 33 
Problems Related to the Analysis Using 
Time Series Data . . . . . . . • . • • • . 34 
TIME SERIES ESTIMATIONS OF THE EXCHANGE 
RATE DETERMINANTS . . . . . . . . • • • . 35 
Results from Stepwise Regression . • . . 35 
Adjustments for Autocorrelation. . . . . . . 40 
Modification of the Model. . . . . . . . 48 
iv 
Chapter Page 
V. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND AN EXCHANGE RATE. 57 
The Concept of the Balance of Payments 
and Its Components • • • • • • • • • • 58 
The Concept of the Trade-Weighted 
Exchange Rate. . . • • . . . • • • • • • • 65 
VI. A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF EXCHANGE 
RATES, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, AND 
RESERVE RELATIONSHIPS • . • • . . • . . . . 67 
VII. 
Belgium. . • 
Canada . • . . 
France • • • 




Sweden • • • • . 
Switzerland ••• 
The United Kingdom • 
The United States •. 
SUMMARY • . • • . 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRPAHY. 
v 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
. . . . . . . 80 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 8 9 
97 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 115 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 124 
. • • • 131 
• • 140 
. • • • 14 7 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 159 
• • 17 5 
• • 182 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
I. Distribution of Trade in Manufactured Goods 
(SITC 8) ' 1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
II. Distribution of Trade in Manufactured Goods 
(SITC 8) ' 1970. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
III. Distribution of Trade in Manufactured Goods 
(SITC 8), 1971. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 29 
IV. Average of Distribution of Trade in 
Manufactured Goods (SITC 8), 1969-1971 •••• 30 
V. Estimates by the Stepwise Regression 
VI. 
VII. 
Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Estimates the Final Equation in Table V of 
Each Country, Corrected for Serial 
Correlation . • • • . • • • • • 
• • 36 
• • 41 
Results of Testing the Hypothesis That 
Coefficients of Omitted Variables Are 
Not Statistically Significant . • . . . • 44 
VIII. Estimates the Variables in Equation (5) 
IX. Re-estimates Equation (5), Corrected for 
Serial Correlation .••••... 
x. Estimates the Variables in Equation (8) 
• • 46 
• • 49 
• 53 
XI. Exchange Rates and the Balance of Payments ••• 63 
XII. Belgium: Exchange Rates and the Balance 
of Payments, 1971-1975. • • • • • • ••• 75 
XIII. Belgium: Quarter-to-Quarter Change in 
Reserves, Expressed in Percent. • • . 78 
XIV. Canada: Exchange Rates and the Balance of 
Payments, 1970-1975 • • • • • • • 83 
vi 
Table 
XV. Canada: Quarter-to-Quarter Change in 
Reserves, Expressed in Percent ..•• 
XVI. France: Exchange Rates and the Balance 
Page 
88 
of Payments, 1971-1975. • • • • . • . • . 92 
XVII. France: Quarter-to-Quarter Change in 
Reserves, Expressed in Percent. . . . . . 96 
XVIII. West Germany: Exchange Rates and the 
Balance of Payments, 1971-1975. . . • 100 
XIX. West Germany: Quarter-to-Quarter Change 
in Reserves, Expressed in Percent ••.•.• 105 
XX. Italy: Exchange Rates and the Balance of 
Payments, 1971-1975 . • • • . • • • • •• 109 
XXI. Italy: Quarter-to-Quarter Change in 
Reserves, Expressed in Percent. • •. 114 
XXII. Japan: Exchange Rates and the Balance of 
Payments, 1971-1975 • . • • • • • • • .• 119 
XXIII. Japan: Quarter-to-Quarter Change in 
Reserves, Expressed in Percent. • •• 125 
XXIV. The Netherlands: Exchange Rates and the 
Balance of Payments, 1971-1975 .•.•.••. 128 
XXV. The Netherlands: Quarter-to-Quarter Change 
in Reserves, Expressed in Percent • . . • 132 
XXVI. Sweden: Exchange Rates and the Balance of 
Payments, 1971-1975 • • • • ••.••.. 135 
XXVII. Sweden: Quarter-to-Quarter Change in 
Reserves, Expressed in Percent •••••... 139 
XXVIII. Switzerland: Exchange Rates and the 
Balance of Payments, 1971-1975 •••••.•• 142 
XXIX. Switzerland: Quarter-to-Quarter Change 
in Reserves, Expressed in Percent .• 146 
XXX. The United Kingdom: Exchange Rates and the 
Balance of Payments, 1971-1975. • . . 151 
XXXI. The United Kingdom: Quarter-to-Quarter 
Change in Reserves, Expressed in Percent ••• 158 
vii 
Table 
XXXII. The United States: The Trade-Weighted 
Exchange Rate and the Balance of 
Payments, 1971-1975 . . •.••• 
XXXIII. U.S. Trade by Area •.• 
XXXIV. The United States: Quarter-to-Quarter 
Change in u.s. Liabilities to Foreign 
Page 
. 162 
. . . 165 
Official Creditors, Expressed in Percent ... 174 
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. Belgium: The Market Rate of the Belgium Franc 
and the Change in the Basic Balance • • • • . . . 77 
2. Canada: The Market Rate of the Canadian Dollar 
and the Change in the Basic Balance . . • • . • • 87 
3. France: The Market Rate of the French Franc 
and the Change in the Basic Balance • • • • • • • 95 
4. West Germany: The Market Rate of the Deutsche 
Mark and the Change in the Basic Balance •••.• 103 
5. Italy: The Market Rate of the Italian Lira and 
the Change in the Basic Balance • • • • ••• 113 
6. Japan: The Market Rate of the Japanese Yen and 
the Change in the Basic Balance • • • • .123 
7. The Netherlands: The Market Rate of the Dutch 
Guilder and the Change in the Basic Balance .•• 130 
8. Sweden: The Market Rate of the Swedish Krona. 
and the Change in the Basic Balance • • ••• 138 
9. Switzerland: The Market Rate of the Swiss 
Franc and the Change in the Trade Balance •••• 144 
10. The United Kingdom: The Market Rate of the 
Pound Sterling and the Change in the Basic 





The increasing acceptance of the dollar as an inter-
national currency arose from the fact that the United States 
had a substantial surplus in its balance of payments which 
led to gold reserve accumulations since World War I. Until 
the 1960s the Bretton Woods agreements recognized the exist-
ing practice and declared its unit of account to be equal to 
the u.s. dollar. The use of a national currency as an inter-
national yardstick can continue as long as enough other 
nations will accept the arrangement and the value of the cur-
rency in question remains fixed. The advantage of seeing the 
dollar used as a reserve currency diminished when other 
countries, in particular the Western European countries, were 
accumulating dollar assets and at the same time were uncer-
tain as to the future course of exchange rates. The domi-
nance of the dollar as the world currency faded from 1968 to 
1976 with the announcement of the first dollar devaluation 
and the suspension of gold convertibility in 1971 and the 
second dollar devaluation in February, 1973. The major cur-
rencies have now been allowed to float. 
Since the generalized floating of major currencies began 
in 1973, the fluctuations in exchange rates have been larger 
1 
than had generally been expected (26) (28, 1975). Discus-
sions of the present managed floating exchange rate system 
2 
and the short experience of countries involved have centered 
so far on questions of the performance of the present float-
ing system. In the 1975 annual meeting of the International 
Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C., Jean-Pierre Fourcade, the 
French Minister of Economy and Finance, opposed the floating 
and said (32, September 15, 1975, p. 268): 
... A return to stable but adjustable parities must 
be the fundamental objective we have to pursue •..• 
Such an objective is in accordance with the inter-
est of the international community. I would like 
to reaffirm my deep conviction that generalized 
floating can only further dislocate the interna-
tional monetary system and delay economic recovery. 
The economic development both of developing and 
industrialized countries can only take place in 
the framework of a monetary system which guarantees 
stable relationship between currencies. 
The opposite view has been expressed by the representative 
from the United States, William E. Simon; the u.s. Treasury 
Secretary (32, September 15, 1975, pp. 268-269): 
... u.s. policy is to have our own exchange rate 
determined essentially by market forces, and not 
by arbitrary official actions ••.• We believe 
strongly that countries must be free to choose 
their own exchange rate system and that all coun-
tries, whatever choice they make, must be subject 
to the same agreed-upon principles of international 
behavior. The right to float must be clear and 
unencumbered. In view of the great diversity in 
political systems, institutional arrangements, 
size of national economies, and degree of depend-
ence on foreign trade and investment, our present 
world requires an open mind about the future. 
It is evident that there is some difference of opinion re-
garding the current practice of managed floating. 
3 
Purpose and Scope of the Study 
This study attempts to shed some light on the impact of 
floating exchange rates in an empirical framework. Accepted 
doctrine tells us that flexible exchange rates maintain bal-
ance of payments equilibrium, require no international cur-
rency reserves, and remain as stable as domestic economic 
developments permit. The floating rates in current use do 
not follow this pattern, and it is the purpose of this study 
to discover their actual behavior. 
We shall distinguish between flexible and floating ex-
change rates. A flexible exchange rate system leaves the 
price of currencies to the forces of demand and supply with-
out official intervention. As Egon Sohmen defines the 
system as (62, p. viii) "an exchange rate whose level at any 
instant is determined in a free market without exchange con-
trols and without prescribed limits of fluctuations." A 
floating exchange rate, however, is determined in the open 
market within the limits judged prudent by officials who will 
intervene in order to prevent rate changes which they con-
sider excessive. In this study the terms "managed floating" 
and "floating" exchange rate will be used interchangeably, 
since both presume government intervention. 
The current experiment of floating exchange rate is not 
the first such attempt in the history of the international 
/ 
monetary system. Many countries in the past, both the devel-
oping as well as the developed countries, have experienced 
floating rates in a system of either unilateral floating or 
4 
joint floating with other countries. This.study will first 
examine what factors ca~e QUrr~t ex9h~rates to ···------------- ~
f 1 uctua ~h e:r:.-tl::!.-a-n-s-J:')·IaCul§:..~~which-i..s-e-f-t-e-n---Gi-te.cLa~ 
~~ The period which the study will cover for 
statistical analysis begins with 1971, when the dollar de-
parted from its fixed exchange rates. 
In the second part, a brief description will be given on 
the developments of the various balance of payments during 
the 1960s and the early 1970s. The empirical evidence 
gathered from a few years of generalized floating permit ten-
tative answers to the following questions: 
What has been the impact of floating exchange rates on 
~•'IIMI8:8T U"l!l . ..._ __ 
the adjustment in a country's balance of payments? 
~- " .,_.,.,,.)l) ..... - .•• >f-.jllf'O.'!I'1"~ .. ., .. ...,,.~~· ... ----""~"'"~'"' 
Have floating rates contributed to the lesse~ use of 
reserves by the monetary authorities than under a regime of 
fixed exchange rates? This argument is suggested by the ad-
vocates of flexible rates. Reserves in this study are de-
fined as official reserves reported by IMF, which include 
gold, foreign exchange, and the gold tranche of the reserve 
position at the IMF, in addition to SDRs since 1970. 
Only countries whose currencies have long been estab-
lished and have occupied a major role in international trans-
actions are considered because of the reliability and detail 
of available data. These countries include Belgium, Canada, 
France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, or 
the "Big Ten" plus Switzerland. Other countries are excluded 
5 
because data, although steadily improving, are still incom-
plete and are often of doubtful quality. The countries in-
eluded in the study have overwhelming shares in world trade 
and finance. The study covers the period before and after 
August, 1971, when the dollar was officially devalued for 
the first time. It includes the second devaluation of 1973 
and its repercussions on 1974 data. 
Methodology. 
This study, first, sketches prevailing economic theory 
of the demand and supply of foreign exchange. Second, sta-
tistical methods are discussed that will properly reflect 
the causal effect of what caused the exchange rates to flue-
tuate. Third, an empirical study is attempted to determine, 
country by country, the impact of floating exchange rates on 
the balance of payments and on the use of official reserves. 
Outline of the Thesis 
This study proceeds in the following manner: 
(1) It discusses some economic factors that could be 
expected to cause an exchange rate to fluctua~ 
(2) it constructs a model that captures the theoretical 
relationship between the change in the exchange rate and each 
of the factors discussed in (1) above, 
(3) it then presents the statistical results of the 
determinants of the exchange rate variations,., 
/ 
(4) it analyzes in the framework of a balance of pay-
ments, the use of effective exchange rates, and 
6 
(5) it details, country by country, the degree of de-
pendence of a nation on trade and capital investments during 
the 1960s and the developments of the country's balance of 
payments. The results are then correlated with the level of 
exchange rates under various time lags to determine the 
impact of the latter on the former. In addition, changes 
caused by managed floating on official reserves are compared 
with the changes during the period of fixed exchange rates in 
order to test the thesis that reserves would be used rela-
tively less under floating rates. 
Data Sources 
Because of their wide use and general acceptance as a 
source of international financial data, International Mone-
tary Fund, International Financial Statistics will be used 
as a principal source of data in this study. Additional 
sources of u.s. data come from the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 
Business. 
CHAPTER II. 
THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
When the demand and supply of foreign exchange are al-
lowed to interact freely in the exchange market, an equilib-
rium rate of exchange will be determined. The purpose of 
this section is to inquire into the determinants of the 
demand and supply of foreign currencies for the purpose of 
developing a better understanding of the impact of a country's 
exchange rate on its balance of payments. 
Determinants of Foreign Exchange 
After World War I major European currencies were allowed 
to float for a period of several years in foreign exchange 
markets. The magnitude and frequency of the variation were 
wider than expected, i.e., greater than their gold points. 
Several studies have attempted to analyze what caus~------
rates to fluctuate so sharply. Nurkse studied the inter-war -------------------------
currency experience of some major European countries. His 
observation was (41, pp. 137-8, p. 118): 
If there is anything that inter-war experience has 
clearly demonstrated, it is that paper currency ex-
change cannot be left free to fluctuate from day to 
day under the influence of market supply and demand . 
••• If currencies are left free to fluctuate, "specu-
lation" in the widest sense is likely to play havoc 
with exchange rates .••• Anticipatory purchases of 
7 
foreign exchange tend to produce or at any rate to 
hasten the anticipated fall in the exchange value 
of the national currency, and the actual fall may 
set up or strengthen expectation of further fall. 
The dangers of such cumulative and self-aggravating 
movements under a regime of freely fluctuating ex-
changes are clearly demonstrated by the French 
experience of 1922-26 •..• But the phenomenon of dis-
equilibrium capital movements under conditions of 
fluctuating exchanges was by no means confined to 
France .•.. it affected in varying degrees most of 
the other depreciated currencies in Europe in the 
early 'twenties,' once it was realized that are-
turn to par could not be taken for granted. 
Friedman contends in opposition (23, p. 170): 
Nurkse examined only one period in anything approach-
ing the required detail, the depreciation of the 
French franc from 1922 to 1926. For the rest he 
simply lists episodes during which exchange rates 
were flexible and asserts that in each case specu-
lation was destabilizing. Even for the French 
episode, the evidence given by Nurkse does not 
justify any firm conclusion. Indeed, so far as 
it goes, it seems to me clearly less favorable to 
the conclusion Nurkse draws, that speculation was 
destabilizing, than to the opposite conclusion, 
that speculation was stabilizing. 
Such opposing conclusions drawn from the post-WW I currency 
experience have generated empirical studies attempting to 
determine factors that contributed to rate fluctuation. 
8 
Various statistical methods have been employed to obtain good-
ness of fit between exchange rate changes and some explana-
tory variables. s. C. Tsiang (66) explains the movements in 
the French franc as a result of expansive credit and money 
supply during the period. Aliber (1) studies the movements 
in spot rates of the French franc in comparison to the for-
ward rates during the same period and, like Nurkse before 
him, concludes that speculation was destabilizing. Lloyd 
9 
Thomas (64) (65) employs a distributed lag method to estimate 
the linear relationship in the form: 
where R is the spot exchange rate expressed in U.S. cents, P 
is the ratio of the price index of the country in question to 
that of the United States, B is the coefficient of expecta-e 
tions, and t is time. His estimated B coefficient for the e 
U.S.-France case was significantly greater than zero, imply-
ing that expectations were not highly inelastic and thus 
destabilizing in the case of France. Pippinger (60) (61) 
refutes Aliber's claims that speculation was destabilizing 
and argues that the French franc movements were in response 
to inflationary pressures. Hodgson (27) employs a general-
ized least squares technique to examine the dollar-sterling 
rate movements during the 1919-1925 period. He found no evi-
dence of destabilizing effects and that the variations in the 
rates came from specific events such as restrictions on capi-
tal exports and certain imports related to British economic 
policies. 
Choice of Variables 
Although speculation in foreign exchange is important to 
an explanation of exchange rate movements, recent research 
yields inconclusive effects concerning the impact of exchange 
speculation. The reason for not being able to come to a more 
definite conclusion are found in the lack of data than can be 
attributed directly to speculation under different assumptions. 
10 
The current floating exchange rate regime has exhibited 
sharp changes and wide amplitude of rate movements on a. num-
ber of occasions since early 1973. Such fluctuations cannot 
be interpreted merely by analyzing whether the movements have 
been under the pressure of exchange speculators. It is neces-
sary to explore other economic factors that could be sig-
nificant in rate variations. 
One e~sen~ial determinant of exchange fluctuations is 
exports and imports of traded goods. For most countries, ex----------
portation of goods is a major source of foreign earnings, 
while imports represent use of foreign exchange. In the for-
eign exchange market, the demand and supply of foreign ex-
change is matched by exchange dealers. When an excess demand 
for foreign exchange develops, the rate appreciates until it 
reaches a level at which the buyers consider the rate too high 
and at which additional sellers will be attracted to the mar-
ket. When an excess supply develops, the exchange depreciates 
until it reaches a level at which the sellers consider it too 
low to sell and it attracts additional buyers to the market. 
An equilibrium rate of exchange will be determined when the 
quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied. In the proc-
ess of selling and buying of foreign exchange the dealers are 
aware of the seasonal demand and supply and thus will quote 
higher prices at the time when imports exceed exports and 
lower rates when exports exceed imports. Foreign exchange 
dealers are also influenced by the published trade data al-
though they know that the trade surpluses or deficits occurred 
11 
in the last period (19) • If the trade balance shows a defi-
cit, it has repercussions on the market for the national 
currency. 
A second deter~t .. ~Q.~L_t:ate movemen.:t.~e in-____.- ' 
~.~i::_iqn_._t:_ca._t.e.~. b~.-~:J;:;hng_~s-'&4-e----6\.Ild_Jo~n price levels. 
,' --~-~-
There are several reasons why keeping domestic price stabil-
ity relative to foreign prices is important to the stability 
of exchange. Stable prices mean, for exte.rnal reasons, 
steady economic growth. It strengthens a country's inter-
national trade competitiveness and external economic position. 
The causal relationship between exchange rate movements 
and price inflation has been widely discussed, but the 
results are still inconclusive among academic observers as 
well as the practitioners and exchange dealers. Neverthe-
less, conventional economic theory provides a useful concep-
tual framework for the analysis of the impact of price 
inflation on a country's currency exchange. The theory sug-
gests that if the price inflation of a country is consist-
ently higher than the type experienced by its trading 
partners, this will, in due course, be reflected in a down-
ward movement in the exchange rate, while a country having an 
inflation rate consistently lower than its trading partners 
will have its currency appreciated. 
In practice, exchange dealers play an important and 
influential role in determining which currencies are strong 
by judging the future trend of relative price inflation 
rates among leading countries. 
Many financial men, by virtue of their own experi-
ence and training, place relatively greater weight 
on price stability than on some of the other ob-
jectives of economic policy, such as growth and 
full employment .••• As a result, price stability 
may assume more weight in assessing a currency 
by those whose judgments are most critical than 
it would in some 'objective' and more balanced 
view of economic targets (10, pp. 179-180). 
An example will help to illustrate the point. The United 
Kingdom and Italy are.among the countries included in this 
study that consistently have the highest rate of inflation 
12 
in the recent past, and the trends of both currency exchanges 
are moving downward. On the other hand, West Germany and 
Switzerland have maintained relatively better price records 
than many other industrialized countries and thus have ex-
perienced an upward trend in their exchange rates. 





According to this view, when the domes-
tic interest rate level is low relative to the foreign level, 
the interest rate arbitragers will buy foreign currencies and 
invest them in foreign assets. An outflow of funds will 
exert downward pressure on the value of a currency. The 
opposite would be the case when the domestic interest rates 
are higher than abroad. This view, however, is subject to 
two qualifications. First, it is based on the assumption 
that the transfer of funds is exempt from government controls 
and regulations. If such capital barriers exist, the fund 
transfer would be difficult and the pressure on exchange 
would be reduced. Second, the argument assumes that the 
change in exchange would be less than the change in interest 
13 
rate in order to have the funds flow out, while a change in 
the interest rate is necessarily smaller than a change in 
the exchange rate to have an inflow of funds. If a change 
in the rate is expected to be the same percentage as the 
opposite change in the interest rate, there would be no in-
centive to transfer the funds for profits. 
The impact of interest rate arbitrage on exchange rate 
movements could be substantial. Kreinin and Gilbert (40) 
estimate the sensitivity of the commercial banks to the 
interest rate differentials in seven European countries. 
The estimated results indicate that during the period.from 
the 1960s through 1970 a one-percen.tage-point incre~se in. 
the Eurodollar interest rate induced the German and Italian 
banks to hold more foreign currencies and mainly. dollars to. 
an equivalent of $287 and $129 million, respectively, and 
lesser amounts in the smaller countries. It must be noted, 
however, that the dollar exchange rate was still rigidly 
pegged at that time. 
In order to prevent a massive outlfow of arbitrage funds 
and to maintain exchange rate stability, the concerned cen-
tral bankers have raised their short-term interest rates 
from time to time to a level that makes such transfer no 
longer profitable. In the recent past, for example: 
The United Kingdom led the way, with short-term 
rates being adjusted upward in the six months 
following the floating of sterling in June, 1972. 
However, in the first half of 1973 the initiative 
was taken over by Germany and the United States, 
which on domestic grounds raised their official 
discount rates progressively to reach peak levels 
by the summer. At this point the United Kingdom 
gave a further sharp boost to short-term interest 
rates to help protecting sterling, and long-term 
yields also began to move steeply upwards. Simi-
lar action proved necessary in November, when the 
Bank of England's minimum lending rate was raised 
to a peak of 13 percent (5, 1974, p. 22). 
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A fourth determinant of the exchange rate fluctuations 
is a country's economic growth as expressed by the percentage 
change in industrial production. A continuous economic 
growth for a country is necessary in order to achieve a strong 
external position through accumulation of international re-
serves. However, rapid growth may increase imports and 
reduce exports because when income increases, more goods and 
services will be consumed domestically and less will be left 
for exports. In addition, as income increases, imports tend 
to rise. The relationship of imports to increases in domes-
tic output depends on the import elasticity. 1 
Strong economic growth will also induce capital inflows 
and discourage outflows. Strong growth means high potential 
profits, which is also accompanied by high interest rates 
which will attract capital from abroad. Williamson (72) has 
made an empirical study of the u.s. economy concerning eco~ 
nomic growth and the balance of payments during the 1820-1913 
period and also during the 1950s. His findings are that 
during the period of rapid growth imports tended to increase 
more than exports. However, both growth and the balance of 
1The estimated income elasticities for imports with 
respect to economic activity ranges from the lowest 1.02 for 
Sweden to the highest 1.81 for the United States (63). 
15 
payments were moving upward together since economic progress 
was accompanied by increasing relative rates of return on 
American securities. Thus a deteriorating trade balance was 
more than compensated by net capital inflows. 
The empirical evidence leads us one step further: higher 
growth rates should be positively related to appreciation of 
a currency, and vice versa. The evidence, however, gives no 
clear-cut answer. Kern indicates that (37, p. 33): 
••• it is not surprising that whereas Japan and 
Germany combined a higher rate of economic growth 
with a rapid rate of currency appreciation, in 
the case of France the rapid rate of economic 
growth coincided with large falls in the value 
of its currency, while at the other extreme, the 
United Kingdom, in spite of the rapid decline in 
the value of its currency, experienced a very low 
rate of economic growth. 
The rate of economic growth is an important factor in 
determining the performance of a country's exchange rate, but 
we have a very imprecise notion of how important. Thus, it 
is appropriate to include the growth factor as one of the 
determinants. 
CHAPTER III 
A MODEL OF THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
In the preceding chapter the study presented the rela-
tive influence of varying factors on the fluctuations of the 
exchange rate. The study singled out four factors that could 
be expected to cause the exchange rate to fluctuate, namely, 
the ratio of exports to imports, relative price levels, rela-
tive interest rates, and the level of economic growth ex-
pressed in terms of the index of industrial production. This 
assumed that these factors were allowed to respond to under-
lying disturbances without implying that the central bankers 
do not intervene in the foreign exchange markets at all. 
They may be actively engaged in smoothing out day-to-day 
fluctuations in the rates as they claim but they do not 
counteract the long-term trend of the rate of exchange. The 
following discussion presents (1) a mathematical model of the 
demand and the supply of foreign exchange, (2) the measure-
ment of each variable, and (3) the statistical approach to 
be used in order to verify the relative importance of each 
factor. 
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The Demand and Supply of 
Foreign Exchange 
17 
The demand for foreign exchange depends for the most 
part on the price of foreign currencies in terms of the 
national currency, the relative inflation rates between 
countries, the relative interest rates of the nations con-
cerned, the ratio of exports to imports, and the level of 
economic growth of the country. Likewise, the supply of 
foreign exchange is determined by the exchange rate, the 
relative inflation rates, the relative interest rates, the 
relative values of exports to imports, and the level of eco-
nomic growth. The demand and supply of foreign exchange are 
matched simultaneously by exchange dealers. The rate of ex-
change at which the quantity demanded equals the quantity 
supplied in a particular period of time does not necessarily 
imply that either the balance of trade or balance of payments 
is in equilibrium at that rate of exchange. It can be argue~ 
however, that the deficit or surplus cannot be maintained for 
long because the exchange rate will depreciate or appreciate 
until the imbalance is eliminated. The long-run equilibrium 
exchange rate is reached when the balance of payments shows 
neither deficit nor surplus over a period of time. 
The discussion can be summarized as follows: 
the demand for foreign exchange 
D = f(R, T, G, I, P) 
and the supply of foreign exchange 
S = g(R, T, G, I, P) 
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where D is the domestic demand for foreign currency in the 
exchange markets for the purpose of making payments abroad, 
S is the supply of foreign currency to the domestic exchange 
markets resulting from exportation of goods and services, 
securities, payments from abroad, and from hoarding, R is 
the spot exchange rate, T is the ratio of export to import 
values (X/M), G is the rate of economic growth, I is the 
ratio of the domestic to foreign interest rates (id/if) , P is 
the ratio of the domestic to foreign price levels (Pd/Pf). 
The linear approximation of the demand and supply of foreign 
exchange can be expressed as: 
D = a 0 + a 1R + a 2T + a 3G + a 4 r + aSP + u 1 
S = bO + b 1 R + b 2T + b 3G + b 4I + bSP + u 2 
(1) 
( 2) 
where a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , as and b 0 , b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , b 4 , bs are 
parameters to the estimated, and u 1 and u 2 are error terms. 
Theoretically, the domestic demand for foreign currency 
is expected to be positively correlated with the price of 
foreign currency, imports, domestic price inflation, foreign 
interest rate, i.e., ( 8D/8R) > 0, ( 8D/8M) > 0, ( 8D/8Pd) > 0, 
(8D/8if) > O, while the~demand for it is expected to be neg-
atively correlated with foreign price inflation, and domestic 
interest rate, i.e., ( ClD/ClP f) < 0, ( ClD/Clid) < 0. For the 
rate of economic growth, the demand for foreign exchange may 
increase or decrease because as the economic growth progres-
ses, imports will rise, which lead to higher demand for for-
eign exchange, but as economic growth is seen sustainable, 
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profit rates may be higher than abroad; thus the demand for 
foreign exchange may fall. The theoretical sign of the 
growth factor is indeterminate. The partial derivatives of 
the demand for foreign exchange with respect to the respec-
tive ratio forms are ( aojaR) > 0, ( aojaT) < 0, ( aojai) < 0, 
(ao;aP) > 0. That is, the theoretical expected signs of the 
coefficients are: a 1 > 0, a 2 < 0, a 3 = unknown, a 4 <0, a 5) 
< o. 
On the supply side, it is theoretically expected that 
the domestic supply of foreign exchange will.inprease when 
there is an increase in the amount of exports, the foreign 
price inflation, and the level of domestic interest rates, 
that is, (as;ax) > 0, (as;apf) > o, (as;aid) > 0, and the 
supply will decrease when there is an increase in the price 
of foreign currency, imports, the domestic price inflation, 
and foreign interest rate, i.e., (as;aR) < O, (as;aM) < O, 
(as;aPd) < 0, (as;aif) < o. The impact of economic growth 
on the supply of foreign exchange cannot be determined. The 
reason is similar to the reason given to the demand for for-
eign exchange. The partial derivatives of the supply func-
tion with respect to each variable are: (as;aR) < 0, 
(aS/aT) > 0, (asjaG) =unknown, (asjai) > 0, (asjaP) < 0. 
The expected signs of the coefficients are: b 1 < 0, b 2 > O, 
b 3 = unknown, b 4 > O, b 5 < 0. 
The balance of payments accounts show the quantity de-
manded and quantity supplied of foreign exchange in the 
accounting framework, that is, debit and credit entries. The 
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balance of payments in a particular period of time showing a 
deficit or a surplus is a result of the excess demand or ex-
cess supply caused by the underlying disturbances, such as 
those factors on the right-hand side of the equations (1) 
and (2). Under the regime of fixed exchange rates, the ex-
change rate R was maintained constant most of the time. In 
order to eliminate disequilibrium in the bale~.nce of payments, 
official control and various restrictions were imposed in 
addition to fiscal and monetary policy measures. In analyz-
ing the surplus or deficit, most studies concentrate on other 
factors in the framework of constant exchange rates. 
This study, as stated earlier, is concerned with the 
analysis of the impact of the present floating exchange rates 
on the country's balance of payments. In othe~ ~ords, the 
exchange rate R in the equations (1) and (2) is fluctuating. 
In fact, the day-to-day and week~to-wee.k movements in the 
exchange rates have shown sharp changes and wide amplitude, 
which have a significant impact on the quantity demanded and 
the quantity supplied. The data of the demand and supply 
shown in the balance of payments, however, are published 
quarterly. The quarterly figures obtained by averaging the 
daily rates of exchange would wash out the variabilities of 
the exchange rates within the quarter period, and conse-
quently the influence of the exchange rate variations would 
be reduced. 
In equilibrium, the quantity demanded and the quantity 
supplied are equal, thus equation (1) equals equation (2): 
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D = S ( 3) 
Note that equations (1) and (2) are not statistically identi-
fied because, in view of equation (3), they are simply linear 
combinations of the same variables. If all error terms are 
zero, i.e., u 1 = u 2 = 0, then all observations should be at 
the intersection of the supply and demand functions. Because 
of the stochastic nature of the equations, observations will 
not lie at the intersection point but will scatter in the 
neighborhood of the point. This problem is called the iden-
tification problem. Such difficulty is common to all studies 
(16, 17, 27). The problem arises because the specification 
of the model is not sufficient to discriminate between the 
demand and supply. 
Due to the lack of statistical identification and to 
bring out the important role of floating exchange rates, the 
study solves for R from equations (1) and (2) in terms of 
other explanatory variables: 
or 
R = 
(a1 - b 1 )R = (b 0 - a 0 ) + (b 2 - a 2 )T + (b3 - a 3 )G 
+ (b 4 - a 4)I + (bS- a 5)P + (u2 - u 1 ) 
b - ao b - a2 b - a3 b - a4 b - as 0 + 2 T + 3 G. + 
4 I + 5 
bl bl bl bl a - bl a - a - a - a -1 1 1 1 1 
p + u. 
( 4) 














c3 = (al- bl), 
(+) 
(b5- as> 
c5 = (al- bl) . 
(+) 
The expected signs of the coefficients are: 
c 2 > 0, c 3 = unknown, c 4 > 0, c5 < 0. 
Measurement of the Variables 
The Spot Exchange Rate (R) 
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(5) 
The exchange rate used for the statistical analysis is 
the spot market rate measured in terms of u.s. cents per unit 
of foreign currency. Monthly exchange rate data are the 
averages of daily rates in the month. The study covers the 
series of exchange rates from January, 1971 to August, 1971, 
when the rates were fixed, and from August, 1971 to December, 
1975. During the latter period the dollar exchange rates 
were first allowed to change in August, 1971, and have been 
floating since early 1973. For the Canadian dollar, the 
study covers ··the exchange rate series beginning in January, 
1970 because the Canadian dollar was fixed from January to 
May, 1970 before it was allowed to float in June, 1970. 
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The Ratio of Export to Import Values (T) 
Export and import values are those reported in the trade 
balance statistics which include only internationally traded 
goods. In order to conform to other variables in the model 
in terms of unit of measurement, the ratio form is used 
rather than the absolute value of the net trade balance. 
Theoretically, the demand for foreign exchange is positively 
related with imports but negatively correlated with exports. 
On the supply side, it is expected that the supply of foreign 
exchange increases with exports but decreases with imports. 
The relationship between the exchange rate and the export-
import ratio is expected to be positive. The higher the 
ratio, that is, exports are relatively higher than imports, 
the greater the currency appreciation. Conversely, the lower 
this ratio, the greater the depreciation of the exchange 
rate. The sign of the coefficient c 2 is expected to be 
positive. 
Economic Growth as Expressed by the Index 
of Industrial Production (G) 
Other things being equal, a high level of economic growth 
may induce foreign capital to flow in since higher growth 
rates usually are assoc,iated with higli:ei:. prot:lts and_ interest 
rates. It is expected that the exchange rate would appreciate 
with economic growth. Higher growth, however, may cause im-
ports to increase relative to imports. The exchange rate 
would be negatively related with economic growth. The sign 
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of the coefficient c 3 cannot be estimated in advance. Eco-
nomic growth of a country is usually measured in terms of 
real gross domestic product or real gross national income. 
However, this study is concerned with monthly analysis in 
the movements of all the variables and since data of gross 
domestic product or gross national income-are published only 
in quarterly series, the industrial production index is used. 
The index shows the monthly level of industrial production, 
which includes mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas, and 
water. It is thus a satisfactory proxy for a country's real 
GNP. 
The Ratio of Domestic to Foreign 
Interest Rates (I) 
The observed domestic interest rates are those rates 
that reflect short-term money market conditions. In this 
study most of the interest rates are those for three-month 
treasury bills. However, for Italy, three-month treasury 
bond rates are used. For France and Japan, day-to-day loans 
or call money rates are used because they reflect money mar-
ket conditions in those countries. 
i 
The rapid growth of the. eurodollar market both in volume 
and in number of transactions in the last decade clearly 
demonstrates an alternative source of credit outside the 
domestic market. Eurodollars are time deposits--denominated 
and payable in u.s. dollars--held in banks outside the United 
States, including foreign branches of U.S. banks. Their 
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maturity ranges from a few days to more than one year. But 
the majority of the deposits have a maturity of less than six 
months (43). The interest rates paid on deposits and charged 
on loans by the eurodollar banks are competitive rates since 
the banks are not subject to reserve requirements. This im-
plies that borrowers would be able to obtain funds at a lower 
cost and lenders to receive a higher rate of return in the 
eurodollar market than in the national market. Allowance 
should be made, of course, for the exchange rate changes in 
lending and borrowing. This study chooses the eurodollar 
interest rates quoted in the London market as an approxima-
tion of foreign interest rates. On theoretical grounds, as 
the level of domestic interest rates increases relative to 
the eurodollar rate, the higher yields would keep funds from 
flowing out and at the same time attract more capital to flow 
in, thus the excess supply would cause the exchange rate to 
appreciate. The opposite would be the case when the excess 
demand develops. The expected sign of c 4 is positive. 
The Ratio of Domestic to Foreign 
Price Inflation Rates (P) 
Economic theory leads to the expectation of a negative 
relationship between the exchange rate and the relative price 
inflation. When the domestic inflation rises relative to 
the trading partners, the demand for foreign currency would 
be higher to pay for more imports of goods and services and 
securities, and would cause the exchange rate to depreciate. 
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When the domestic inflation is relatively lower than abroad, 
the supply of foreign exchange would increase resulting from 
higher exports and lower demand for foreign currency; the 
lower ratio would cause the exchange rate to appreciate. 
The consumer price index is used to gauge the degree of 
domestic price inflation. For foreign inflation, the study 
constructs the weighted average of the price levels of the 
country's trading partners taken as a group, as shown in 
Tables I to IV. The weights used are obtained from relative 
shares in trade in manufactured goods. The weighted average 
of the consumer price indexes of major industrialized coun-
tries is being used instead of comparing the consumer price 
index of the country in question to the price index of one 
particular country because the actual trade flows indicate 
two broad patterns of trade among countries included in the 
study. On the one hand, the Western European countries have 
higher trade ratios among them than with the United States, 
Canada, or Japan. On the other hand, Canada, Japan, and the 
United States have higher relative shares in trade among each 
other than with the European countries. In this study, the 
trade flows are restricted to miscellaneous manufactured 
goods (SITC 8) because export subsidies and other discrimi-
nating measures distort competitive conditions in the trade 
of other commodity classifications. 
In constructing the weighted average of foreign price 
inflation, it is necessary to compute the weights to be 
TABLE I 
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BELGIUM -- .007 .154 .092 .048 .013 .255 .028 .029 .031 .030 
CANADA .005 -- .017 .012 .015 .058 .005 .008 .019 .067 .171 
FRANCE .236 .034 -- .180 .203 .022 .089 .060 .130 .079 .054 
GERMANY .226 .040 .289 -- .311 .072 .368 .260 .293 .124 .101 
ITALY .078 .033 .215 .205 -- .018 .092 .097 .117 .066 .124 
JAPAN .016 .100 .019 .037 .015 -- .028 .052 .052 .061 .307 
NETHERLANDS .285 .007 .065 .167 .064 .025 -- .048 .. 026 .074 .025 
SWEDEN .009 .004 .013 .035 .020 .013 .014 -- .034 .070 .018 
SWITZERLAND .026 .023 .075 .106 .064 .036 .021 .091 -- .093 .062 
BRITAIN .030 .085 .049 .048 .039 .045 .063 .199 .099 -- .109 
u.s.A. .089 .668 .103 .119 .222 .698 .065 .157 .202 .335 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 l. 000 
*Each number in the table represents the proportion country in heading imports and exports 
of manufactured goods (SITC 8) from country in stub, in relation to its imports 
and exports of the same classification of manufactures with 10 countries combined. 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Foreign Trade, N 
Series B; Commodity Trade Analysis by Main Regions, 1970. 
-...] 
TABLE II 
DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE IN MANUFACTURED GOODS (SITC 8) 1 1970* 
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BELGIUM -- .008 .153 .093 .048 .013 .248 .033 .028 .034 .029 
CANADA .005 -- .017 .011 .015 .052 .004 .009 .016 .059 .166 
FRANCE .219 .035 -- .166 .170 .024 .088 .060 .128 .074 .053 
GERMANY .239 .040 .299 -- .343 .085 .383 .255 .302 .133 .101 
ITALY .078 .036 .192 .215 -- .022 .088 .087 .120 .067 .128 
JAPAN .017 .098 .021 .042 .017 -- .030 .049 .055 .063 .314 
NETHERLANDS .296 .008 .073 .178 .065 .028 -- .051 .026 .088 .024 
SWEDEN .010 .004 .013 .032 .017 .012 .014 -- .033 .072 .017 
SWITZERLAND .025 .020 .080 .104 .066 .038 • 019 .092 -- .103 .058 
BRITAIN .032 .083 .050 .050 .040 .047 .071 .217 .112 -- .108 
U.S.A. .079 .669 .102 .108 .219 .678 .056 .148 .180 .308 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1. 000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
*Each number in the table represents the proportion country in heading imports and exports 
of manufactured goods (SITC 8) from country in stub, in relation to its imports 
and exports of the same classification of manufactures with 10 countries combined. 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Foreign Trade, [\.) 
Series B; Commodity Trade Analysis by Main Regions, 1971. 00 
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BELGIUM -- .007 .160 .094 .049 .015 .248 .031 .026 .035 .027 
CANADA .005 -- .017 .010 .015 .055 .003 .012 .017 .063 .174 
FRANCE .232 .038 -- .179 .169 .027 .091 .055 .139 .083 .052 
GERMANY .238 .038 .313 -- .359 .093 .386 .261 .307 .134 .096 
ITALY .074 .034 .178 .216 -- .023 .085 .082 .124 .068 .123 
JAPAN .018 .101 .022 .044 .018 -- .029 .048 .055 .067 .321 
NETHERLANDS .304 .006 .077 .187 .068 .030 -- .051 .028 .099 .026 
SWEDEN .009 .005 .010 .028 .015 .011 .011 -- .032 .066 .015 
SWITZERLAND .022 .022 .081 .102 .069 .039 .019 .098 -- .099 .056 
BRITAIN .033 .091 .053 .049 .042 .053 .075 .225 .110 -- .109 
u.s.A. .066 .657 .088 .092 .197 .656 .052 .137 .162 .285 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
*Each number in the table represents the proportion country in heading imports and exports 
of manufactured goods (SITC 8) from country in stub, in relation to its imports 
and exports of the same classification of manufactures with 10 countries combined. 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Foreign Trade, 




AVERAGE OF DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE IN MANUFACTURED GOODS (SITC 8), 1969-1971* 
Ul 0 
0 ~ ~ ..:I 
~ ~ ..:I p:j z 
::> ~ ILl z p:j z ILl H . 
H 0 u 
~ 
~ ~ ILl ILl 
t:-;1 ~ ~ 
(.!) ~ 
~ 
..:I ::r:: 0 E-1 E-1 . 
..:I ~ ~ P-4 E-1 
ILl H H Ul 
ILl ILl E-1 ~ ILl :s; :3: p:j . 
Ill u 1%.1 (.!) H I-) z Ul Ul Ill ::> 
BELGIUM -- .007 .156 .093 .048 .014 .250 .031 .028 .033 .029 
CANADA .005 -- .017 .011 .015 .055 .004 .010 .017 .063 .170 
FRANCE .229 • 0'36 -- .175 .181 .024 .089 .058 .132 .079 .053 
GERMANY .234 .039 .300 -- .338 .083 .370 .259 .301 .130 .099 
ITALY .077 .034 .195 .212 -- .021 .088 .089 .120 .067 .125 
JAPAN .017 .100 .021 .041 .017 -- .029 .050 .054 .064 .314 
NETHERLANDS .295 .007 .072 .177 .066 .028 -- .050 .027 .087 .025 
SWEDEN .009 .004 .012 .032 .017 .012 .013 -- .032 .069 .017 
SWITZERLAND .024 .022 .079 .104 .066 .038 .020 .094 -- .098 .059 
BRITAIN .032 .086 .051 '. 049 .040 .048 .070 .214 .107 -- .109 
U.S.A. .078 .665 .098 .106 .213 .677 .058 .147 .181 .309 
TOTAL 1.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 
*Each number in the table represents the proportion country in heading imports and exports 
of manufactured goods (SITC 8) from country in stub, in relation to its imports 
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assigned to the country's trading partners. In this study 
the trade flows are confined to manufactured goods exports 
to and imports from eleven countries. Data on f.o.b. imports 
are obtained from export data. For instance, Canada's ex-
ports to the United States are the same as the United States 
imports from Canada in f.o.b. prices, and the United States 
exports to Canada are the Canadian imports from the United 
States. The sum of Canada's exports to and imports from the 
United States is divided by Canada's total exports to and 
imports from ten other countries. The pure number represents 
Canada's trade weight with respect to the United States. 
Estimates of weights are given in Table I for the year 1969. 
In that year, Canada's exports to and imports from the United 
States accounted for 66.8 percent of its total exports to and 
imports from ten other countries. Reading vertically, 
Britain accounted for 8.5 percent of Canada's exports and 
imports in merchandise trade, Switzerland has a weight of 2.3 
percent, etc., to a total of 100 percent for the ten 
countries. 
In order to allow for shifts in the trade patterns over 
time, the weights also have been calculated for the years 
1970 and 1971, as shown in Table II and Table III. Table IV 
shows the average of the weights for the years 1969 through 
1 IMF Annual Report also employs a similar technique to 
show graphically the relative price inflation rates of the 
country in question to the weighted average of seven major 
industrialized countries (28, 1975). The computation method 
employed here follows the method used by Fred Hirsch and Ilse 
Higgins (25) • 
1971. It can be seen that the ~elative shares in manufac-
tured goods during those three years have been rather stable. 
The higher weights show a closer trade relationship between 
the country in question and its trading partners. Thus, 
price inflation of the country will be compared to its closer 
trading partners with relatively higher weights assigned. 
Next, to obtain a weighted average of foreign inflation 
rates, apply the weights from Table IV to its corresponding 
consumer price index: 
where w1 , w2 , ••. , w10 are the relevant weights which sum to 
unity, and P1 , P2 , .•• , P10 are respective consumer price 
indexes of ten other countries. When the domestic price 
index of the country in question is compared to the weighted 
average of the price indexes of its trading partners, it will 
clearly show the relative inflation rates as measured by the 
consumer prices. 
Data Sources 
Monthly data of exchange rates, the consumer price index, 
the three-month eurodollar rates in London, and the values of 
exports and imports for countries in this study are found in 
International Financial Statistics, IMF. The data of the 
index of industrial production are taken from Main Economic 
Indicators, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) • Data of domestic interest rates are from 
OECD Financial Statistics. 
Statistical Method Used in the Analysis 
One important objective of the study is to determine, 
among the four explanatory variables mentioned earlier, which 
factor has contributed relatively more weight to the deter-
mination of the demand and supply of foreign exchange. The 
independent variables included in equation (5) will be used 
to explain the fluctuations of currency exchanges of coun-
tries included in this study. In order to make a statistical 
selection of the first factor that is significantly corre-
lated to the exchange rate level, then the second significant 
variable, if any, correlated to the dependent variable, and 
so forth, the stepwise regression analysis is adopted in this 
study. 
The stepwise regression involves a step-by-step approach 
in selecting significant variables in the model. First, it 
selects among the variables the first variable that is most 
correlated to the dependent variable Y, say x1 ; then the coef-
ficient a 11 is calculated such that E(Y- a 11x1 ) 2 is mini-
mized. The variable x1 possesses the highest calculated 
partial F value and compared to a predetermined significant 
level of the appropriate F-distribution. If the calculated 
partial F value is greater than the F statistics at the .05 
level, the variable and its coefficient are entered in the 
model. This represents the first step. The second step in-
volves selecting which of the remaining variables that is 
most correlated to Y subject to meeting the partial F 
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criterioh. The selection process continues until no variable 
is included as its F value fails to meet the F criterion. 
Problems Related to Multiple Regression 
Analysis Using Time Series Data 
The linear multiple regression model using time series 
data usually encounters autocorrelation problems. The auto-
correlation is a result of the distrubances being interde-
pendent, that is, their expected value of errors ut and ut+s 
is not zero for all t and for all s ~ 0, or E(utut+s) 10. One 
possible cause of the interdependence of the distrubances is 
an incorrect specification of the model (35). For example, 
the relationship between the dependent and independent vari-
ables is assumed to be linear when the true relationship is 
non-linear. A second possible cause is the exclusion of some 
variables from the model. In a model, only certain variables 
are included because they are relevant to the problem and 
other variables are subsumed under the distrubance term. 
This error term must then represent the influence of omitted 
variables. A third reason is the pure existence of serial 
correlation in the disturbances. The pattern assumed is that 
the correlation coefficient between the t and t+s in disturb-
. s d 1 1 ances 1s p an - < p < • 
CHAPTER IV 
TIME SERIES ESTIMATIONS OF THE 
EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINANTS 
The basic model of the demand and supply of foreign ex-
change was developed in the previous section. In this sec-
tion, the study presents (1) the statistical results obtained 
by stepwise regression technique, and (2) a modified version 
of the basic equation by taking into account the lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable. 
Results From Stepwise Regression 
Equation (5) was first estimated using the stepwise ap-
proach. The results for each country are presented in Table 
v. 1 In this table are presented the estimates of the coef-
ficients, the t-ratios of these coefficients, the coeffi-
cients of determinations (R2), the F-value for each equation, 
and the Durbin-Watson test statistics (D-W) • The regression 
analysis in Table V may be described as follows. For Belgium, 
the first variable chosen to help explain the Belgium franc 
1switzerland is not included in the statistical analysis 
b~cause of a lack of production data in the monthly series. 
In fact, the data for all production and income of Switzer-
land, which can be used as a proxy for the economic growth 




R = 1.97 + 
R = 0.81 + 
Canada: 
R = 84.43 + 
R = 83.49 + 
R = 170.36 + 
France: 
R = 7.40 + 
R = -8.18 + 
R = -117.3 + 
Germany: 
R = 44.21 -
R = 50.80 -
R = 44.21 -
TABLE V 
ESTIMATES BY THE STEPWISE 
REGRESSION APPROACH 
N = 60 
.006 I 
(3.24)** 
.005 I + .01 G 
(3.32)** (3.26)** 
N = 72 
.13 G 
(5.13)** 
.18 G - .07 I 
(8.03)** (5.95)** 
.12 G - .08 I - .81 p 
(5.28)** (7.86)** (5.12)** 
N = 60 
.12 G 
(3.76)** 
.15 G + .12 p 
(4.70)** (2.66)** 
.16 G + .16 T + 1. 03 p 
(5.58)** (3.90)** (3.86)** 
N = 60 
.72 p 
(8.58)** 
.55 p + .31 T 
(7.87)** (6.34)** 
.62 p + .21 T + .23 G 






.29 11.45 .26 
.27 26.35 
.52 37.39 
.65 42.74 .37 
.20 14.10 
.28 11.33 
.44 14.38 .54 
.56 73.60 
.74 81.71 






TABLE V (Continued) 
25.39 - .09 p 
(8.84)** 
10.41 + .20 G 
(9.07)** 
N = 60 
N = 60 




.57 78.08 .21 
.59 82.35 .26 
R = -6.77 + .35 G .30 25.26 
(5.03)** 
R = 176.44 + .56 G - 2.01 P .53 32.17 
(7.96)** (5.25)** 
R = 153.83 + .49 G - 1.91 P + .21 T .59 26.85 .65 
(6.49)** (5.26)** (2.85)** 
Sweden: N = 60 
R = 4.06 + .16 G 
(8.68)** 
R = 39.80 + .10 G- .29 P 
(3.92)** (3.56)** 
The United Kingdom: N = 60 
R = 380.45 - 1.27 P 
(9.26)** 




.64 51.60 .38 
.60 85.72 
.67 58.05 .35 
R = the spot exchange rate measured in u.s. cents per 
unit of foreign exchange, 
T = the ratio of export to import valu~s in u.s. dollars, 
G = the index of industrial production seasonally 
adjusted, 
I = the ratio of the domestic interest rate to the euro-
dollar rate, 
P = the ratio of the domestic consumer price index to the 
trade weighted average of the consumer price indexes 
of trading partners. 
exchange rate movements was the interest rate ratio, which 
accounted for 16 percent of the total fluctuations. The 
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next variable to come in was the economic growth factor meas-
ured by the index of industrial production. The two vari-
ables showed the correct signs and were statistically 
significant at the .01 level; together they accounted for 29 
percent of the variations. For Canada, the growth variable 
was selected first, and the second was the interest rate 
variable. However, the interest rate ratio showed a negative 
sign which is inconsistent with the theoretical expectation. 
The variables included in the final model were the economic 
growth, the interest rate ratio, and the relative price in-
flation rates. All variables gave the correct signs. For 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the fluctuations of 
their exchange rates were explained by the changes in growth, 
price, and trade variables. The difference among them was 
due to the order of the selection process based on the rela-
tive values of the F statistics. The growth variable was 
chosen first for France and the Netherlands but not for 
Germany. Instead, the movements in the Deutsche mark were 
first explained by the relatively lower domestic inflation 
rate than its trading partners. All but one of the coeffi-
cients of the price variable yielded the expected correct 
signs except for France, which was positive. Next, the 
relatively higher price inflation than its trading partners 
was responsible for the movements of the Italian lira, while 
the fluctuations of the Japanese yen were explained by the 
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strong economic growth. For Sweden, the economic growth and 
the relative price variables were included in the final 
model. The relatively high inflation rate in the United 
Kingdom was the first factor that explained the fluctuations 
of the pound sterling. The next variable chosen to help ex-
plain the movements of the pound was the interest rate ratio, 
but the sign of the coefficient was incorrect (negative) • 
In summary, all the variables entered in the model 
showed high t values and were significant at the .01 level. 
In seven out of nine instances, the growth and the price 
variables were chosen by the stepwise approach to help ex-
plain the exchange rate movements. The growth factor was 
positive in all cases, while the price variable showed a 
negative sign in all cases except for France. The export-
import ratio appeared in three out of nine instances and 
emerged with the expected (positive) sign. The interest 
rate variable was included in two equations; however, both 
instances gave the incorrect sign. The overall explanatory 
power of the selected variables was on the average above 50 
percent except for Belgium and France, which showed a low 
value of R2 • The validity of these statistics, however, is 
suspect, because in all cases the Durbin-Watson test statis-
tics yielded a relatively low value? It indicates 
2The critical values for rejection of the hypothe-sis of 
no first order serial correlation in the residuals at the .05 
level are 1.48 for France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 1.51 
for Belgium, Sweden, the U.K., 1.52 for Canada, and 1.55 for 
Japan and Italy. 
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significant first order autocorrelation. Therefore, the 
final equation for each country was re-estimated subject to 
the errors following a first order autoregressive process 
where pis the coefficient of autocorrelation, and !PI < 1. 
(D-W) 
An estimate of p can be derived from 1 - 2 in which D-W 
is the Durbin-Watson statistic appeared in Table V for the 
relevant country, and st is assumed to have classical 
properties. 
Adjustments for Autocorrelation 
To eliminate the autocorrelation problem, the final 
equation for each country was transformed by multiplying 
through by p, with all the variables lagged one period. 
Then run a least squares regression on the transformed 
variables: 
c3(Gt- pGt-1) + c4(It- pit-1) + 
cS(Pt- pPt-1) + (ut- put-1)' 
which gives a minimum sum of squares with respect to p, and 
tests the residuals from this equation for autocorrelation. 
The re-estimated results are shown in Table VI. The 
overall value of the Durbin-Watson statistic for all coun-
tries were improved significantly, and yet most of the values 
were relatively low except for Japan, whose value was greater 
than the critical value. Table VI also shows that those 
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TABLE VI 
ESTIMATES THE FINAL EQUATION IN TABLE V OF EACH COUNTRY, 
CORRECTED FOR SERIAL CORRELATION 
R2 
F 
Countr;r: Value D-W 
Belgium: N = 59 
( 2) I R' = 28.50 + .08 I' + .07 G' .01 .43 .95 
(11.7)** (. 7 5) (.57) 
Canada: N = 71 
( 3) I R' = 24.25 + .11 G' - .02 I' - .04 P' .23 6.64 1. 24 
(7.5)** (2.7)** (1.57) (2.61)* 
France: N = 59 
( 3) I R' = -1.69 + .11 G' + .OS T' - .09 P' .19 4.34 .70 
(. 2 5) (3.3)** (2.17)* (. 4 7) 
Germany: N = 59 
( 3) I R' = 25.53 - .76 P' + .06 T' + .06 G' .42 13.42 1. 02 
(5.8)** (5.5)** (2.1)* (.89) 
Italy: N = 59 
( 1) I R' = 2.60 - .07 P' .OS 3.06 1. 39 
(5.7)** (1.75) 
Japan: N = 59 
( 1) I R' = 2.97 + .09 G' .08 5.18 1. 54 
(5.1)** (2.28) * 
The Netherlands: N = 59 
( 3) I R' = 17.02 + .28 G' - .49 P' + .01 T' .23 5.40 .62 
(1.6) (4.0)** (1.48) (. 2 8) 
Sweden: N = 59 
( 2) I R' = 9.67.+ .01 G' - .30 P' .16 5.46 1.14 
(5.1)** (.51) (3.19)** 
TABLE VI (Continued) 
Country 
The United Kingdom: N = 59 
(2) I R' = 47.56 - .15 P' - .• 05 ·I' 
(7.1)** (.43) (1.20) 
*Indicates the .05 significant level. 









variables which were significant in Table V become insignif-
icant in several cases. The growth and price variables 
showed the expected signs and were significant at least at 
the .OS level in 4 and 3 instances, respectively, whereas in 
Table V each variable was significant and appeared in 7 equa-
tions. The trade variable emerged with the correct (posi-
tive) sign and was significant at the .OS level in 2 cases, 
down from 3 in Table V, while the interest rate variable was 
insignificant in all instances. 
As noted earlier, one explanation of the autocorrelation 
problem is that there may be some significant variables which 
were excluded from the model. Table V as well as Table VI 
show only variables that were selected by the stepwise re-
gression process and thus some variables were omitted. 
To test the hypothesis that coefficients of omitted 
variables (c's) in the final model for each country were 
equal to zero, the appropriate formula is: 
( R3 - R1 ) (N - S) 
( 1 - R3 ) ( S - L) 
where R1 is the multiple correlation coefficient from Table 
v, R3 is the multiple correlation coefficient from the re-
gression using all independent variables presented in Equa-
tion (S), N is the number of observations, and L is the 
number of variables in the regression equation in Table V 
including the constant term. The results are presented in 
Table VII. For each country the calculated F value was 
compared with the F statistic. If the calculated value is 
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less than the F criterion at the .OS level, the hypothesis 
is that c's = 0 is accepted. However, if the calculated F 
value is greater than the F statistic, H0 : c's ~ 0 is ac-
cepted. According to the test performed, coefficients of 
omitted variables for each country are insignificant, as 
seen in Table VII; therefore, H0 : c's = 0 is accepted. 
';i 
TABLE VII 
RESULTS OF TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS THAT COEFFICIENTS OF 
OMITTED VARIABLES ARE NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT 
Calculated Degrees 
F F of 
Country Value Statistic Freedom 
Belgium .577 < 3.17 F(2, 54) 
Canada 0 < 4.98 F(l, 67) 
France 2.282 < 4.02 F(l, 54) 
Germany .925 < 4.02 F(l, 54) 
Italy 1.027 < 2.78 F(3, 54) 
Japan 1.011 < 2.78 F(3, 54) 
The Netherlands .040 < 4.02 F(l, 54) 
Sweden 1.543 < 3.17 F(2, 54) 
The United Kingdom .510 < 3.17 F(2, 54) 
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In this study we explored the possibility of the multi-
collinearity problem, that is, a linear dependence exists 
between the explanatory variables. If such a problem exists, 
it affects the standard errors of coefficients, which in turn 
yields biased test Statistics. By dropping variables from a 
regression, resulting from biased t-ratios, that perhaps be-
long in the equation, the Durbin-Watson becomes significant. 
i 
Upon examining the partialcorr~l.ition coefficients among .the 
independent variables in (5), it did not appear that these 
variables are highly correlated. For the evidence that the 
problem is not resulting from omitted variables is presented 
in Table VIII. In this table, the values of the Durbin-
Watson test statistic as well as the coefficients of deter-
mination and F-test for all countries are shown. All values 
were higher than those shown in Table V, but the problem of 
serial correlation still prevails. 3 Note that all variables 
that showed significant at the .01 level in Table VIII were 
the same as those shown in Table V. In other words, vari-
ables excluded by the process of stepwise regression were 
insignificant to the determination of the exchange rate move-
ments, which supported the test results in Table VII. 
Since the values of the Durbin-Watson statistic shown in 
Table VIII were relatively low for all countries, the study 
thus re-estimated the basic model using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
3The critical values for rejection of the hypothesis of 
no serial correlation in the residuals at the .05 level are 
1.50 for Canada, and 1.44 for other countries. 
TABLE VIII 
ESTIMATES THE VARIABLES IN EQUATION (5) 
R2 
F 
Country Value D-W 
Belgium: N = 60 
R = -2.83 + .004 I + .013 G + .035 P + .001 T .29 5.93 .30 
(. 83) (1. 93) (3.18)** (1.07) (. 04) 
Canada: N = 72 
R = . 170.39 + .120 G - .080 I - .810 P - .005 T .65 ; 3},. 58 .37 
(9.S:l)** (4.01)** (7.37)** (4.94)**. (.01) 
~ : 
France: N = 60 
R = -107.90 + .160 G + .170 T + .920 P + .020 I .46 11.~0 .62 
(3. 69) ** (5.47)** (4.15)** (3.30)** (1.51) 
Germany: N = 60 
R = 41.89 - .590 P + .210 T + .230 G - .020 I .78 48.77 .55 
(4.06)** (7.60)** (3.75)** (2.97)** (.97) 
Italy: N = 60 
R = 22.04 - .100 P + .020 G + ~020 T + .002 I .60 20.31 .32 
(9.83)** (6.14)** (1.58) (1.48) (. 39) ., 
~ 
0'1 




Japan: N = 60 
R = 4.85 + .190 G + .050 P + .005 T + .0007 I .61 21.35 
(0.73) (5.19)** (1.05) (. 24) ( .. 06) 
The Netherlands: N = 60 
R = 159.23 + .490 G - 1.96 P + .210 T - .005 I .59 19.80 
(3.54)** (6.71)** (4.24)** (2.83)** ( .19) 
Sweden: N = 60 
R = 39.54 + .100 G - .320 P + .030 T + .003 I .66 27.06 
(3.03)** (3.41)** (3:17)** (1.74) (. 4 3) 
The United Kingdom: N = 60 
R = 326.35 - .810 P - .180 I + .110 G + .130 T .68 28.79 
(8.10)** (4.49)** (3.16)** ( 0. 42) (1.01) 









technique, which yields an approximation to generalized least 
squares. The results are presented in Table IX. Note that 
the overall values of the Durbin-Watson statistic were higher 
compared with the corresponding values in Table VIII, but 
they still were less than their respective critical values. 4 
The coefficients of R2 for all countries were greatly reduced 
and some variables became insignificant. The growth and the 
price variables showed the correct signs and were significant 
at least at the .05 level; each appeared in 4 of 9 instances. 
The trade variable gave the correct sign and was significant 
at the .05 level in two cases. The interest rate ratio vari-
able was insignificant in all cases. The results presented 
in Table IX are similar to those reported in Table VI in that 
both tables have the same number of significant variables for 
each country. 
Modification of the Model 
The presence of the relatively low values of the Durbin-
Watson statistic in Table IX after the correction for serial 
correlation casts doubt on the static model presented in 
Equation (5). There is a question of whether the demand for 
and the supply of foreign exchange depend only on the pre-. 
vailing price of the currency exchange. That is, do partie-
ipants in the foreign exchange markets attribute significant 
weight on the past exchange rate movements when the rates 
4see the critical values in footnote 3. 
TABLE IX 
RE-ESTIMATES EQUATION (5) , CORRECTED FOR SERIAL CORRELATION 
R2 
F 
Country Value D-W 
Belgium: N = 59 
R = .60 + .001 I + .0006 G - .02 P + .001 T .06 .822 .82 
(1. 3) (. 99) (. 43) (. 63) (1.44) 
Canada: N = 71 
R = 23.94 + .11 G - .02 I - .40 P - .009 T .23 4. 87 1.23 
(7.42)** (2.52)* (1.6) (2.56)* (.57) 
France: N = 59 
R = -.82 + .10 G + .04 T + .07 P - .002 I .18 3.01 .74 
( .13) (3.19)** (2.11)* (. 38) (. 21) 
Germany: N = 59 
R = 25.45- .74 P + .06 T + .06 G- .02 I .44 10.59 1.04 
(5.68)**(5.23)** (2.04)* (1.0) (.87) 
Italy: N = 59 
R = 3.84 - .07 P - .01 G + .003 T - .0003 I .12 1.91 1.24 
(7.53)**(2.16)* (1. 0) (. 61) (. 09) '~~~ 
·.l::>o 
1..0 
TABLE IX (Continued) 
Country 
Japan: N = 59 
R = 2.23 + .09 G + .04 P + .009 T + .004 I 
(1.93) (2.18)* (.51) (1.3) (.52) 
The Netherlands: N = 59 
R = 10.83 + .23 G - .32 P + .0006 T + .004 I 
(1. 2) (3.49)** (. 96) (. 02) (. 24) 
Sweden: N = 59 
R = 12.31 + .02 G - .34 P + .003 T + .001 I 
(5.23)** (.86) (3.58)** (. 30) ( .: 24) 
The United Kingdom: N = 59 
R = 41.53 - .13 P - .05 I + .23 G + .04 T 












The numbers in parentheses are t ratios; ** indicates significant at the .01 level; 









have been allowed to float? Expectations are formed in many 
ways (44); in this study we assume that the weight attached 
to the observed exchange rate in the last period is very 
high. 
To describe expectations in terms of Equations (1) and 
(2) , it is assumed that the demand and supply of foreigh ex-
change depend on the current spot rate as well as on the 
rate in the previous period, that is, the demand function: 
Dt = h(Rt' Rt-1' Tt' Gt' It' Pt) 
and the supply function: 
St = k(Rt' Rt-1, Tt' Gt' It' Pt). 
The above equations are statistically unidentified. Solve 
for Rt in terms of other explanatory variables and express 
it in the reduced form: 
Rt = gO + glRt-1 + g2Tt + g3Gt + g4It + gSPt + wt (6 ) 
where wt = Lwt-l + et with I L 1· < 1 and the et' s have the 
classical properties. If L (alpha) were known, transform 
equation (6) would obtain the best linear unbiased estimates 
(BLUE) of the coefficient g's. In fact, the value of L is 
unknown, this study employs a search routine for a set of L 
values in the range from .1 to .9 to obtain a range of values 
for the sum of squares. Select the L value which gives the 
smallest sum of squares, then transform Equation (6) by mul-
tiplying through by L, with all variables lagg~d one period: 
( 7) 
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then ( 6 ) - ( 7 ) : 
Rt- LRt-1 = gO(l- L) + gl(Rt-1- LRt-2) + g2(Tt- LTt-1) 
(8) 
The expected sign of the coefficient g1 is to be positive 
and the signs of the other coefficients remain the same as 
those presented in Equation (5). Equation (8) indicates that 
a change in the exchange rate from its previous level is the 
linear function of a change in the past exchange rates, a 
change in the growth rate from its previous rate, a change in 
the relative price inflation rates, a change in the export-
import ratio, and a change in the interest rate ratio. 
Equation (8) has a dynamic property since the lagged depend-
ent variable is included in the model. 
Table X summarizes the findings for each country. The 
table includes the estimations of coefficients of determina-
tion, values of coefficient g's with the corresponding esti-
mated t ratios in parentheses below, the h statistic, 5 and 
the values of L. The results can be described as follows. 
For Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, their exchange 
5The Durbin-Watson test was designed for the case when 
no lagged dependent variable is included in the equation. 
The h-test is applied when the lagged dependent variable is 
in the model and the sample size is large (not less than 30). 
The formula for the h-test is: 
h = P ~~1---~nV~nT'~(-r-) ' where V' (r) is the estimate of the 
variance of r, n is the sample size, and p is derived 




ESTIMATES THE VARIABLES IN EQUATION (8) 
Country 
No. of . Rt_ 1-LRt_ 2 Gt-LGt-1 Pt-LPt-1 Tt-LTt-1 It-Lit-1 2 
Months Constant R L h-stat - -
Belgium 57 .232 .491 .0004 -.014 .002 .0006 .30 .9 .139 
(.922) (4.33)** (0.37) (0.57) (2.56)* (0.67) 
Canada 69 -18.944 -.188 .208 1.870 -.563 -.129 .19 .1 -2.207 
( 0 .16) (1.65) (0.94) (1.55) (2.55)* (1.37) 
France 57 -13.955 .847 .034 .194 .036 -.003 .85 .4 -.144 
(1.77) (13.66)** (2.04)* (1.49) (2.37)* (0.52) 
Germany 57 8.388 .825 -.019 -.112 .049 -.018 .90 . 4 .555 
(1.60) (10.29)** (0.41) (1.38) (1.95) (1.32) 
Italy 2.934 .394 -.008 -.039 .004 .001 .29 . 8 -.224 
(4.11)** (3.43(** (1.15) (1.55) ( 0. 89) (0.51) 
Japan 57 5.284 .864 .055 .017 .014 .006 • 92 .1 .018 
(2.09)* (15.2)** (2.96)** (0.69) (1. 84) (1.01) 
Netherlands 57 22.363 .885 .107 -.469 -.047 -.007 .88 .5 .009 
(2.53)* (15.1)** (2.79)** (2.56)* (2.28)* (0.77) 
Sweden 57 10.627 .755 .003 -.161 -.001 -.002 .81 .5 .421 
.(2.67)** (9.12)** (0.18) (2.49)* ( 0 .16) (0.50) 
lJ1 
w 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Countrx 
No. of Rt_1-LRt_ 2 
Months Constant 
Gt-LGt-1 Pt-LPt-1 Tt-LTt-1 It-Lit-1 2 
R 
United 
Kingdom 57 23.860 .681 .157 -.025 .064 -.012 .59 
(1.49) (7.12)** (1.10) ( 0 .13) ( 1.10) (0.33) 
**Indicates significant at the .01 level. 







rate_s were determined by a change in their past exchange 
rates. This lagged dependent variable was significant at 
the .01 level in all cases. A change in the exchange rate 
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of the Belgium ;franc. was a. respQIJ.S.e to .Q.. change .in previous 
exchange rates and a change in the trade account. These two 
variables were significant at the .05 'level and gave the cor-
rect signs. For France, the French franc fluctuations were 
determined by a change in her industrial production in addi-
tion to the export-import ratio and the performance of her 
past exchange rates. These variables were significant at the 
.05 level and yielded the correct signs. Next, a change in 
the economic growth rate and the performance of past exchange 
rates were significant and positively related with the fluc-
tuations of the Japanese yen. For the Dutch guilder, a 
change in the past rates, the growth rate, the relative in-
flation rates, and the trade ratio were all significant at 
least at the .05 level; all the coefficients emerged with 
the expected signs except the trade variable, which exhibited 
the incorrect {negative) sign. The movements in the Swedish 
krona exchange rate were in response to a change in the past 
rates and a change in the relative inflation rates. Both 
were significant and yielded the correct signs. In the case 
of Canada, only the export-import ratio was significant at 
the .05 level but the sign of the coefficient was incorrect 
{negative). However, the h-test shows that serial correla-
tion is significant {the critical value is 1.645). There-
fore, the t value for the trade variable is biased. The 
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values of h-statistic in the last column indicate that there 
is no serial correlation in all equations except for Canada. 
In summary, the lagged dependent variable was signifi-
cant at the ..... Ql level .. in eight of nine equations and gave 
the correct sign. The growth 'variable was significant in 
I . 
three instances, while the re~ative infl~tion variable was 
significant in two equations. t The trade variable was sig-
nificant at the .05 level in t:hree equations (the case for 
i 
I 
Canada is excluded because of ·the presence of serial corre-
lation) but gave the incorrect sign in the equation for the 
Netherlands. The findings presented in Table X seem to sug-
gest.that the dynamic model in Equation (8) provides an 
accurate description of the present floating exchange rate 
system. When the exchange rates have been allowed to flue-
tuate in response to the demand and supply of foreign ex-
change, exchange dealers may pay more attention to previous 
rates than when the exchange rates were pegged. Expectations 
of future rates are formed based on the movements in the past 
exchange rates. 
CHAPTER V 
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND 
AN EXCHANGE RATE 
f 
This chapter reviews, since the currency realignment in 
1971, the development of the balance of payments of the coun-
tries included in this study. The results are analyzed in 
each case and correlated with the exchange rate changes. 
More specifically, this chapter studies the proposition that 
the floating exchange rate system has contributed to the 
balance of payments adjustment of each country concerned. We 
clarify first the significance of major sections included in 
the balance of payments, which will be used for this analy-
sis. Since details vary from one country to another, this 
study focuses only on major sections as commonly used in 
country publications: specifically, the balance of merchan-
dise trade, the balance of services including transfer pay-
ments, the balance of long-term capital movements, and the 
balance of short-term capital including errors and omissions. 
The second section explains the concept of the trade-weighted 
or effective exchange rate, which has been generally accepted 
as a close approximation of measuring the change in a coun-
try's exchange rate. 
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The Concept of the Balance of Payments 
and Its Components 
58 
The balance of payments is a record of all transactions 
which have taken place between residents of one country and 
residents of the rest of the world over a period of time. 
The balance of payments consists of a series of debit and 
credit entries. Any transaction that gives rise to a foreign 
claim on residents is recorded as a debit or a minus sign 
entry. Any transaction giving rise to a monetary claim by 
residents on foreigners is recorded as a credit or plus 
entry. 
For the purpose of this study, the balance of payments 
will be divided into five sections. 
The merchandise trade account records transactions 
arising out of imports and exports of traded goods. When 
merchandise exports are .greater than imports, the result is 
a credit entry or a positive sign in the balance of trade 
account. When imports exceed exports, a debit entry or a 
negative sign appears in the trade balance. 
The trade balance does not include receipts or payments 
resulting from services rendered. Service accounts, some-
times called invisible trade accounts, are made up of re-
ceipts or payments for transport services, insurance, travel, 
investment income, and other services as well as fees and 
r~yalties. Transfer payments comprise gifts, foreign aid, 
private r~mittances, charitable donations, all of which do 
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not generate quid pro quo. Service accounts together with 
transfer payments constitute the second section in the bal-
ance of payments. 
The third section is th~ long-term capital account. It 
comprises the net acquisitions of long-term claims on for-
eigners by both the private arid government sectors. Private 
long-term capital movements are broadiy divided into direct 
investments abroad and portfo]io investments with an original 
maturity of more than one yea~. The broad distinction be-
tween the two is that portfol1o investments by residents do 
not confer control over the operation,of the issuer of the 
debt-instrument, whereas direct investments have voting con-
trol over the assets acquired or, in the case of foreign 
affiliates, operating controls. Other long-term capital 
transactions include government loans and securities issued 
abroad. Loans may be granted, for instance, from EEC Agri-
cultural funds or from European Investment Banks. Capital 
accounts are reported net indicating only the balance of 
flows. A minus sign indicates outpayments exceed inpayments, 
while a positive sign indicates the opposite. 
The sum of the current balances (the balance on goods, 
services, and transfer payments) and the balance on long-
1 term capital is called the basic.balance. This balance is 
often considered as an indic~tor of underlying long-term 
trends of the payments position. 
1This classification is commonly used in textbooks of 
international trade and finance; see, for example, (71). 
This basic balance was originally conceived as an 
indicator that dominated most transitory effects 
and served to illustrate basic or underlying eco-
nomic trends. Presumably, it is these underlying 
trends that exert their influence upon real in-
come, employment levels and upon'policy goals so 
that the.basic balance is perhaps_ the.b.est indi-
cator of what has been referred to as a nation's 
"international health". A basic balance of zero 
would show that the increase in the international 
net worth of a country was just e~~~l to the long-
term assets which it had acquired (24, p. 63). 
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The fourth section covers short-term financing including 
errors and omissions. The short-term capital account in-
eludes purchases and sales of financial assets with a matur-
ity of less than one year. Thus, short-term capital 
involves the international flows of funds into bank deposits, 
trade accounts, commercial and government short-term papers, 
and other short-term securities. Errors and omissions covers 
a residual item that is not otherwise accounted for. 
The sum of the basic balance and the balance on short-
term flows including errors and omissions is described as 
"autonomous," "fundamental," "above the line" items because 
' 
the transactions are responding to general economic or polit-
ical factors. 2 Export and import trade is a result of rela-
tive prices among trading countries and the unequal distribu-
tion of natural'resources in the world as well as a result of 
changes in tastes and prefe~ences. Profit opportunities give 
2The sum of these balances is also called the liquidity 
balance. However, some short-term items are placed below the 
line as a means of settlement or financing.· Such items are 
those banks' net foreign position with.foreigners, excluding 
trade credit received or extended. 
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rise to investment flows. Political instability would also 
motivate funds to be transferred out of the country. 
The conceptual distinction between short- and long-term 
capital movements is based on the argument that the two 
types of transactions are motivated by different considera-
tions. While the rationale may be valid:,' the statistical 
distinction is based entirely on the original maturity of 
the assets bought and sold. Thus, the short-term assets may 
' change to long-term ones simply by rolling them over at 
maturity for new obligations. Conversely, long-term assets 
with maturity of more than one year may represent short-term 
movements of funds to be sold a few weeks or months after 
they were bought. In recent years, financial flows have 
increased tremendously and a satisfactory distinction between 
short- and long-term capital flows via the banks have become 
more and more difficult. Hence, the conceptual distinction 
cannot be captured by statistical methods. 
The fifth section includes official reserves. It com-
prises gold, foreign exchange, IMF reserve positions, and 
Special Drawing Rights. This account records transactions 
undertaken by public authorities. In the system of fixed 
exchange rates government officials were obliged to maintain 
exchange rates within a narrow margin. The imbalances that 
developed in the basic balance as well as in the short-term 
capital_account were settled or financed by changes in 
reserves. 
\ 
In present floating, the choice between allowing 
exchange rates to vary in accordance with market 
pressure and the financing of imbalance, arises 
continuously rather than merely from time to 
time, as it did under fixed rates (28, 1975, p. 37). 
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On many occasions the gov~rnment authorities encourage 
the non-bank and banking sectors to borrow abroad. Thus: 
... if monetary authorities exert a direct influ-
ence on commercial banks' foreign position, or if 
they intervene in the forward exchange market, in 
such case, changes in banking or forward positions 
may assume the same function as changes in mone-
tary authorities' foreign, position and may become 
a proxy for changes in official reserves (70, p. 25). 
This study thus examines the developments of financing the 
imbalance by analyzing the changes in official reserves and 
banks' external position. 
The five sections making up the country's balance of 
payments can be summarized as shown in Table XI. 
TABLE XI 
EXCHANGE RATES AND THE 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1 
1. Merchandise Trade: 
Exports, f.o.b. 
Imports, f.o.b. 
2. Services and Transfer Payments 
3. Long-term Capital 
Basic Balance 
4 .. Short-term Capital Including Errors and Omissions 
Liquidity Balance 
5. Balance of Payments (or Financing): 
Reserves 
Banks' Short-term External Position 
Non-balance Items Affecting Payments: 
Effective Exchange.Rate 
Dollar Exchange Rate 
Change in the Rate (in percent) 
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In Table XI, short-term capital is the residual item, 
in addition to errors and omissions. The short-term account 
consists of transactions that are sensitive to changes in 
interest rates and trade credit terms, which are classified 
as non-monetary transactions (29). In the U.S. balance of 
payments, the non-monetary items are dlas~ifi~d as 
l . . d 3 non- lqUl . 
Liquidity balance 4 is obtained by adding the short-term, 
non-monetary transactions (or short-term non-liquid private 
cpaital in the U.S. balance of payments definition) to the 
basic balance. 
·The accounts omitted from the liquidity balance are 
shown "below" the line as financing items which comprise re-
serve changesand net changes in commercial banks' short-term 
position with foreigners. Therefore, when an imbalance 
3such capital flows are short-term liabilities net of 
short-term claims to private foreigners reported by non-
banks. In the United States they are considered to be non-
liquid and thus are placed above the line. The liquid claims 
and liabilit~es to foreigners reported by U.S. banks are 
considered to be liquid and are placed below the line. The 
original purpose of the distinction between liquid a~d non-
liquid claims was to measure potential pressure on U.S. 
reserve assets. However, the practice of the distinction 
between liquid and non-liquid claims was to measure potential 
pressure on U.S. reserve assets. However, the practice of 
the distinction between the.two types has been discontinued 
due to the subjective nature of this classification. Fur-
thermore, since the present international monetary arrange-
ment is under managed floating and the dollar is no longer 
convertible into assets such as gold and SDRs, the pressure 
on the dollar in the foreign exchange market is now reflected 
in the appreciation and depreciation of the dollar. 
4 . . 
It is called "overall balance" in the annual report 
published by the Bank for International Settlements (5). 
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develops, either one or both items below the line must accom-
modate the imbalance. Thus, the inclusion of banks' external 
position to changes in official reserves has two 
significances: 
First, this balance ••. is an indicator of the im-
pact of external transactions on·domestic liq-
uidity .... Second, it is r~levant Whenever · 
commercial banks' transactions are or may be 
subject to the control of the monetary author-
ities .... the changes in net official reserves 
do not reveal the full exchange-market gap that 
had to be financed by monetary authorities and 
thus convey an incomplete measure of the pres-
sure to which the national currency was exposed 
in the exchange-market (70, p. 28). 
The Concept of the Trade-Weighted 
Exchange Rate 
The exchange rates measured both on a trade-weighted 
basis and at the dollar rate of the currency in the spot 
market are also presented in Tabl~ XI along with the balance 
of payments. A 'priori, payments imbalances should cause 
balancing movements in the exchange rates under the present 
floating exchange rate system. Temporary pressures from 
changes in international transactions should be absorbed by 
rate movements rather than reserve changes. In contrast, in 
a fixed rate regime, payments imbalances are financed by 
changes in reserves. 
The concept of trade-weighted or effective exchange rate 
is "the change that would induce the same alteration in its 
trade balance expressed in the numeraire currency as that 
brought about by a given realignment of all exchange rates" 
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(2, p. 606). An index can be computed by comparing the 
actual exchange rate of the country with the trade-weighted 
average of the rates of its trading partners. The index of 
trade-weighted exchange rates, howeyer, ignores capital move-
ments which in the case of Switzerland may be larger than 
trade. Therefore, the market exchange r~te of the currency 
against the dollar is needed to show the pressure of inter-
national capital movements on the currency of the country, 
even though the overall change or the effective rate may 
exhibit small or no change at all. 
Because of their wide use and general acceptance, the 
series of exchange rates and the balance of payments pub-
lished in International Financial Statistics (IMF) will be 
employed. Note that the short-term capital account published 
in IFS is further divided into deposit money banks and other 
short-term capital accounts, the latter is classified as the 
non-monetary sector and thus is placed "above the line," 
whereas the former is recorded "below the line" as a finan-
cing item. The grouping of various sections as presented 
in Table XI will be followed in the subsequent analysis to 
the extent to which exchange rate changes contributed to pay-
ments adjustment in each country. For the United States, the 
balance of payments will be recast to conform with the cur-
rent presentation (69, June, 1976). 
CHAPTER VI 
A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF 
.EXCHANGE RATES, THE BALANCE 
OF PAYMENTS, AND RESERVE 
RELATIONSHIPS 
In the country-by.-country analysis, it starts with a 
brief description cif the country's foreign sector in relation 
to its gross domestic product in order to.measure the extent 
of the country.'s exposure to foreign business. ·Next, it sur-
veys the recent t~ends of trade and capital accounts and the 
means of financing imbalances that developed prior to the 
currency realignment in 1971. Then ·the stage is set for the 
analysis of the impact of the exchange rate variations on 
payments adjustment. The criterion to be used in determining 
'whether exchange rate movements have contributed to the bal-
ance of payments adjustment is the following: If the ex-
cha~ge rate variability consistently moves in the direction 
that helps balance the payments, skillful use of managed 
floating will be assumed. The movements of'the basic balance 
indicate the direction of imbalance. However, if no consis-
tent pattern is found, it will be concluded that the exchange 
rate variatihns did not serve,as a tool of balance of. paymen~s 
adjustment. Reserv~ changes will not be ·used as an indicator 
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of payments imbalance because, as stated earlier, the imbal-
ance may be partly shared by changes in commercial banks' 
short~term external position. However, a comparison will be 
made of actual reserve changes before and after the floating 
has been adopted. Advocates of fluctuating exchange rates 
claim that a floating exchange rate system would reduce the 
use of reserves. 
To investigate the statistical relationship between the 
change in the basic balance and the exchange rate, a simple 
linear model is formulated: 
Bt = kl + k2Xt-l + k3Xt-2 + et 
k 2 , k 3 < 0, et is N(O, o~) 
(9) 
where Bt is the dollar amount in the basic balance at time t, 
Xt is the level of exchange rate expressed in terms of U.S. 
cents per unit of national currency, and et is a stochastic 
distribution. A rise in the rate, that is, the value of X 
increases means appreciation of the domestic currency; the 
basic balance will tend to fall. The expected signs of the 
coefficients k 2 and k 3 are negative. Note that if X is meas-
ured in terms of national currency, for example, DM 3 per 
u.s. $1, a rise in X means depreciation of the German mark, 
so that the expected signs of the coefficients are positive. 
Equation (9) is established on the assumption that interven-
tion in the foreign exchange market is confined to maintain-
ing orderly market conditions as often claimed by government 
authorities. The transactions in the basic balance are also 
69 
affected by a wide variety of other factors, most of which 
can for present purposes be regarded as random shocks. The 
one and two period lag is introduced into the model because 
current flow of trade .and payments. is determined by previous 
orders and cannot respond in the short run to the current 
exchange rate. This model examines some specific items 
"above the line" as opposed to the strictly monetary approach 
which is looking at the monetary transaction items "below the 
line." 
The channels through which the exchange rate affects 
the basic balance operate via the combination of relative 
price effect, absorption effect, real balance effect, and 
interest rate effect. The relative price effect or the price 
elasticities approach starts from partial equilibrium analy-
sis. It focuses on the demand and supply of imports and 
exports of traded goods. The condition for which the balance 
of payments adjustment will be attained when the sum of the 
elasticities of demand for imports exceeds unity (the 
Marshall-Lerner stability condition). The absorption ap-
proach focuses on the relationship between the balance of 
payments and. domestic income conditions. This approach sup-
plements the price elasticities approach. When the currency 
is depreciated or appreciated, the changes will have an im-
pact on relative prices and income. For a deficit (surplus) 
country, a decline (increase) in aggregate expenditures on 
goods including international traded goods relative to income 
must take place in order for devaluation (revaluation) to 
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adjust to the imbalance .. The real balance effect or the 
monetary approach focuses on real lev~l of cash balances 
people desire to hold. A devaluation'implies, with a time 
lag, higher domestic price.s and consequently .lower real cash 
balances. In order to maintain the real balance previously 
attained, they. must increase saving or· reduce the e'xpE:mdi-
tures relative to income. As a result, an excess supply of 
goods develops. The reverse phenomenon occurs in the country 
that appreciates its currency. The real cash balance in-
:creases brough about by lower domestic prices. To.maintain 
the level of real balances, people must increase spending 
including that on imports :r:·elati ve to income. The outcome 
of the analysi~ is that there will be a reduction in the 
deficit for the de*aluing country and a reduction in the 
surplus for the revaluing country. 
The interest rate effect focuses bn monetary policy 
regarding the money supply and interest rates. In the defi-
cit country, the monetary authorities may restrict the supply 
of money and force interest rates upward in order to prevent 
price inflation resulting from an export boom. Hence, it 
reduces capital outflow. In the surplus country, on the 
other hand, the money supply and the interest rate level may 
fall in order to avoid recession due to imports increasing 
faster than exports as a consequence of the exchange rate 
~djustment. In this case, capital tends to flow out. 
In the analysis of the short-run effects on the balance 
of payments and the exchange rate, there are various 
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approaches to such a problem. The classical approach concen-
trated· on the purchasing power parity, which explains the 
effect of relative price inflation rates on the country's 
balance of payments i:n .a .. two..., country model; the consequence 
of higher price inflation at home than abroad is the deter-
ioration in the balance of payments (the sum of the current 
·and capital accounts) and ·thus contributes to the exchange 
rate depreciation. The monetary approach, on the other 
hand, explains the balance of payments adjustment through 
·the loanable fund theory. One version of the monetary ap-
proach is to have an expected shift in assets (assuming 
only.two assets in a small economy: domestic paper currency 
and foreign money) by way of expectation of the exchange rate 
depreciation. This causes an increase in lending abroad. 
The outflow of funds causes the exchange rate to fall. The 
depreciation causes the current account to move to a surplus 
(the excess of domestic output over domestic absorption) . 
The surplus gradually increases the stock of foreign assets, 
which tends to raise the exchange rate and cause the current 
account surplus to diminish. The equilibrium condition is 
established when the exchange rate is at a higher level than 
the initial position and the balance on current account is 
zero. In short, the current account adjusts over time to 
the exchange rate which is determined by shifting in foreign 
assets through the expectations of the changes in the ex-
change rate (38) . The approach used in this study assumes 
that the basic balance adjusts, with a time lag, to the 
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exchange rate which is determined by some economic factors 
other than a wealth effect. 
Belgium 
The economy of Belgium depends considerably on its for-
eign trade sector. It ranks second to the Netherlands among 
the industrialized countries in terms of foreign trade value 
as a percent of gross domestic product. In 1971, imports 
accounted for 41 percent of the GDP, while exports were 43 
percent. Of total exports in 1968, 88 percent went to OECD 
countries, 1 79 percent of which were supplied to the original 
six EEC nations. 2 On the import side, Belgium's imports have 
come mainly from OECD, and particularly from EEC countries. 
For instance, in 1968, 80 percent of imports was from OECD 
countries and 79 percent of which from the EEC. Belgium's 
foreign trade sector is closely linked with the EEC. France, 
1There are twenty-four member countries in OECD: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
2European Economic Community (EEC) or European Common 
Market was established in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome. 
The original six member countries were: France, West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
Since January, 1973, the official name has been changed to 
the European Community (EC) as it encompasses three addi-
tional nations. The new member countries are: the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland. In addition, Greece and 
Turkey have joined the EEC but they have been granted asso-
ciated status (see 39). 
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West Germany, the Netherlands, and more recently, the United 
Kingdom, all neighboring countries, are the major sources of 
Belgium trade flows. Main export products of Belgium are 
manufactured goods and, to a lesser extent, machinery and 
transport equipment, which accounted for 42 and 21 percent 
in 1973, respectively. Its imports .also include manufactured 
goods, machinery, and transport equipment, each comprising 
approximately 25 percent of total imports in 1973, in addi-
tion to food, since the country is too small to feed its 
population. 
The trade balance during the 1960s fluctuated consider-
ably; it registered a deficit of $94 million in 1966 to a 
surplus of $800 million in 1970. On the averag~ of the 
whole period the trade balance showed a small surplus. The 
service accounts were in balance during the first half of 
the 1960s, followed by a significant increase in earnings in 
the second half, whereas the balance on the transfer account 
recorded a small net inflow in the early 60s, then it showed 
a net outflow of some $50 million in the late 60s. On bal-
ance, the current account was in equilibrium in the first 
half of the 60s, followed by a gradual- increase in net 
inflow. 
On the capital side, the net capital outflows tend to 
offset the current account surplus, but the amount is less 
than the surplus from trade. Therefore, a continuous surplus 
on the liquidity balance is reflected in the accumulation of 
official reserve assets. 
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Table XII shows Belgium's balance of payments from 1971 
to 1975 along with the exchange rates measured both on the 
trade-~eighted bas~s and the market rate vis-a-vis the 
dollar. Beginning of the floating in the first quarter of 
1973, the market rate of the Belgium fran~ appreciated grad-
ually until the third quarter when it reached a maximum. 
Then the rate began to depreciate in the next two quarters, 
and then appreciated further, with a slight·decline in 1974: 
III until the end of the first quarter of 1975 before it 
'started to slide down throughout the rest of 1975. 
The trade-weighted exchange rate also shows a similar 
pattern with an exception in the third quarter of 1974, when 
the market rate exhibited a decline, whereas the trade-
weighted rate showed an upward movement. The difference 
between the two series is that the market rate fluctuates 
with a wider amplitude. The quarter-to-quarter change of 
the average rate of the Belgium franc in the foreign ex-
change market has shown a wide margin {in eight out of twelve 
quarters the change was no less than 5 percent from the pre-
ceding quarter) . The index of the trade-weighted exchange 
rate in 1975:IV showed a small depreciation {103.8) compared 
with 104.2 in 1973:I (May, 1970 = 100), ~hereas the level of 
the franc during the s~me period slightly appreciated above 
the 1973:I level. 
The result of a simple linear regression of the rela-
tionship, corrected for autocorrelation, between quarterly 
changes in the dollar amount of the basic balance and the 
TABLE XII 
BELGIUM: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1973 1974 1975 
1971 1972 I II III IV I II III IV I II III 
1. Merchandise Trade: .77 1.03 .29 .34 .34 .26 .27 .01 .35 .25 .47 .18 .02 
Exports, f.o.b. 10.61 13.11 3.88 4.48 4.86 5.11 5.30 6.16 6.42 6.71 6.81 6.55 5.41 
Imports, f.o.b. -9.84 -12.0.8 -3.59 -4.14 -4.52 -4.86 -5.03 -6.15 -6.07 -6.46 -6.34 -6.37 -5.44 
2. Services and Transfer .08 .08 .08 -.10 -.13 .07 .07 -.13 -.02 .12 .15 .04 .05 
3. Long-term Capital -.31 -.56 -.22 -.08 -.12 .01 .03 .06 .01 -.29 -.04 -.32 .01 
Basic Balance .54 .55 .15 .16 .09 .33 .37 -.06 .33 .08 .58 -.18 .04 
4. Short-term Capital 
Incl. Errors and 
Omissions -.08 -.36 .21 -.31 .16 -. 04 -.17 .17 .39 -.35 .13 .22 -.10 
Liquidity Balance .46 .19 .36 -.15 .25 .29 .20 .11 • 72 -.27 .71 .04 -.06 
5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing) : 
Reserves .39 .40 .68 .09 .18 -.13 -.37 -:-.09 .58 .25 .49 .12 -.03 
Banks' External 
Position .16 -.17 -.31 -.24 .08 .42 .57 .20 .14 -.52 .22 -.08 -.03 
Non-balance Items Affecting 
Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 100.3 103.3 104.2 105.1 105.1 103.3 102.6 106.1 106.4 106.9 109.3 108.1 105.2 
Dollar Exchange Rate* 2.06 2.27 2.39 2.56 2.74 2. 59 2.42 2.60 2.59 2.65 2.87 2.56 2.63 
Quarterly Percentage 
Change - 10.40 5.15 7.28 7.02 -5.50 -6.48 8.00 -1.26 2.63 8.10 -.35 -8.15 
*Quarterly figures are obtained from monthly average rates. 


















level of exchange rates with one and two quarter lagged is 
as follows: 
Bt = 836.7- 561.3 xt-l + 222.6 xt_ 2 
(0.73) (1.17) (0.54) 
R2 = .15, D-W = 1.955, L = .2, n = 8, 
where B is the basic balance, X is the spot exchange rate, 
and the figures in parentheses are t ratios. The coeffi-
cients of the lagged variables are not statistically signifi~ 
cant at the .05 level. The exchange rate explains only 15 
percent of the total variations. Since the value of Durbin-
Watson statistic lie between du and 4-du, the residuals are 
not autocorrelated at the 95 percent confidence leve1. 3 
Figure 1 shows quarterly changes in the basic balance 
arid the level of the Belgium franc exchange rate against the 
dollar. Quite clearly, the exchange rate variations have no 
significant impact on alleviating the imbalance. 
Table XIII shows the quarterly changes in reserves ex-
pressed as a percent of the preceding quarter. The reserve 
changes, regardless of the sign, will be used to evaluate 
how extensive official reserves have been used before and 
after the floating began. On the quarter average changes 
shown in the last column, 1973 was the year.that showed the 
change amounted to 8.7 percent, the highest percent change 
3since the number of observations is small (8 observa-
tions), the critical region of rejecting or accepting the 
null hypothesis in the Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation 
is derived by extrapolation: d 1 = d 1 (15) - 7(.03) 
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Figure 1. Belgium: The Market Rate of the Belgium Franc 
and the Change in the Basic Balance 
TABLE XIII 
BELGIUM: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN RESERVES, 
EXPRESSED IN PERCENT 
Quarter 
Year I II III IV 
1969 3.89 5.19 1. 58 9.74 
1970 5.95 2.69 7.39 2.04 
1971 7.94 4.00 7.13 1. 43 
1972 5.76 4.66 5.10 4.21 
1973 25.74 3.93 3.07 2.15 
1974 6.29 3.18 11.50 3.61 
1975 10.25 1. 60 3.77 .62 
1976 7.94 2.44 
Source: H~F, International Financial Statistics, 












during the seven-year period from 1969 through 1975. The 
second highest reserve use was in 1974 when the oil crisis 
erupted. Then came 1975; the use was less in comparison 
with the preceding years. It can be concluded from the evi-
dence of reserve changes that reserves have been used rela-
tively less than during the fixed rate regime as the 
managed floating has assumed ~n increasing role. 
To further investigate the relationship between the 
fluctuation of the Belgium franc and reserve changes, data 
of reserve changes point to the monetary policy of restrain-
ing excessive fluctuation of the franc due to the agreements 
made·within EEC regarding the 4 1/2 percent fluctuation 
limits of the "snake." 4 For instance, in the first quarter 
of 1973 the expectation that the Belgium franc would be re-
valued caused short-term capital to flow in, in the amount 
of $210 million. As a ~esult of intervention, reserve assets 
increased by $620 million, partly offset by a reduction in 
the banks' short-term external positl.on in the amount of 
4 rn March, 1972, the original six members in the EEC 
nations agreed to limit the range of fluctuations between 
their currencies to only 4 1/2 percent. The arrangement is 
sometimes referred to as "snake in the tunnel," which means 
the currencies can deviate 2 1/4 percent from either side of 
their respective central rates established at the Smithsonian 
Conference in December, 1971. Thus, the band of 4 1/2 per-
cent is the tunnel in which the currencies can fluctuate. 
However, the tunnel was disregarded in 1973, but the curren-
cies of the EEC countries still are pegged to each other and 
floated jointly with the dollar, with a maximum spread of 
2 1/4 percent between the dollar rates of the strongest and 
weakest currencies. (Sweden and Norway also adhere to the 
joint float, even though they are not the members of the 
EEC.) The arrangement is referred to "snake without a 
tunnel." 
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$310 million. During the period of floating rates, official 
reserves moved in the same direction as the change in the 
level of the franc. Reserves increased when the franc appre-
ciated and decreased when the franc was falling. Official 
interventions occurred in 8 out of 12 quarters from 1973:1 
through 1975:IV. 
Since the floating, the surplus on the liquidity balance 
persisted in spite of the offsetting outflows of capital and 
the appreciation of the franc exchange rate. However, it is 
not surprising when the trading relationship of Belgium with 
the EEC is taken into account. In terms of the exchange 
rate; the Belgium franc is fixed in relation to the German 
mark, the Netherland guilder, and, to a lesser extent, the 
French franc because France left the "snake'' in late January, 
1974, rejoined in July, 1975, and left again in March, 1976. 
Hence, the Belgium economy is much influenced by the position 
5 of its trading partners. The strong balance of payments 1s 
essentially coming from the export sector because "export 
prices seem on the whole to have remained competitive" (46, 
1973, p. 21). 
Canada 
Canada's foreign trade in relation to its GDP is in the 
neighborhood of 22 percent (47, 1975). Canada has a close 
5Note that the smaller rate of inflation experienced by 
the German economy in 1976 makes it increasingly more diffi-
cult to retain the fixed rate with Germany wi t.hout severe 
trade losses. 
81 
economic relationship with the United States. In 1973, 
Canadian exports to the United States accounted for 68 per-
cent of the total, while imports were 71 percent. The 
second largest market share of the Canadian exports goes to 
the Common Market, and particularly the United Kingdom. Her 
exports to the Community in 1973 amounted to 12.5 percent of 
the total, of which 50 percent went to the U.K., while im-
ports from the Community accounted for 10.6 percent of the 
total, 40.5 percent of which came from the United Kingdom. 
Japan is equally important for Canada in trade. In 1973, 
exports to Japan amounted to 7.1 percent of total exports, 
while imports accounted for 4.4 percent. Canada's major 
exports are machinery and transport equipment, crude mater-
ials excluding fuels, and basic manufactures, which accounted 
for 31, 23, and 18 percent, respectively in 1973. Main im-
ports are machinery and transport equipment (50 percent) , 
basic manufactures (15 percent) , and miscellaneous manufac-
tured goods (9 percent) (67, 1974). 
Before the Canadian dollar was allowed to float in 
June, 1970, the merchandise trade account shows a consistent 
surplus. However, the balance on current account shows a 
consistent deficit resulting from the deficit on services 
and transfer payments (the balance on interest and dividends 
is by far the largest cause of outpayments) . To finance the 
deficit on current account, foreign borrowings have bee~ reg-
ularly sought by floating new issues of long-term bonds in 
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the international markets. Hence, the annual figures on the 
basic balance indicates net inflows for many years. 
During the five-year period preceding the adoption of 
the floating exchange rate by the Canadian government, the 
overall balance showed a small surplus and thus contributed 
to an annual accumulation of international reserves. 
Table XIV presents the balance of payments and the 
Canadian exchange rates from l970:I through l975:IV. On the 
whole, the basic balance shows a small surplus. However, 
when a deficit developed in the basic balance, in most cases 
the deficit was a result of unusually high net payments for 
inte~est and dividends and to a lesser extent a relative 
decline in long-term capital inflow. For instance, in the 
fourth quarter of 1971 as well as in the first quarters of 
1972 and 1973, the net outflows for services and transfer 
payments were recorded in the amount of $700, $750, and $890 
million, respectively. In the same period, long-term invest-
ments in Canada were relatively low. The deficit on the 
basic balance reappeared again throughout 1974 and in the 
first half of 1975. The principal cause of the deficit was 
again the large outflows for services and transfer payments, 
which together exceeded $1 billion in the first and fourth 
quarters of 1974 and also in the first quarter of 1975. For 
the second and third quarters of 1975, however, it was the 
net outflows on long-term capital that caused the deficit on 
the basic balance. In l975:IV, despite a large payment on 
debt service ($1.43 billion), the net inflow of long-term 
TABLE XIV 
CANADA: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1970-1975 
(in billions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1970 1971 
I II III IV I II III IV I II 
1. Merchandise Trade: .65 .64 .75 1.02 .73 .61 .66 .56 .31 .48 
Exports, f.o.b. 3.96 4.52 4.07 4.37 4.08 4.67 4.36 4.76 4.42 5.37 
Imports, f.o.b. -3.31 -3.88 -3.32 -3.35 -3.35 -4.06 -3.69 -4.20 -4.11 -4.88 
2. Services and Transfer -.65 -.52 -.33 -.40 -.60 -.48 -.35 -.70 -.75 -.55 
3. Long-term Capital .59 .oo .13 .03 .30 .03 .OS .10 .28 .59 
Basic Balance .59 .12" .55 .65 .33 .16 .36 -.04 -.16 .52 
4. Short-term Capital Incl. 
Errors and Omissions -.38 .47 -.14 -.14 -1.10 -.24 -.55 .35 -.24 -.72 
Liquidity Balance .21 .59 .41 .51 -.77 -:.08 -.19 .31 -.40 -.20 
,5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing) 
Reserves .53 .78 .22 .13 .17 .01 .14 .58 .18 .32 
Banks' External Position -.22 -.17 .18 .33 -.69 -.10 -.32 -.28 -.46 -.51 
Non-balance Items Affecting 
Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100.7 102.2 
Dollar Exchange Rate* 93.21 96.70 98.13 98.98 99.20 97.71 99.10 99.78 100.31 101.49 
Quarterly Percentage 
































TABLE XIV (Continued) 
1973 
I II III IV I II 
1. Merchandise Trade: .53 .73 .59 .87 .55 .49 
Exports.,- f .o.b. 5.68 6.61 5.82 7.33 7.12 8.39 
Imports, f.o.b. -5.15· -5.88 -5.23 -6.46 -6.57 -7.90 
2. Services and Transfer -.89 -.60 -.38 -.83 -1.09 -.66 
3. Long-term Capital .18 .15 .01 .03 .46 -.01 Basic Balance -.18 .28 .22 .07 -.08 -.18 
4. Short-term Capital Incl. 
Errors and Omissions -.23 -.21 .-.23 .16 .79 .54 Liquidity Balance -.41 .07 -.01 .23 .71 .36 
5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing) : 
Reserves -.08 -.11 -.32 .05 .33 .02 
Banks' External Position -.33 .18 .31 .18 .38 .34 
Non-baiance Items Affecting 
Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
105.9 (May, 1970 = 100) 104.0 102.1 100.8 102.2 106.3 
Do:j.lar Exchange Rate* 100.27 100.00 99.63 100.03 102.04 103.63 
Quarterly Percentage 
Change -.20 -.27 -.37 .40 2.01 1.56 
*Quarterly figures are obtained from monthly average rates. 
Source: IMF, International Financial S~atistics, August, 1976 and earlier issues. 
1974 
III IV I 
.29 .19 -.56 
8.00 8.87 7.54 
-7.71 -8.68 -8.10 
-.35 -1.06 -1.35' 
-.04 ·.63 .43 
-.10 -.25 -1.48 
.11 .59 1.08 
.01 .34 -.40 
-.28 -.05 -.04 
.29 .39 -.36 
105 •. 4 104.7 102.2 
101.97 101.42 100.15 

































capital more than offset the current account deficit, thus 
giving rise to a surplus on the basic balance. 
The Canadian dollar has oscillated around the U.S. $1 
parity. The percent change of the Canadian dollar in the 
foreign exchange market was small (in 12 out of 23 quarters, 
the change was less than l percent, while in 8 quarters the 
change was between land 2 percent). The highest level of 
the Canadian exchange rate attained was U.S. $1~0363 in 
l974:II, and the lowest level was U.S. $.967 in l970:II, the 
period in which the Canadian dollar was first allowed to 
float. The effective exchange rate of the Canadian dollar 
generally moved in line with the market rate against the U.S. 
dollar. 
To substantiate the finding, data adjusted for auto-
correlation were employed in the estimation of linear rela-
tionship between the quarterly change iri the basic balance 
(B) and the level of exchange rates (X) from l970:II through 
l975:IV. The result is: 
Bt = 8043.6 - 32.3 xt-l - 66.1 xt_ 2 
(2.12) (0.61) (1.21) 
R2 = .19, D-W = 1.18, L = .2, n = .19. 
The numbers in parentheses are t ratios. Although the signs 
are correct, the coefficients are not statistically signifi-
cant at the .05 level. The explanatory power of the lagged 
exchange rates is low (R2 = .19). Since the value of D-W 
lies between d 1 and du' the autocorrelation may or may not 
exist at the 95 percent confidence level. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the movements of the Canadian 
exchange' rate and the change in the basic balance. It has 
become apparent that there is no consiste,nt pattern of the 
Canadian dollar exchange rate to correct the deficit on the 
basic balance. 
Table XV presents the quarterly change in reserves ex-
pressed in a percentage. The erratic changes in reserves 
were apparent in the first two years of the floating (l970:II 
through 197l:IV); after that reserve changes were relatively 
small until 1975, when the use of reserves began to increase 
moderately. In comparison with reserve use prior to the 
adoption of the floating in 1970:II, the quarter average 
figures during the floating were relatively larger than the 
period before the floating except in 1968. In the first 
quarter of 1968 the reserve loss was heavy due to speculative 
attack on the Canadian dollar as a result of the announcement 
of the new United States balance of payments program on 
January, 1968, which would affect capital flows to Canada. 
In addition, foreign direct investments in Canada dropped to 
almost zero in that quarter, but they rose sharply in the 
second quarter and remained high throughout 1968 (6, 1968, 
pp. 35-45) . 
Between 1971 and 1975 the balance on reserve account 
showed a small surplus. In 1970 a post-war record gain in 
reserves was registered resulting from a very high increase 
1n exports of many agricultural products. Reserves continued 
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Figure 2. Canada: The Market Rate of the Canadian Dollar and the Change 
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TABLE XV 
CANADA: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN RESERVES, 
EXPRESSED IN PERCENT 
Quarter Qtr. 
Year . I II III . IV Avg. 
1967 . 52, 1. 82 1. 89 1. 04 1. 32 
1968 16.78 19.90 1. 00 11.25 12.23 
1969 1.15 1.66 .17 5.06 2.01 
1970 15.84 20.43 5.08 2.77 11.03 
1971 3.55 .15 2.89 14.20 5.20 
1972 3.32 5.57 .05 2.75 2.92 
1973 1. 69 1.72 5.39 .83 2.41 
1974 5.77 .36 5.13 .28 2.89 
1975 .03 8.53 2.10 2.07 3.18 
1976 9.41 2.71 
·----------
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
August, 1976 and earlier issues. 
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reserves rose again ln the first half and then fell off for 
the next four quarters before picking up in the second half 
of 1975. 
Paul Wonnacott has made a remark on the experience of 
the floating exchange rate of the Canadian dollar during the 
1950s that (73, pp. 177-178): 
On the whole, the Canadian experience with a flex-
ible exchange rate has been a happy one .... Most 
striking, perhaps, has been the over-all strong 
position of the Canadian dollar in spite of cur-
rent account deficit. This strength, plus the 
patently favourable position of both Canadian 
corporations and Canadian governments in gaining 
access to the American capital market, has given 
short shrift to any widespread doubts as to the 
ability of Canada to maintain a strong inter-
. national currency. 
The situation differed in the 1970s when all currencies were 
floating and Canada was no longer alone in adjusting its cur-
rency to its needs. In spite of these di£ficulties, such 
remarks can be equally applied to the experience during the 
1970s since the Canadian dollar has exhibited small varia- ' 
tions compared with other major currencies. In addition, 
during the same period, reserves have shown on the whole no 
significant change. 
France 
The dependence of the French economy on foreign trade 
is modest compared with other countries in Western Europe. 
Imports and exports accounted for 16.4 and 17.2 percent, 
respectively, of GDP in 1972 (48, 1976). Her trade relation-
ship with the OECD nations is strong. In 1974, the value of 
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exports to OECD amounted to 75 percent of the total, 71 per-
cent of which went to the EEC. The business with the EEC 
countries has been maintained rather stable since the organi-
zation was founded in 1958. France, however, is losing her 
6 export share in the Franc area. In 1965, the value of ex-
ports was 8 percent of the total, and it went down to 4 per-
cent ten years later. On the import side, France also 
imports mostly from the OECD countries (68 percent of the 
total in 1974), and particularly from EEC. Her imports from 
the Franc area went down from 6 percent of the total in 1965 
to 3 percent in 1974. Major items in foreign trade are basic 
manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, in addition 
to exportation of food as the third major category. 
The trade balance.of France shows a modest surplus from 
1965 through 1968, then the balance turned to a deficit of 
around $900 million due to strong import demand. In 1970 the 
trade surplus re-emerged, and the trend continued throughout 
the 1970s. However, the balance on the invisible trade ac-
count is overshadowed by transfer payments (both private and 
official) which show a substantial but rather stable net out-
flow of approximately $1 billion annually, mainly due to 
immigrants' remittances (48). Hence, when a small surplus 
appeared in the trade sector, the large outflow of transfer 
payments tended to erase the gain from trade. As a deficit 
6countries included in the Franc area are: Algeria and 
the Sahara, Morocco, Tunisia, the thirteen nations of tropi-
cal Africa, and the Malagasy Republic. 
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developed, the net outpayments o~ immigrants' remittances 
tended to aggravate it. Thus, the current account exhibits 
a surplus when the export surplus is large, and a deficit 
when the trade balance shows a small surplus or a deficit. 
The trend of long-term capital presents a net outflow 
due to medium and long-term export credits linked with the 
expansion in the export of capital goods. This movement 
could continue because of the time la~ between orders and 
deliveries. The capital outflows became pronounced when the 
franc exchange rate was expected to drop, as occurred in 
1968 and 1972 as well as in 1973. 
'All in all, the annual figures of the basic balance 
tend to move in line with the current account. Over the 
period from 1968 through 1972 the deficit in the balance of 
payments is mainly reflected in the changes in official 
reserves and partly financed by short-term capital inflows 
and changes in commercial banks' external position. Reserve 
losses were hPavy in 19~8 prior to the devaluation in 1969 
and again in 1973. 
Table XVI shows the balance of payments and the franc 
exchange rates from 1971 through 1975. The annual figures 
of the trade balance show a surplus from 1971 through 1973, 
then it turned to a deficit largely due to high payments for 
'1 7 01 • The current account deficit was financed by heavy 
7oil imports on the average amounted to $2.5 billion be-
tween 1970 and 1972, accounted for 10 percent of total im-
ports, then the oil payments jumpted to $10.27 billion, or 
19 percent of total imports (30, 1975). 
TABLE XVI 
FRANCE: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars, a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
1. Merchandise Trade: 1.11 1.30 .12 .51 .14 .00 -1.13 -1.51 -.97 -.26 .26 l. 21 .39 .04 Exports, f.o.b. 20.68 26.15 7.78 9.31 8.74 10.06 10.37 ::.::..66 11.09 12.70 13.02 14.03 11.27 12.97 Imports, f.o.b. -19.57 -24.85 -7.66 -8.79 -8.60 -10.06 -11.50 -13.17 -12.05 -12.96 -12.78 -12.82 -10.88 -12.94 2. Services and Transfer -.58 -1.00 -.35 -.24 -.68 -.20 -.48 -.35 -.96 -.29 -.63 -.27 -.52 -.15 3. Long-term Capital .01 -.65 -.33 -.24 -1.07 -.60 -.19 .20 .24 -.43 .17 -.26 -.96 -.19 Basic Balance .54 -.35 -.56 .03 -1.61 -.80 -1.79 -1.66 -1.69 -. 98 -.20 .68 -1.09 -.30 4. Short-term Capital 
Incl. Errors and 
Omissions 1.34 .64 .68 .40 .45 .59 l. 27 .76 .87 .88 l. 21 l. 46 l. 52 .55 Liquidity Balance 1.88 .29 .12 .43 -1.16 -.21 -.52 -.90 -.82 -.10 1.01 2.14 .43 .25 5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing} : 
Reserves 3.29 1.64 .62 -.09 -2.35 -.08 -.62 .01 .44 -.18 .61 1.27 .35 l. 31 Banks' External 
Position -1.41 -1.35 -.52 .52 1.19 -.13 .10 -.91 -1.26 .08 .39 .87 .09 -1.07 
Non-balance Items Affect-
ing Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 98.4 101.7 103.7 107.4 108.1 106.0 99.0 96.0 100.1 101.9 106.1 111.5 109.8 109.8 Dollar Exchange Rate* 1B.l5 19.82 20.86 22.58 23.89 22.69 20.26 20.51 20.90 21.53 23.35 24.50 22.95 22.45 Quarterly Percentage 
Change - 9.24 5.24 B .22 5.79 -5.21 -10.71 1.23 l. 91 2.99 8.46 4.93 -6.33 -2.18 
*Quarterly figures are obtained from monthly average rates. 




inflows of short-term capital and by further increases 1n 
banks' external liabilities through borrowing abroad. The 
latter marks a change in the monetary policy towards tighter 
domestic credits (48, l975). The turnaround 1n the trade 
balance occurred in the first three quarters of 1975 mainly 
as a result of the monetary policy which provided an incen-
tive for firms to cut their purchases abroad by making it 
more difficult to finance stocks (30, 1976), in addition to 
limiting oil imports (oil payments went down to $9.54 billion 
in 1975) . The trend in the basic balance shows a continuous 
deficit throughout the 1970s, with an exception in 1971, the 
year·in which exports registered a large surplus, assisted 
by a reduction in long-term capital outflow. 
The French franc in the foreign exchange market shows 
wide fluctuations from quarter to quarter. The exchange rate 
of the franc against the dollar appreciated during the first 
three quarters of 1973, then it weakened in l973:IV. France 
then decided to leave the Community "snake" in January, 1974 
and let the franc float independently. ·The exchange rate of 
the franc went down another 10.7 percent in l974:I, then 
picked up strength and continued to appreciate further for 
five quarters. In July, 1975, the French government rejoined 
the joint float arrangement; the franc depreciated in the 
second half of 1975 through the first quarter of 1976. The 
franc once again left the "snake" in March, 1976. The per-
cent changes in the franc exchange rate on the quarterly 
basis show a wide amplitude. In 7 out of 12 quarters the 
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change was no less than 5 percent. The trade-weighted ex-
change rate of the franc has moved in line with the market 
rate. On the trade-weighted basis, the franc has appreciated 
9.8 percent in 1975:IV from the base period in May, 1970. 
To further investigate the relationship between the 
change in the basic balance (B) and the level of the franc 
exchange rates (X) , a regression was run using quarterly 
data, adjusted for autocorrelation, for the period from 
1973:I through 1975:IV, the result is: 
Bt = 6768.9 + 
(2.08) 
237.4 xt-l + 53.0 xt_ 2 
(1.30) (0.35) 
2 R = .28, D-W = 2.63, L = .1, n = 8. 
The t ratios are in parentheses. The coefficients are not 
statistically significant at the 95 percent con~idence level, 
and the signs are opposite of those expected from a theoret-
ical standpoint. The lagged exchange rates explain only 28 
percent of the total variations. The value of D-W indicates 
the absence of autocorrelation. 
Figure 3 depicts the movements of the franc exchange 
rate and the change in the basic balance. The evidence so 
far shows no balancing impact of the exchange rate changes on 
the long-term trend in the basic balance. 
Table XVII shows quarter-to-quarter change in reserves 
expressed as a percent of the previous quarter. It clearly 
shows that reserves have been used extensively during the 
float, contrary to the advocates of greater exchange rate 
flexibility. Note that in 1974 when France left the "snake" 
in January and the franc floated independently, the reserves 
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Figure 3. France: The Market Rate of the French Franc 
and the Change in the Basic Balance 
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TABLE XVII 
FRANCE: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN RESERVES, 
EXPRESSED IN PERCENT 
Quarter 
Year I II III IV 
1969 5.09 9.43 10.94 4.32 
1970 7.64 7.78 6.66 4.58 
1971 10.69 3.01 29.27 12.90 
1972 2.62 10.97 6.61 .04 
1973 ll. 65 3.67 3.18 24.00 
1974 4.73 .52 4.29 3.92 
1975 5.91 12.18 l. 24 18.28 
1976 ll. 58 13.75 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 












used,on the average, were rel~tively lower than the preceding 
years. Banks' short-term liab~lities;to foreigners in 1974, 
on the other hand, showed a huge increase in the second and 
'the third quarter? as a :result' o:t: the,monetary poticy that 
I 
restrained credits. .Furthermore, the i French government 
abandoned a two-tier system as; the frc!tnc1 'floated' independ-
' ' 
!' ently (during 1972-73, when a :two-tie:~; system was imple-
mented, the French retained the old fixed exchange rate to 
the dollar for commercial tra~sactions inc~uding travel, and 
, permitted the franc to float fior capital transfer) . Overall, 
l 
the use of reserves has been e:xtensive in 1973 and 1975, but 
' I 
not in 1974, due primarily to the policy of adhering to the 
Community "joint float." In comparison with the period 
under the fixed exchange rates, the reserves have not shown 
a decline in transactions. 
West Germany 
The foreign trade sector of Germany is quite large. In 
'absolute terms, the dollar value of exports and imports is 
the second largest in world trade after the United States. 
In relation to its GDP, the export trade sector accounted for 
about 25 percent, with imports somewhat smalleri Germany has 
also a close economic relationship with the OECD nations. 
Trade with these countries accounted for two-thirds of total 
trade flows. More importantly, about one-half of Germany's 
trade is with EEC. On a bilateral basis, the trade position, 
measured as the excess of exports of Germany with its major 
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trading partners, namely, Belgium, France, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, has been strong. However, trade with Italy, 
the Netherlands, and the United States gives different 
trends. With Italy, the surplus trend was maintained during 
the first half of the 1960s, then it swung to a deficit in 
the second half and continued pntil 1972 and started to 
emerge with a surplus afterwards. Germany's trend in its 
trade with the Netherlands sho~s a similar pattern; it dif-
fers from the Italian case in ;the date of the turning point 
from a surplus to a deficit wh;ich occurred in 1970 and con-
tinues into the 1970s. Germany's trade position with the 
United States moved from a weak to a strong position. The 
Germans imported more merchandise than they exported to the 
United States throughout the 1960s. A reversal began in 
1970, and Germany maintained a surplus but reduced it sharply 
beginning in 1974. 
The balance on services and transfer payments shows in-
creasing outflows. Service payments together with transfer 
payments show net outpayments of $3 billion annually in the 
1960s and tend to increase further in the 1970s. Despite the 
deficit on the service account, the current account yielded 
a substantial surplus before it started to decline in the 
early 70s. 
On the capital side, long-term capital inflows were 
relatively larger than the outflows in the mid-1960s, and 
the turnaround began in 1967 as a result of the decline in 
private foreign investments in Germany coupled with large 
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outflows of portfolio investment abroad as well as trade 
credits. The outflow continued for three years, when it 
reached its peak in 1969, and the surplus reappeared through 
early 1970. 
The overall trend of the basic balance, the sum of the 
current and long-term capital balances, was in equilibrium 
during the 1960s period. 
Table XVIII presents the German balance of payments and 
the movements of the Deutsche mark exchange rate from 1971 
through 1975. The surplus on the trade account continues 
from the 1960s. The strong position of the German trade 
reached its peak in 1974 and started to decline slightly in 
1975. The outflow on the service account and particularly 
foreign travel shows an upward trend, which suggests that 
price elasticity with respect to foreign travel is higher 
than trade (5, pp. 103-104). The current account, however, 
remains strong.· 
The tendency of long-term capital movements to offset 
the current account surplus began in 1974 and 1975, after 
they helped to strengthen the German trade position in the 
early 1970s. The expansion o£ the net outflow of long-term 
funds was mainly the increase in German investment abroad 
through commercial banks' long-term loans to foreigners. In 
addition, "the diminished foreign interest in the Federal 
Republic was a reflection not only of the recession, but also 
of higher relative production costs there as a result of the 
appreciation of the Deutsche Mark'' (5, 1976, p. 66). 
TABLE XVIII 
WEST GERMANY: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1973 1974 1975 
1971 1972 I II III IV I II III IV I II rn rv 
1. Merchandise Trade: 6 .63' 8.17 2.59 3.51 4.80 4.32 5.41 5.03 5.00 6.51 5.10 4.26 3.74 4.02 
Exports, f.o.b. 39.10 46.12 13.89 16.05 18.47 19.58 20.45 23.35 22.61 24.77 23.15 24.22 21.50 23.68 
Imports, f.o.b. -32.47 -37.95 -11.30 -12.54 -13.68 ~15.26 -15.04 -18.32 -17.61 -18.26 -18.05 -19.95 -17.76 -19.66 
2. Services and Transfer -6.31 -7.13 -2.03 -2.47 -3.97 -2.40 -2.62 -2.80 -4.13 -2.63 -2.90 -3.40 -4.15 -2.83 
3. Long-term Capital 1.89 4.61 1.09 1. 74 1.44 .66 -.70 -.20 -.81 -1.19 -1.42 -2.24 -2.08 -1.06 
Basic Balance 2.21 5.65 1.65 2.78 2.27 2.58 2.71 2.03 .05 2.69 .78 -1.38 -2.49 .13 
4. Short-term Capital 
<'~~ Incl. Errors and 
Omissions 1.95 -.64 3.09 .43 .92 -2."06: -2.70 -.07 -1.15 -.42 1. 70 1.44 1.56 -1.48 
Liquidity Balance 4.15 5.01 4.74 2.21 • 3.19 .52' .01 1.96 -1.09 2.27 2.48 .06 -.93 -1.35 
5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing) 
Reserves 4.96 5.03 6.59 1.08 3.49 -1.75 -.12 1.35 -2.45 .65 2.14 -1.67 -1.06 -.22 
Banks' External 
Position .59 -.13 -1.84 1.12 -.30 2.27 .13 .61 1.35 1.62 .33 1. 74 .14 -1.14 
Non-balance Items Affecting 
Payments 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 103.6 107.1 109.7 ll5.9 127.9 123.7 122.2 128.5 124.1 127.3 131.4 129.4 124.9 124.5 
Dollar Exchange Rate* 28.72 31.36 33.21 36.55 41.78 39.23 36.60 39.95 38.30 39.65 42.78 42.47 39.17 38.51 
Quarterly Percentage 
Change - 9.17 5.90 10.05 14.33 -6.11 -6.70 9.15 -4.12 3.52 7.87 -. 71 -7.76 -1.70 
*Quarterly figures are obtained from monthly average figures. 





The basic balance also is strong from 1971 through 
1975:I, then it shows a deficit in the second and third 
quarters before it came to a small surplus again in the last 
quarter of 1975. The deficit in the basic balance in 1975, 
the first time since the second quarter of 1970, was primar-
ily the result of both the decline in long-term capital in-
flow and the increase in net outflow. 
Table XVIII also clearly shows the change in the quarter 
average of the exchange rates of the D-mark as a percent of 
the previous quarter. It exhibits erratic movements from 
quarter to quarter, except in the second quarter of 1975, 
which sho~s the depreciation was less than one percent. The 
D-mark was revalued twice in 1973, one in March and the 
second one in June, then the mark continued to appreciate 
furthe~with a decline in the last quarter of 1973 and in 
the first quarter of 1974. The D-mark reached its peak in 
l975:I; at that level the quarter average exchange rate was 
u.s. 42.775 cents per one DM, an increase of 60 percent over 
its annual average rate in 1970. On the trade-weighted 
basis, however, the DM exchange rate appreciated by 31 per-
cent from its base rate in May, 1970. The D-mark then 
started to weaken in the second half of 1975. 
To further investigate the impact of the D-mark exchange 
rate on the change in the basic balanqe, quarterly data, cor-
rected for autocorrelation, of the basic balance were 
regressed on the D-mark exchange rate, with one and two 
. period lagged, the result is: 
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= 4034.9 + 74.0 xt-l - 148.3 xt_ 2 (0.61) (0.59) (0.99) 
2 R = .14, D-W = 1.64, L = .2, n = 9. 
The t ratios are in parentheses. All the coefficients are 
not statistically significant at the .05 level. The explan-
atory power of the _lagged variables is low (R2 = .14). The 
value of D-W indicates the absence of autocorrelation (the 
critical values of D-W are d 1 = .77 and du- 1.54). 
Figure 4 depicts the movements of the D-mark exchange 
rate and the change in the basic balance. The evidence thus 
far does not lend support to the exchange rate impact on the 
basic balance, especially the trade sector. On the contrary, 
despite rather erratic and pronounced fluctuations in the 
exchange rate of the D-mark, exports expanded rapidly during 
the first two years of the float. 
Various factors have been suggested to explain the 
phenomenal rise in exports: the rapid accelera-
tion of world trade, the coincidence of excessive 
boom conditions in Germany's main foreign markets 
and competing countries, higher rates of inflation 
abroad, favorable German commodity and geographi-
cal export structure, bilateral trade agreements 
and, last but not least, expectations of further 
DM revaluations (49, 1974, p. 25). 
Furthermore, German business men are extremely 
export conscious and have carefully nursed their 
markets, and they are continuously adapting their 
production to changes in demand. It thus seems 
quite possible that this strong export orienta-
tion is playing an increasing important role in 
strengthening the competitive position of German 
industry (22, p. 32). · 
In evaluating the impact of the D-mark exchange rate, the 
OECD Economic Survey of Germany comments (49, 1976, pp. 
12-13): 
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West Germany: The Market Rate of the Deutsche 
Mark and the Change in the Basic Balance 
The impact of revaluation on Germany's external 
competitive position is difficult to quantify. 
Up to 1973, there is little doubt that the major 
effect was to raise export prices relative to 
those of important trading partners, but with 
buoyant world demand and easier supply condi-
tions in Germany than in other industrialized 
countries, the impact of .export volume was 
rather small and the net·effect therefore "per-
verse." Since 1974 with'inflation running well 
( 0 ' , I below the OECD average, the pr1c~ gap began to 
close again. However, much of this appears to 
have been at the expense,of profit margins, as 
labor costs continued toirise reiative to those 
of trading partners, whereas relative export 
unit values were on the \ihole fa;lling. 
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Private short-term capital movements tend to move gen-
erally in line with the chang$s in th~ exchange rate. The 
I 
inflow of short-term funds oc~urred when the DM was rising 
and the outflow appeared as the DM was falling. Therefore, 
the liquidity balance is most of the time influenced by 
short-term capital movements. On the annual basis, the 
liquidity balance still shows an overall surplus throughout 
the seventies. 
Reserve changes as presented in Table XIX clearly show 
a decline in use in 1974 and 1975 compared with earlier 
years. The erratic movements in reserves were apparent in 
1969 as the D-mark was allowed to float temporarily in 
October and was revalued later in the month. In 1970 the 
unrest in the foreign exchange markets precipitated the 
temporary float of. the D-mark and the Netherlands' guilder 
in May, 1971 before the D-mark was revalued again in 
December. Since the second quarter of 1973, the beginning 
of generalized floating, reserves have been used relatively 
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TABLE XIX 
GERMANY: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN RESERVES, 
EXPRESSED IN PERCENT 
Quarter 
Year I II III IV 
1969 17.52 23.80 19.89 41.46 
1970 3.31 19.70 28.19 20.43 
1971 16.11 5.64 1.52 10.08 
1972 7.34 14.55 6.97 3.07 
1973 35.90 .22 9.30 5.90 
1974 .89 4.11 4.92 .44 
1975 6.16 5.07 4.64 .31 
1976 12.12 4.22 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 











less than before the international monetary arrangement with 
fixed exchange rates. 
Reserve changes are in line with the movements of the 
DM exchange rate. In all twelve quarters from 1973:I 
through 1975:IV reserve increases were accompanied by upward 
movements in the exchange rate and reserve decreases were 
followed by the falling of the exchange rate. Despite the 
massive intervention in the foreign exchange markets, the 
variations of reserve assets have been relatively less than 
reserves used under the fixed exchange rate system. 
Italy 
In the Sixties the foreign trade sector of the Italian 
economy accounted for 20 percent of GDP and this share rose 
to 25 percent in the Seventies. In the first half of the 
1960s, Italy experienced a deficit in the trade account; 
however, the reverse trend occurred in the second half. Her 
main trading partners are the neighbor countries on the 
European continent, and particularly the countries in the 
Common Market. The major export items are engineering prod-
ucts, chemicals, textile materials and products, which 
accounted for 27, 14, and 12 percent, respectively, of total 
exports in 1968. Main imports comprise, from high to low 
order, food, engineering products, and crude oil, which 
together accounted for one-half of all imports in 1968. In 
1974, as a consequence of higher oil prices, crude oil 
imports accounted for 24 percent, the highest import share. 
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During 1961-1972 the share of exports of goods und services 
in GNP at 1963 prices increased at an average annual rate of 
1.1 percent, the share of imports at a rate of 0.9 percent 
(50, 1975). 
The net inflow on the service account helped to streng-
then the balance in the 1960s. The positive net balance on 
foreign travel and the inflow of funds from workers' earnings 
abroad which taken as a part of services rendered, both 
amounted to an annual average rate of $1.5 billion in the 
second half of the Sixties. Thus, the current balance reg-
istered from a small surplus of $320 million in 1964 to 
$2.34 billion in 1969, then the surplus was sharply reduced 
in the early Seventies. 
On the capital side, net long-term direct investment in 
Italy during the second half of the 1960s showed a small in-
flow.· A major capital outflow which also counts as part of 
long-term capital investments is remittances by foreign 
banks of Italian banknotes. These transactions tend to wash 
out the surplus on current account. In 1964 the outflow of 
Italian banknotes registered $577 million, then it rose to 
$2.25 billion in 1969. In all, long-term capital showed an 
offsetting tendency to the current account surplus. 
A wide margin was maintained between the current and 
long-term capital accounts in the first half of the 1960s, 
so that the basic balance recorded a substantial surplus. 
The margin then was reduced sharply in 1967-68 due to a 
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marked increase in the outflow of banknotes. 8 In 1969, the 
basic balance recorded a deficit as a result of a huge out-
flow of banknotes. The basic balance in 1970 showed a 
marked contrast compared with 1969~ there was a sharp reduc-
tion in the banknotes outflow, the reversal of a deficit to 
a surplus in the trade account began in the mid-1970s. 
Italy's balance of payments along with the movements of 
the lira exchange rate are presented in Table XX. In 1971 
and in 1972 the annual figures of the trade balance showed 
a continuation of the trade surplus from the late 1960s. 
The reverse trend occurred in the first quarter of 1973, and 
the deficit continued. The decline in exports continued 
in 1973 due mainly to the strikes which took place at the 
beginning of the year. To reduce the uncertainty caused by 
fluctuations of the lira, a two-tier exchange market was 
introduced in January, 1973 (50, 1975). In 1974 the increase 
in the deficit on the trade balance was recorded at $8.5 
billion, compared with $3.97 billion a year before. The 
large deficit was mainly the result of high payments for oil. 
In March, the Italian government decided to abolish the two-
tier system since it was unable to keep the two markets 
separate, that is, a possible profit can be made when the 
gap between the official exchange rate and the market rate 
8The Italian balance of payments is heavily influenced 
by the domestic political situation. When uncertainty rises 
at home, domestic capital formation no longer leads to new 
economic activities, but it is exchanged into banknotes 
which are sold abroad to take Italian capital out of the 
potential control of future government. 
TABLE XX 
ITALY: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
1. Merchandise Trade: .58 .82 -.78 -1.06 -.84 -1.29 -2.30 -2.52 -2.13 -1.53 -.36 -.11 .10 -.77 Exports, f.o.b. 14.89 18.44 4.15 5.33 6.00 6.58 6.17 7.17 8.07 8.40 7.97 8.53 8.60 9.26 Imports, f.o.b. -14.31 -17.62 -4.93 -6.39 -6.83 -7.87 -8.47 -9.69 -10.20 -9.92 -8.33 -8.64 -8.50 -10.03 2. Services and Transfer 1.46 1.45 .08 .32 .82 .23 -.20 .08 • 71 .06 -.10 .25 .76 -.31 3. Long-term Capital .78 .31 -.32 .37 2.18 1.77 .73 1.15 .so .86 .57 .16 -.18 .14 Basic Balance 2.82 2.58 -1.02 -.37 2.16 .71 -1.77 -1.29 -.92 -.61 .11 .30 .68 -.94 4. Short-term Capital 
Incl. Errors and 
Omissions -1.57 -3.02 .19 -.27 -.97 -.68 -.17 -1.23 1.19 -.60 -.29 -.61 -.94 -.34 Liquidity Balance 1.25 -.44 -.83 -.64 1:19 .03 -1.94 -2.52 .27 -1.21 -.18 -.31 -.26 -1.28 5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing) 
Reserves -1.06 -. 71 -.59 -.23 .58 .04 -1.50 -1.34 -.51 -1.28 -.11 .06 -1.40 -1.08 Banks' External 
Position -.17 .44 -.23 -.41 .61 -.01 -.44 -1.18 .79 .07 . -. 07 -.36 1.14 -.19 
-
Non-balance Items Affecting 
Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 98.80 98.50 95.50 88.80 86.70 87.50 83.60 81.40 80.80 78.20 77.70 78.40 77.80 77.10 Dollar Exchange Rate* .1617 .1713 .1731 .1690 .p41 .1700 .1549 .1566 .1530 .1507 .1568 .1591 .1504 .1471 Quarterly Percentage \ 
Change - 5.56 1.17 -2.31 2\96 -2.30 -8.82 1.29 -2.55 -1.31 3.97 1.27 -5.66 -2.00 
*Quarterly figures are obtained from monthly average rates. 





is becoming large. However, an import deposit scheme was 
introduced in May, 1974 to curb the deficit on the trade 
account. Importers were required to deposit 50 percent 
of the imports value in a non-interest-bearing account with 
the Bank of Italy for a period of 180 days. The deprecia-
tion of the lira has als6 induced substitution of domestic 
goods for imported products (50, 1975, pp. 32-33). In ef-
fect, impbrts were down substantially in 1975 compared with 
one year earlier. Thus, the size of the deficit on the cur-
rent account was drastically reduced. Tourist spending in 
Italy coupled with remittances of workers' earnings abroad 
have helped to reduce the trade deficit. The net inflow in 
the service account recorded $1.5 billion annually between 
1971 and 1972, the highest ever; then it gradually declined. 
In all, the current account was in surplus between 1971 and 
1972, then it swung to a deficit; in 1975 the· account was in 
balance. 
Capital movements exhibit different patterns. In the 
1970s the annual net figures of long-term capital showed net 
inflow due largely to heavy borrowing by state companies 
(50). Therefore, the deficit on current account was mostly 
financed by borrowing abroad. Short-term capital, including 
errors and omis.sions showed a large outflow in 1972, mainly 
because the speculative attack on the lira caused by the 
floating of the British pound in June, 1972. In July, 1973, 
a compulsory advance deposit of 50 percent in a non-interest-
bearing account was introduced for residents buying foreign 
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securities. However, such restrictions were abolished in 
March, 1975. Consequently, capital outflows resumed. 
The lira exchange rate shows a downward trend. When 
the lira was allowed to float in February, 1973 the exchange 
rate floated up in the first quarter, then it weakened in 
the second quarter before it picked up strength in the next 
quarter. The lira came under attack and slid downward 
for two quarters before it st'arted to strengthen in 1974:II. 
However, the rate was under r,enewed pressure in the next 
quarter and fell for six months. In 1975 the lira was 
strong, and appreciated in the first hal£, but fell back 
again in .the s~cond half. Despite the up-and-down movements 
of the lira in the foreign exchange markets, the percent 
changes of the rate from quarter to quarter were relatively 
small compared with the currencies in the "joint float." 
In 9 out of 12 quarters, i:he percentage changes .were between . ' . . 
l and 3 percent. The trade-weighted exchange rate of the 
lira did not fluctuate as wide as the market rate. Instead, 
it exhibited a continued downward trend. In the fourth 
quarter of 1975 the lira exchange rate against the dollar 
was at the lowest level; it depreciated by 7 percent from 
the 1970 annual rate, whereas the trade-weighted rate showed 
a 23 percent decline from the base rate in May, 1970. 
Reserve losses were large in 1974, amounting to $4.6 
billion, compared with the loss of only $200 million one 
y~ar earlier. The loss was a result of difficulty in bor-
rowing in the euro-market (5, 1975, pp. 92-93). In 1975 
J 
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reserve losses were relatively smaller than in 1974, but 
still substantial ($2.4 billion), due partly to repayment on 
previous loans and partly to the termination of the import 
deposit scheme. 
To further estimate the rel~t~onship between the basic 
balance (B) and the level of exchange rates (X) , this study 
employs a regression technique· by regressing the change in 
the basic balance on the level; of lirq exchange rate with one 
and two quarter lagged, the result is: 
-2658.4 + 1107.5 xt-l- 955.0 xt_ 2 (0.39) (2.02) (1.64) 
R2 = .35, D-W = 2.063, L = .1, n = 8. 
The t ratios are in parentheses. Like the previous estimates, 
all the coefficients are not statistically significant at the 
95 percent confidence level. The lagged independent vari-
ables explained 35 percent of the total variations. The 
value of D-W statistic indicates the absence of 
autocorrelation. 
Figure 5 depicts the movements of the lira exchange rate 
and the change in the basic balance. It is apparent that the 
depreciation of the lira has.not fully corrected the 
imbalance. 
Turning to examine the fluctuations of reserve assets, 
Table XXI presents the quarter-to-quarter change in reserves 
as a percent of the previous level. Based on the quarterly 
average figures, reserve changes prior to the generalized 
floating in March, 1973 were relatively less than during the 
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ITALY: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN RESERVES, 
EXPRESSED IN PERCENT 
Quarter 
I II III IV 
5.35 l. 96 2.45 . 4. 36 
.69 7.91 3.29 18.30 
12.74 .96 9.42 l. 82 
l. 96 3.35 .26 5.22 








1974 4.68 21.14 43.06 8.68 19.39 
1975 2.07 l. 50 13.38 17.72 
1976 2.74 6.73 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 




floating, particularly in 1974 and to a lesser extent in 
1975. The dramatic increase of 43.06 percent in reserves in 
1974:III was a result of the Bank of Italy obtaining a $2 
billion six-month loan from the Duetsche.Bundesbank (5, 1975, 
pp. 92-93). The relatively Small reserve use in 1973 was due 
to the substitution of borrowing by state enterprises from 
the international money market. The comparison of reserve 
use in the period before and after the floating suggests that 
reserve assets have fluctuated wider margins than under the 
fixed exchange rate system. However, there has been some 
~. tendency for reserve use to decline further when comparing 
reserve changes in 1975 with 1974. It can be concluded that 
reserves still occupy a significant role despite the·abandon-
ing the defense of the fixed exchange rates. 
Japan 
The dollar volume of the Japanese trade flows is large, 
comparable to those of France and the United Kingdom. How-
ever, in relation to its GDP, exports accounted for only 
11 percent, while the value of imports was 8.5 percent in 
1972 (51, 1975), the second lowest foreign trade ratio next 
to the United States. The gedgraphic distribution of Japan's 
trade relation is different from the country sections de-
scribed previously. Of total imports and exports, about one-
half is directed to the developing countries, while trade 
with the United States accounted for one-third, and the 
remainder is with the rest of the world. Japan's main export 
l-16 
products are machinery including transport equipment, manv-
factured goods, and chemicals; together they accounted for 
80 percent of the total. On the import side, over 70 per~ent 
of the total are composed of basic materials, fuels, and 
food. 
Japan's trends to bilateral trade with main geographic 
regions can be briefly described as follows: Trade deficits 
are incurred with countries that are sources of primary prod-
ucts, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South 
Africa. In addition, since Japan depends entirely on im-
ported fuels, the trade deficits are also incurred with the 
with the oil-producing countries. The surpluses have bee~ 
recorded with southeast Asia countries and Western Europe in 
general. Japan's trade with the United States was in the 
deficit prior to the mid-l960s; then the turnaround occurred 
in 1964, and the surplus trend has continued since then (~1, 
19 7 2' pp. 3 9-41) . 
The deficits in the invisible trade account have bee~ 
steadily increasing. The regular deficits have been recorded 
with both the United States and Western Europe due mainly to 
transportation costs. However, the service account deficit 
with the European countries has begun to exceed the trade 
surplus since 1969 (51, 1972, p. 41). Transfer payments ,re 
generally in deficit as a result of foreign aid given to the 
developing countries, and this trend continues to rise mo¢er-
ately in the Seventies. The overall trend of Japan's cur~ent 
account exhibited a steadily growing sur~lus during the 
Sixties. 
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Long~term capital continues to show an outflow to the 
developing countries. Beginning in 1964, capital ~xports 
started to rise very rapidly. Capital transactions with 
the indus~rialized countries exhibited erratic movements. 
The net long-term capital balance with the United States 
showed a large inflow during the first half of the Sixties, 
then Japan became a net capital exporter until 1969. Western 
Europe also exported capital to Japan during the early 1960s. 
However, the funds transferred were relatively smaller than 
those from the United States. Then the European countries 
began to import capital from Japan during the 1965-67 period 
before they started to export the capital again in the late 
1960s. 
In all, the basic balance showed a surplus during the 
Sixties. The trend, however, can be divided into two phases. 
In the early 1960s, the basic balance showed a small deficit, 
then the reverse position has been recorded since 1965; only 
one deficit appeared in 1967, mainly as a result of the fall 
in exports combined with higher payments for transport costs 
[the closedown of the Suez Canal in 1967 (51, 1968, pp. 13-
15) ] . 
The liquidity balance also exhibited a similar pattern 
as the basic balance. It showed a small deficit during the 
early 1960s, then it reversed to a surplus from 1965 to 1972, 
with one interruption in 1967 which showed a deficit. The 
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liquidity balance recorded a surplus of over $6 billion in 
1971 and in 1972 as a result of the inflow of a huge amount 
of short-term funds in response to ~xpectations of a yen 
revaluation. 
A gain in reserve assets has begun to merge since 1968 
after they were in balance dur~ng the period of the early 
Sixties as a whole. In 1972 the increase in reserves regis-
tered at $10.4 billion, the highest ever recorded. 
The major sections of the Japanese balance of payments 
and the movements of the yen exchange rate are presented in 
Table XXII. The surplus in th~ trade account started to 
fall·after it reached a recorded high in 1971 and 1972. A 
deficit in the trade account occurred in the first half of 
1974, then an improvement began to show after the second 
half. However, the size of the gain from trade in 1975 is 
not quite as large as in the earlier years because payments 
for oil have taken a sizable share from the export earnings 
(the share of imported oil and related materials during 
1974-75 has increased to over 40 percent of the total im-
ports, compared with 24 percent in 1972). 
The traditional deficit in the service account exhibits 
the rising trend during the Seventies owing to increasing 
transport costs. Thus, the current account was in deficit 
in 1973 as a result of higher imports combined with higher 
service costs, it was the first deficit since 1967. The 
current account deteriorated further in 1974 before it 
TABLE XXII 
JAPAN: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAY.f\1ENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1973 1974 1975 
1971 1972 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
1. Merchandise Trade: 7.79 8.97 1.05 .59 1.00 1.04 -1.85 -.85 1.52 2.62 .66 1.08 1.40 1.89 Exports, f.o.b. 23.57 28.03 7.41 8.51 9.43 10.91 10.09 13.47 14.68 16.23 12.88 13.48 13.52 14.86 Imports, f.o.b. -15.78 -19.06 -6.37 -7.92 -8.42 -9.87 -li.94 -14.32 -13.17 -13.62 -12.22 -12.40 -12.11 -12.97 2. Services and Transfer -1.99 -2.35 -.56 -1.01 -.90 -1.36 -1.44 -1.56 -1.65 -1.48 -1.58 -1.38 -1.43 -1.32 3. Long-term Capital -.96 -3.02 -1.77 -1.97 -2.08 -2.64 -1.55 -1.04 -.56 -.44 .19 .73 -.40 -.60 Basic Balance 4.84 3.60 -1.28 -2.39 -1.98 -2.95 -4.84 -3.44 -.69 .69 -.73 .43 -.42 -.03 4. Short-term Capital 
Incl. Errors and 
Omissions 2.93 2.44 .73 -.63 .18 -. 73 .76 .36 .13 .34 .03 -1.00 -.20 -.55 Liquidity Balance 7.77 6.04 -.55 -3.02 -1.80 -3.68 -4.08 -3.08 -.56 1.03 -.70 -.57 -.62 -.58 5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing) 
Reserves 10.40 3.01 -.45 -2.92 -.40 -2.55 .18 1.00 -.22 .28 .59 .47 -1.20 -.47 Banks ' -External 
Position -2.50 3.18 -.10 -.10 -1.39 -1.13 -4.26 -4.08 -.34 .75 -1.30 -1.04 .58 -.11 
Non-balance Items Affecting 
Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 102.4 114.5 122.4 126.3 123.2 121.0 117.5 119.4 113.2 111.3 111.4 111.6 112.6 111.2 Dollar Exchange Rate* .2878 .3299 .3520 .3773 .3773 .3641 .3421 .3583 .3394 .3333 .3409 .3420 .3356 .3294 Quarterly Percentage 
Change - 13.24 8.31 7.10 -0- -3.45 -6.04 4.68 -5.31 -1.77 2.70 .32 -1.75 -2.08 
*Quarterly Figures are obtained from monthly average rates. 




started to show an improvement in 1975 resulting from in-
creases in exports coupled with the reduction in imports. 
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The Japanese monetary policy has switched from encourag-
ing capital outflows during the 1972-73 period to encourage 
capital inflows as a consequence of high payments for oil. 
In 1972 various policy measures were adopted to stop the in-
flow of speculative funds combined with the liberalization 
on purchases of foreign securities and investments in real 
estate abroad. As a result, in 1972 long-term capital 
showed a net outflow of $3.02 billion, increased from $960 
million in the preceding year. The commercial banks' exter-
nal position recorded an outflow of $3.18 billion, compared 
with an inflow of $2.5 billion in 1971. In addition, short-
term funds registered a $2.44 billion inflow in that year for 
speculative reasons. The trend of long-term capital outflow 
continued into 1973. 
The shift in policy regarding capital transactions oc-
curred in November, 1973 as a result of the deterioration in 
the trade account and the outbreak of the oil crisis (51, 
1974, pp. 38-40). Controls on non-resident purchases of 
Japanese stocks and bonds were lifted and purchases of short-
term foreign securities were restricted. Investments abroad 
in real estate were withdrawn from the foreign currency lend-
ing program. The outcome of this change in external policy 
was a reduction in long-term capital outflow and more inflows 
of funds in short-term capital account. Banks' position with 
non-residents showed net in£low of funds through borrowinq 
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from the u.s. and the eurodollar money markets (51, 1975, 
pp. 34-35). 
The basic balance showed an annual surplus during the 
period of 1971-72, and went to a deficit from 1973 through 
1975. 
In the foreign exchange m:arkets, the yen wa-s allowed to 
float independently in February, 1973. It appreciated and 
reached a maximum in 1973:III and remained at that level for 
another quarter, then it weakened in the next two quarters 
before it recovered in 1974:II. The yen exchange rate, how-
ever, has not been allowed to rise to its record level in 
1973~II. The yen then depreciated again in the second half 
of 1974 and recovered the following six months before it fell 
back in the second half of 1975. The fluctuations of the yen 
exchange rate showed erratic movements during the 1973-74 
period and variations were relatively smaller in 1975. The 
rate in the fourth quarter of 1975 showed an appreciation of 
18 percent from the annual rate in 1970, while on the trade-
weighted basis, it increased by 11 percent. 
Using the regression technique to determine the rela-
tionship between the change in the basic and the lagged level 
of exchange rates, corrected for autocorrelation, the follow-
ing result is recorded: 
Bt = -3218.0 - 321.1 xt-l + 396.5 xt_ 2 (0.49) (0.69) (1.17) 
R2 = .16, D-W = 1.605, L = .6, n = 9. 
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The figures in parentheses are the t ratios. All the regres-
sian coefficients are not statistically significant at the 
.05 level. The explanatory power of the independent vari-
ables are 2 1 ow ( R = . 16 ) . The value of D-W statistic indi-
cates the absence of autocorrelation at the .05 level. 
Figure 6 illustrates the movements of the yen exchange 
rate and the change in the basic balance. It can be seen 
that there is no strong indication of any relationship be-
tween the two. The insignificant result from the statistical 
test, despite the recent downward fall in the trade account 
as well as the deficit showing in the basic balance, can be 
explained by, first, the aggregate trade figures may wash 
out the impact of revaluation on certain products whose corn~ 
petitiveness has suffered relatively more than others; sec-
ond, administrative measures were exerted in 1972 and most 
of 1973 to restrain export growth, for balance of payments 
reasons; third, the relatively higher domestic prices in 
relation to export prices may have induced to increase 
domestic sales to total sales. 
The liquidity balance was in deficit throughout the 
1973-75 period, after it recorded a continued surplus from 
1967 to 1972. The huge deficit in 1973 was mainly financed 
by reserve losses and partly assisted by the inflow of funds 
through banks. In 1974, however, the deficit was largely 
financed by borrowing through the banking system, whose net 
liabilities increased by almost $8 billion, compared with 
$2.72 billion a year earlier. The increase in banks' 
123 
Q) U) ..... 
' the exchange Q) o-1 !o-1 '· o-1-rei rei 4.0 ' rate .38 '" rei s:: Ur-I u Q) Cl.lr-1 Cl.l:>t 0 
QJ'O 2.0 .34 Q) !o-1 u .j..JQ) S::I.H reiO. rei 0 ,. .. '""' 0 , ' .30 p:j r-1 ' \ , ' I '-' ... ., .... U) rei U) \ 
' Q).j..J Ill s:: \ 
\ I O"lS:: 0 .. I s:: Q) U·r-i -2.0 ' ~' f .24 rei u .... - " ·r-i r-1 
' 
I ..c: U)r-1 
' I u . rel·r-i .... I ><oo Jll..O ' , ~ . -/ 
Q) s:: ,...4.0 ::J QJ-..c: ·r-i the basic ..c: 8-
balance 8 
1971 1972 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1973 1974 1975 
Year 
Figure 6. Japan: The Market Rate of the Japanese Yen and 
the Change in the Basic Balance · 
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liabilities partly explained by the withdrawals of foreign 
exchange by the monetary authorities (5, 1974, pp. 140-41). 
The deficit in the first six months of 1975 was again fi-
nanced through the banking system. The reserve assets, on 
the other hand, rose during this period owing to the sale of 
Treasury bills to non-residents (5, 1976, p. 72). The loss 
of reserves that occurred in the second half was brought 
about by market interventions in the foreign exchange 
markets. 
The percent changes in the reserve level as presented 
in Table XXIII show that reserve use during the floating has 
been·less in extent than ~uring the period under the fixed 
exchange rates. The wide fluctuations of reserves in 1971 
were the result of speculative flows of funds into Japan as 
expectatibns of the yen revaluation developed. The lesser 
use of reserves during 1974-75 came about as the exchange 
rate was allowed to absorb some of the pressure which devel-
oped during the period. 
The Netherlands 
With exports of goods and services amounting to over 
one-half the GDP, the highest ratio among the industrialized 
countries, the Dutch economy depends very much on develop-
ments in countries that are her main trading partners. Im-
ports, too, represent nearly 50% of GDP. Like other Western 
European countries, the Dutch trade chiefly with countries 





JAPAN: QUARTER-·TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN RESERVES, 
EXPRESSED IN PERCEr·JT 
Quarter 
I II III IV 
10.70 2.77 5.43 10.76 





1971 21.88 32.24 71.57 14.76 35.11 
1972 8.49 4.92 4.07 11.38 
1973 1. 31 16.14 2.66 17.23 
1974 1. 46 8.07 1. 93 2.66 
1975 4.69 3.19 9.15 3.42 
1976 10.67 8.56 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 







exports were for OECD nations, of which 67 percent went to 
EEC. Since the Common Market was founded in 1958, trade 
with the member countries has increa~ed at the expense of 
countries outside the EEC. Exports to North America, which 
in 1965 accounted for 5 percent of the total, represented 
practically the same percentage in 1974. Food, manufactured 
goods, and machinery represent the most important export 
products. Since 1974 exports of natural gas resources, lub-
ricants, and chemicals have increased rapidly in revenues as 
a result of worldwide increase in prices of oil and raw 
materials. During the 1960s the bulk of imports came mainly 
from.OECD nations (80 percent of the total), of which 67 per-
cent were from the EEC. This trend of imports continued in 
the Seventies, with a relatively larger percent of imports 
coming from the EEC. Main import items are machinery, manu-
factured goods, and fuels. 
The Netherlands trade account was in a deficit through-
out the 1960s (some $550 million annually). The offsetting 
force usually comes from the service account. Earnings from 
transportation and insurance have been the main positive con-
tributions to the account, despite a growing deficit on the 
travel account. The trend of receipts from services remained· 
rather stable, with a slight decline in the late Sixties as 
foreign travel was increasing. In total, the current account 
showed a small deficit during the Sixties. 
Capital movements, to some extent, played a counter-
balancing role to movements in the current accounts. In the 
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early 1960s, capital inflows particularly through the banking 
system were more than offsetting a small deficit in the cur-
rent account, except in 1968, when a reserve loss was 
recorded due mainly to the reduction in liabilities of the 
banks' external position. 
The Netherlands' balance of payments and the movements 
of the guilder exchange rate during the 1971-75 period are 
presented in Table XXIV. A surplus on the trade account has 
been recorded since 1972. In 1974 the trade account regis-
tered a $670 million surplus while most countries experienced 
a deficit due mainly to higher.oil payments. The strong 
trade account was explained by a rapid expansion in oil prod-
uct industries and higher earnings from natural gas exports. 
Earnings from services rendered have been on the rise, par-
ticularly during the period of 1973-74, but they fell slight-
ly in 1975. On balance, the service account tends to help 
strengthen the trade account. Thus, the current account has 
swung to a surplus since 1972. 
The outflow of capital tends to reduce the surplus in 
the current account. However, the ~mount has normally been 
less than the gain from exp6rts of goods and services. 
Therefore, the basic balance as well as ~he liquidity balance 
generally shows an annual surplus. 
The movements of the guilder exchange rate are in line 
with other currencies in the "joint float." The guilder 
exchange rate against the dollar floated upward in the first 
three quarters of 1973 and then depreciated for two quarters 
TABLE XXIV. 
THE NETHERLANDS: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1973 1974 1975 
1971 1972 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
1. Merchandise Trade: -.61 .44 .09 .38 -.17 .65 .19 .19 .22 .07 .01 .42 .21 .24 
Exports, f.o.b. 12.46 15.46 4.75 5.36 5.37 6.32 6.85 8.08 7.75 8.17 8.06 8.39 7.09 8.31 
Imports, f.o.b. -13.06 -15.02 -4.66 -4.98 -5.54 -5.67 -6.65 -7.89 -7.54 -8.09 -8.05 -7.96 -6.88 -8.07 
2. Services and Transfer .45 .85 .36 .30 .20 .48 .29 .33 .34 .40 .14 .17 -.01 .39 
3. Long-term Capital .57 -.88 -.28 -.48 -.40 -.54 -.30 -.33 -.07 -.45 -.27 -.17 -.70 
Basic Balance .41 .41 .17 .20 -.37 .59 .18 .19 .49 .02 -.12 .01 .03 -.07 
4. Short-term Capital 
Incl. Errors and 
Omissions .16 .28 .28 -.27 .12 -.41 00 -.16 -.11 .09 .34 .60 -.01 -.38 
Liquidity Balance .57 .69 .45 -.07 -.25 .18 .18 .03 .38 .11 .22 .47 .02 -.45 
5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing): 
Reserves .24 .95 .91 -1.04 .02 ,82 .06 -.46 1.15 .24 .19 -.39 .24 .27 
Banks' External 
Position .41 -.18 -.46 .97 -.26 -.64 .12 .49 -. 77 -.12 .02 .87 -.22 -.73 
Non-balance Items Affecting 
Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 101.0 102.4 103.3 103.8 106.4 "109.1 109.0 112.0 112.5 113.3 115.2 114.6 111.9 112.1 
Dollar Exchange Rate* 28.62 31.16 32.81 34.98 38.29 35.56 35.22 37.87 37.43 38.42 41.44 41.47 38.09 37.50 
Quarterly Percentage 
Change - 8.88 5.29 6.61 9.46 -1.90 6.23 7.55 -1.19 2.65 7.88 .06 -8.15 -1.53 
*Quarterly figures are obtained from monthly average rates. 





before it strengthened in l974:II. The rate in the third 
quarter of 1974 fell slightly from the preceding quarter and 
then it became strong enough through the first six months of 
1975 and started to decline in the second half. In the 
course of the floating, the guilder exchange rate reached 
its peak in l975:II. At that level (U.S. 41.468 cents per 
one guilder), it has increased by some 50 percent over the 
1970 average rate, whereas the trade-weighted exchange rate 
increased by 14.6 percent (May, 1970 = 100). 
By regressing the change in the basic balance (B) on the 
lagged level of the exchange rates (X) , corrected for auto-
correlation, the following relationship is obtained for the 
l973:I-l975:IV period: 
B = -331.2 - 105.5 xt-l + 117.5 xt_ 2 
t (0.24) (2.77)* (3.23)** 
R2 = .61, o-w= 2.67, L = .1, n = 8. 
The figures in parentheses are the t ratios. The coefficient 
of Xt-l is statistically significant at the .05 level, and 
the coefficient of Xt_ 2 is significant at the .01 level. 
The variables accounted for 61 percent of the total varia-
tions. The value of D-W statistic fndicates the absence of 
autocorrelation. The sign of Xt-l is theoretically correct, 
but the sign of the coefficient Xt_ 2 is wrong. Perhaps the 
reduction in the basic balance in response to the guilder 
appreciation occurred in the short run, followed by a per-
verse result as the guilder exchange rate appreciated further. 
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Figure 7. The Netherlands: The Market Rate of the 








and the change in the basic balance. It clearly shows that, 
without lagging the level of exchange rate, it does not give 
a close relationship with the change in the basic balance. 
Turning to examine reserve movem~nts since 1969, as pre-
sented in Table XXV, the percentage changes in reserves were 
large during the foreign exchange crisis in the 1972-74 per-
iod. However, if the quarter average figure in 1975 is taken 
as an indicator of the tendency in the use of reserves, then 
the managed floating has partly absorbed the market pressure 
as reflected in the relatively lesser use of reserves. 
Sweden 
The dependence of the Swedish economy on foreign trade 
is considerable. Imports as well as exports represented some 
25 percent each of GDP throughout the 1960s. In the Seven-
ties, the ratio of external trade to GDP increased further 
as prices of international traded goods rose faster than the 
domestic prices (53). Imports of food, fuels, and machinery 
accounted for the bulk of purchases abroad, while exports of 
raw materials and machinery including transport equipment 
represent over one-half of the total exports. During the 
Sixties and Seventies Sweden conducted the bulk of its for-
eign trade with the OECD nations. The volume of trade flows 
with these countries amounted to 80 percent of the total. 
Even though Sweden is not a member of the Common Market, her 
trade with EEC countries accounted for over one-half of total 
exports and imports. With respect to geographical 
TABLE XXV 
THE NETHERLANDS: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN 
RESERVES, EXPRESSED IN PERCENT 
Quarter 
Year I II III IV 
1969 2.23 .17 . 04 6.93 
1970 5.54 .52 ll. 41 8.20 
1971 9.77 l. 52 3.18 5.24 
1972 14.88 .62 11.80 2.47 
1973 27.19 3.47 7.03 19.86 
1974 8.31 7.96 19.46 5.41 
1975 3.44 6.06 .86 4.27 
1976 2.41 16.24 













distribution of trade, a modest trade surplus with the OECD 
countries has been maintained throughout; her trade with the 
developing countries, on the other hand, shows a consistent 
deficit owing to the heavy dependence on fuels and food 
supply. On balance, the balance showed a small surplus 
during the 1960s, then a substantial surplus began to emerge 
from the late Sixties through 1973 before it was drastically 
reduced in 1974 and 1975 as a result of higher prices of 
imported oil. 
Like the Netherlands, the main contribution to the ser-
vice account is revenues from freight and insurance. Prior 
to t~e mid-1960s, the service accounts more than compensated 
for the deficit in the trade balance, giving rise to a sur-
plus in the current balance. Commencing in 1965 the surplus 
from the service earnings began to shrink as the counter-
balancing force of foreign travel was rising rapidly. In 
addition, the traditional deficit on transfer payments not-
ably to developing countries also rose substantially in the 
late Sixties. 
In all, the current account was in a surplus prior to 
the mid-1960s as service earnings more than offset the trade 
deficit, then the turnaround began in _1965 as net service 
revenues were down combined with increasing transfer pay-
ments. The deficit in the current account continued until 
1970 before the position was reversed again in 1971. 
Capital movements, to a great extent, were sufficient 
to offset the deficit in the current account. Within the 
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capital account, net long-term direct investment showed a 
continuous outflow, which was counterbalanced by the inflow 
of borrowing abroad and other long-term capital inflows. 
The private short-term capital account including errors and 
omissions showed a small net inflow in the early 1960s and 
reached a maximum of $90 million in 1966, then was in balance 
in 1967, followed by a net outflow of $17 million and $86 
million in 1968 and 1969, respectively. A reversal began in 
the following year, which recorded a huge inflow of $450 
million. On balance, the basic balance recorded a small sur-
plus during the 1960s separated by a deficit in 1969 and 
1970. 
Table XXVI presents the balance of payments and the 
movements of the Swedish krona for the 1971-1975 period. 
The strong position of the merchandise account continued from 
the late 1960s through 1973, then it was sharply reduced in 
1974-75 arising mainly from the oil price increases. The 
service balance including transfer payments turned from a 
surplus during the Sixties to a deficit throughout the 1970s. 
In all, the current balance was in a surplus during the 1971.-
1973 period, then it turned to a deficit in the following 
two years. 
Capital movements between 1971 and 1973 showed a net 
inflow, thus giving rise to a surplus in both the basic and 
the liquidity balances. In 1974 and 1975, the basic balance 
showed a deficit despite the increase in net inflow of long-
term capital. The deficit occurred as a result of further 
TABLE XXVI 
SWEDEN: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 I II III IV I II III IV I II III - IV 
1. Merchandise Trade: .90 1.25 .44 .65 .43 .63 .11 .40 -.02 .12 .19 .18 -.05 .42 Exports, f.o.b. 7.42 8.58 2.63 2.84 2.63 3.36 3.40 3.88 3.91 4.60 4.55 4.66 3.62 4.47 Imports, f.o.b. -6.52 -7.33 -2.19 -2.19 -2.20 -2.73 -3.30 -3.48 -3.93 -4.48 -4.36 -4.48 -3.67 -4.05 2. Services and Transfer -.73 -1.00 -.25 -.25 -.:h -.18 -.36 -.36 -.38 -.45 -.61 -.65 -.49 -.60 3. Long-term Capital -.01 .12 .15 -.07 -.08 .18 -.05 .07 -.02 .27 .24 .49 .23 .18 Basic Balance .16 .37 .34 .33 .04 .63 -.30 .11 -.42 -.06 -.18 .02 -.31 .oo 4. Short-term Capital 
Incl. Errors and 
Omissions .06 .19 .08 .03 .04 -.29 .30 -.37 .17 .14 .36 .56 .48 .12 Liquidity Balance .22 .56 .42 .36 .08 .34 .oo -.26 -.25 .08 .18 .58 .17 .12 5. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing) : 
Reserves .28 .47 .40 .27 -.03 .16 -.35 -.39 -.13 .06 .09 .59 .29 .28 Banks' External 
Position .01 .14 .02 .08 .11 .17 .35 .13 -.11 .02 -.09 .oo -.12 -.16 
Non-balance Items Affecting 
Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 99.7 101.8 102.7 103.0 105.7 103.0 99.8 104.1 103.7 106.2 110.6 111.5 106.9 106.0 Dollar Exchange Rate* 19.58 21.00 21.74 22.79 24.21 22.99 21.36 23.00 22.60 23.25 25.11 25.38 23.30 22.75 Quarterly Percentag.e 
Change - 7.26 3.52 4.83 6.25 -5.07 -7.08 7.67 -1.74 2.87 8.04 1.04 -8.16 -2.36 
*Quarterly figures are obtained from monthly average rates. 





deterioration in the service account. The liquidity balance, 
on the other ahnd, showed an improvement in 1975 after it 
deteriorated in 1974 owing to the shift of the short-term 
capital acco~nt including errors and omissions from a net 
outflow to a net inflow. Thus the strong trade and the net 
inflow of capital during the 1971-1973 period was reflected 
in reserve gain. Reserve losses appeared in 1974 before 
they started to show an increase in the following year. 
The exchange rate of the Swedish ikrona remained pegged 
to the currencies in the "joint float~" The reason is ob-
vious. Trade and capital transaction~ between Sweden and the 
EEC,. particularly Germany, have played an important role in 
the Swedish economy. In addition, joining the "snake" would 
discourage speculative capital movements. Thus the Swedish 
krona experienced the same erratic movements of the exchange 
rate as those. currencies in the "snake." The changes in the 
exchange rate from quarter to quarter were relatively large. 
In six out of twelve quarters the changes were greater than 
five percent, whereas only in four quarters the changes were 
less than three percent. The highest exchange rate against 
the dollar was reached in the second quarter of 1975 (U.S. 
25.38 cents per krona) which showed an increase of 31 percent 
over the 1970 rate. The trade-weighted exchange rate, how-
ever, rose by only 11.5 percent over the same period. 
A regression to determine the relationship between the 
quarterly change in the basic balance (B) and the lagged 
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level of the exchange rates (X) , adjusted for autocorrela-
tion, produced the following result: 
Bt = 2889.3 - 126.5 xt-l - 8.2 xt_ 2 (1.15) (1.10) (.09) 
R2 = .155, D-W = 2.553, L = .1, n = 8. 
The t ratios are in parentheses. All the coefficients are 
not statistically significant at the .05 level. The lagged 
independent variables explain only 16 percent of total vari-
ations. The value of D-W indicates the absence of autocor-
relation. Figure 8 illustrates the movements of the Swedish 
krona exchange rate against the dollar and the change in the 
basic balance. It becomes apparent that the two variables 
are not strongly correlated; The reasons are that the krona 
exchange rate, on the one hand, has been managed to remain 
in line with the currencies in the "joint float'' against the 
dollar in order to halt speculative flows. The changes in 
the basic balance, on the other hand, were subject to random 
shocks, such as the oil price increases in 1974 and the shift 
in pqlicy measures regarding capital movements from strict 
controls on capital inflows to encourage borrowing abroad as 
the trade balance deteriorated (5, 1975, p. 100). 
A comparison of reserve movements in response to the 
exchange rate fluctuations is presented in Table XXVII show-
ing the percentage changes in reserves on a quarterly basis. 
It can be seen that during the period in which the krona was 
pegged to the currencies in the "snake,'' erratic changes in 
reserves have been substantial as a result of intervention by 
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SWEDEN: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN RESERVES, 
EXPRESSED :IN PERCENT 
Quarter 
Year I II III IV 
1969 7.41 21.73 6.98 27.47 
1.970 6.03 1. 22 3.87 13.41 
1971 13.93 11.30 3.42 11.22 
1972 20.27 4.42 .57 12.34 
1973 34.35 12.48 .59 6.89 
1974 9.53 21.85 7.38 4.83 
1975 5.30 30.31 16.75 10.64 
1976 5.72 1. 35 
source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 











the monetary authorities in the foreign exchange market. Re-
serve accumulations occurred from the second half of 1970 
through the end of 1973, followed by losses throughout 1974 
before a gain_re~emerged afterwards. Thus it can be con-
cluded that in the case of Sweden the exchange rate fluctua-
tions have not adequately absorbed market pressures and, 
consequently, the use of reserves has been extensive. 
Switzerland 
A small country like Switzerland with relatively high 
per capita income depends considerably on foreign trade. 
The average of exports and imports share expressed as a per-
cent of GDP was 32 percent each in 1965, then the share in-
creased to 36 percent in 1970, and it has been maintained 
rather stable since then (54, 1976). Imports of machinery, 
manufactured goods, and food accounted for the bulk of total 
purchases abroad. The main export categories are machinery, 
manufactured goods, and chemicals. Exports of timepieces 
accounted for some 14 percent of the total during the 1960s. 
Between 1966 and 1974 exports to the EEC represented some 46 
percent of the total, and the share has been remarkably 
steady, while the market share in the United States has been 
gradually decreased from 10.8 percent of total exports in 
1966 to 7.2 percent in 1974. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the trade account was in 
a deficit. The deficit averaged $400 million annually during 
the 1960s, theri it rose to $1.2 billion annually during the 
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Seventies. The increasing trade deficit, however, was suffi-
ciently offset by sizable net invisible earnings beginning 
in 1966, owing to higher investment income, while tourism 
showed a net inflow of approximately $35__9 million annually. 
Thus, the current account turned from a small deficit during 
the first half of the 1960s to a modest surplus in the second 
half. 
Examination of the Swiss capital balance is made ex-
tremely difficult by lack of data; the following information 
is obtained from (11) . In the first half of the 1960s 
Switzerland was a net capital importer as a result of its 
econ~mic boom, combined with the removal of exchange controls 
in Europe ai the beginning of the Sixties (11, pp. 33-50). 
The second half showed a net outflow in response to higher 
yields in the eurodollar market. At the·same time the strong 
current account from the mid-1960s onwards may have contrib-
uted to the capital outflow. ~n total, the liquidity balance 
recorded a surplus throughout the Siities, which was re-
flected in reserve accumulations.· 
Table XXVIII presents annual data of the Swiss balance 
of payments and the movements of the Swiss franc exchange rate 
from 1970 through 1975. The growth of the deficit in the 
trade balance reached its peak in 1974 (at $2.1 billion), 
then the balance swung to a surplus of $73 million in 1975, 
which is largely explained by a domestic recession (5, 1976, 
p. 66). The rise in both exports and imports between 1972 
and 1974 despite the continuous upward movements of the 
TABLE XXVIII 
SWITZERLAND: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1970-1975 
(in millions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1. Merchandise Trade: 
Exports, f.o.b. 
Imports, f.o.b. 
2. Services and Transfer 
Current Balance 
3. Capital Account (net) 
Liquidity Balance 
4. Balance of Payments 
(or Financing) 
Reserves 
Banks' External Position 
Non-balance Items Affecting 
Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 
Dollar Exchange Rate* 


















































































Swiss franc seems to suggest that, on the whole, price 
elasticities are inelastic (54, 197 3, :p. 14) . Thus the im-
pact of the exchange rate revaluation is limited. The high 
degree of specLalization of many_export ~oods, the excellence 
of aftersale services, the cost of changing suppliers, and 
the success of exporters in adapting ~he' dhanging pattern of 
'world demand are considered to have an influence on the in-
elastic demand for Swiss products in relation to prices (54, 
1975, p. 25). 
The higher earnings in the service account during the 
1970s were a result of the rise in interest rates in the 
eurocurrency markets. On the whole, the current balance was 
near equilibrium during the 1970-74 period, then the huge 
surplus appeared in 1975 owing almost entirely to a sharp 
reduction in imports. 
The annual changes in the Swiss franc exchange rate 
were large. The rate showed an upward trend, while the cur-
rent balance was approaching equilibrium level over the per-
iod as a whole. It is assumed, therefore, that the inflow 
of funds was the driving force behind the appreciation of 
the franc exchange rate (54) . The trade-weighted exchange 
rate in 1976:1 recorded at 150.7 (May, 1970 = 100), compared 
with the rate against the dollar which has increased by 67 
percent over the same period. Figure 9 depicts the changes 
in the trade balance (f.o.b. - c.i.f.) and the level of the 
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Figure 9. Switzerland: The Market Rate of the Swiss 
Franc and the Change in the Trade Balance 
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the changes from quarter to quarter were erratic, the trade 
balance exhibited the tendency of moving towards equilibrium. 
Capital movements, as shown in Table XXVIII, are pre-
sented on a net. annual basis. With limited data information, 
the capital account showed a net inflow from 1970 through 
1975 except in 1972 when the b~lance was' close to equilib-
r 
I 
rium. The large inflow of funps occu:r;-red in the 1970s de-
spite various policy measures adopted·to discourage such , ; 
flows. 9 The failure to stop c;apital ~nflows has induced the 
I 
Swiss authorities to consider seriously joining the ''snake." 
Since Switzerland is not a member of the IMF it has not 
I 
been. in a position to draw on a stock of conditional liquid-
ity or at present obtain SDRs. Prior to 1971, gold was the 
largest component of total reserve assets; since 1972 the 
changes in assets have been in the form of foreign exchange, 
essentially u.s. dollars. Table XXIX presents the changes in 
reserve level, expressed as a percent from the previous quar-
ter. The erratic movements of reserves during 1969-197l:III 
were on several occasions the results of swap transactions 
between the Swiss National Bank and the commercial banks. 
The 21.27 percent increase in 1969:IV was a result of swap 
transfer of dollars from the banks to the National Bank (5, 
9such policy measures are, for instance, the upward 
adjustments in reserve requirements on liabilities to non-
residents in order to limit banks' liquidity, interest was 
also discontinued on all bank despoits by non-residents 
deposits, instead a commission of 3 percent per quarter must 
be paid on them, and on several occasions banks were required 
to balance their foreign currency position at the close of 
each day's business [see (54)]. 
TABLE XXIX 
SWITZERLAND: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN RESERVES, 
EXPRESSED IN PERC~NT 
Quarter 
Year I II III IV 
1969 18.45 3.43 .77 21.27 
1970 9.22 7.02 4.93 13.77 
1971 9.99 9.95 28.84 6.37 
1972 3.19 4.06 5.51 1.12 
1973 7.57 7.23 .78 l. 49 
1974 5.86 4.89 l. 46 8.70 
1975 .39 2.94 4.95 25.93 
1976 4.29 10.34 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 












1970, p. 128). Another substantial increase in reserves oc-
curred in 197l:III, particularly in the first two weeks of 
August, which recorded an increase of $2.1 billion as a re-
sult of currency speculation (5, 1972). After the tremendous 
inflow in August, 1971, the Swiss authorities did not inter-
vene in the exchange market from September, 1971 through 
December, 1974, as a result relatively small changes in 
reserves were recorded. The improvement in the external 
position during this period was reflected in the increase in 
banks' net foreign assets, in spite of tight controls on the 
inflow through the banking system. The exchange market 
inte~vention resumed in 1975 and as a result, the changes 1n 
reserves were becoming relatively large, particularly in the 
second half of 1975. It can be concluded that reserve 
changes were relatively large under the fixed exchange rate 
regime, as happened prior to the third quarter of 1971 and 
in 1975. If the exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate 
freely as it occurred during the 197l:IV-1974:IV period, 
reserve changes were relatively smaller as the exchange rate 
absorbed most of the market pressures. 
The United Kingdom 
Britain has traditionally been a large net importer of 
basic foodstuffs, raw materials, and fuels, the resulting 
deficit being covered by net exports of manufactured products 
and by earnings from services rendered. The average of ex-
ports and imports of goods and services as a percent of GDP 
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was 17 percent each in 1963, then it rose to 20 percent in 
1970. The recent increases in prices of commodities and 
fuels contributed to higher payments~ for imports, while ex-
port prices of manufactures have been lagging behind; there-
fore, the ratios of exports and imports of goods and services 
to GDP were 21 and 25 percent, respectiv~ly, in 1974. During 
the 1960s British exports of manufactures increased at a 
relatively slower pace than the world's rate of export 
growth, while imports of manufactured goods increased 
rapidly. In relative terms, the share of manufactured ex-
ports as a percent of total exports fell from 16 percent in 
1960. to ll percent in 1970. Between 1963 and 1972 almost 
three quarters of the rise in imports was attributable to 
manufactured goods (15). Britain's bilateral trade with her 
main trading partners also showed some significant changes 
during the Sixties. In the first half of the decade the mer-
chandise trade account showed a surplus with major Western 
European countries, with an exception of the Netherlands, 
which showed more imports than exports. A trade deficit was 
recorded with the United States and the developing countries, 
and the trend continued throughout the Sixties as well as in 
the Seventies. The shift from a strong surplus to a deficit 
on the trade account vis-a-vis her Western trading countries 
occurred in the mid-l960s and the deficit continued into the 
1970s despite the 1967 devaluation. The decline in exports, 
particularly in manufactured goods, can be explained by 
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non-price factors other than rising export prices. One pos-
sible explanation of the fall in Brit~in's exports is that: 
... the income elasticity of demand for U.K. exports 
is lower than that for, say German or Japanese 
goods. In the aggregate this. cotild.happen for 
structural reasons, because the U.K. specialised 
in products which were unresponsive to income 
growth abroad, or in trading partners whose in-
comes grew more slowly than thos~'of our competi-
tors. Alternatively, in a world,when the impetus 
to trade is increasingly tehcnolagical, a low 
income elasticity of demand can ~merge as a 
result of technological backward~ess. Countries 
which introduce new goods or continuously differ-
entiate their products by means of quality im-
provements face a higher income elasticity than 
do countries which export goods with well estab-
lished production technologies which are already 
available within the customer's qwn economy (44, 
p. 90). 
The net surplus on the invisible balance has helped the 
British to meet·the deficit on the trade account. Some 
developments occurred, however, in the components of the 
invisibles during the 1960s. Investment income and "other" 
services recorded a substantial surplus, while government's 
net payments and transfers showed a fair amount of deficits. 
A small deficit also appeared in foreign travel, whereas 
earnings from transportation were approximately in balance. 
In all, the surplus was rather steady in the early part of 
the Sixties, but after 1966 it started to increase at a fast 
rate (42). 
The current account from 1961 through 1970 recorded 
four deficits, which occurred in 1962-63, 1967, and in 1968. 
For the average of the whole period, outpayments were greater 
than.· inpaymen ts. 
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The capital account also recorded a deficit in the 1960s 
period taken as a whole. Long-term capital accounts showed 
a consistent deficit resulting from more investment abroad 
than at home, in addition to the new outflow of government 
payments on loans received. Export trade cr~dits increased 
more than credits received; co+nbined with the net outflow in 
the miscellaneous item they contributed to a deterioration in 
the capital balance. 
Table XXX presents the deyelopmeqts of the U.K. balance 
of payments and the movements bf tn~ pound sterling exchange 
rate from 1971 through 1975. On the ~rade account, a small 
surplus was recorded in 1971, but from 1972 onwards the defi-
cit was steadily widening until it reached $12.3 billion for 
1974 as a whole, followed by a reduction to $7 billion in 
1975. The slow growth on invisible accounts occurred between 
1970 and 1972, but in the following three years a significant 
inflow of funds from foreign investments contributed to a 
marked increase in the service account. On balance, the cur-
rent account remained in a surplus between 1971 and 1972, 
then the deficit began to emerge beginning in 1973, the first 
time since 1968, and it continued to 1975. 
Long-term investments in the U.K. showed uneven inflows. 
They grew rapidly in 1970 and in 1971, but fell back in 1972, 
then rose significantly in the following two years before 
they fell back again in 1975. Direct investment abroad, on 
the other hand, rose at a very high rate between 1971 and 
1973, then it was cut back in 1974. However, as world 
TABLE XXX 
THE UNITED KINGDOM: EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars; a minus sign indicates an outflow) 
1972 1973 
1971 I II III IV I II III 
1. Merchandise Trade: .68 -.55 -.01 -.07 -.26 -1.28 -.99 -1.44 Exports, f.o.b. 21.44 5.66 6.22 4.66 6.34 6.48 7.33 7.18 Imports, f.o.b. -20.76 -6.21 -6.30 -5.47 -6.60 -7.76 -8.32 -8.62 2. Services and Transfer 1.89 .51 .49 .44 .41 .46 .95 .98 Current Balance 2.56 -.04 .48 -.37 -.15 -.82 -.04 -.46 3. Long-term Capital -.37 -.53 -.63 -.25 -.88 -.23 -.01 .24 Basic Balance 2.19 -.57 -.15 -.62 -1.03 -1.05 -.05 -.70 4. Short-term Capital Including Errors 
and Omissions -3.85 .12 -1.43 .16 -.64 .31 -1.88 -.51 Liquidity Balance -1.66 -.45 -1.58 -.46 -1.67 -.74 1.93 -1.21 5. Balance of Payments (or Financing) 
Reserves 3.75 .50 -.12 -1.56 -.47 .17 .95 -.64 Change in Sterling Holding 1. 74 -.54 -.07 .21 -.32 -.49 -.22 .85 Banks' External Liabilities 
[Increase (-) l -2.91 -.06 1.21 -.48 -.88 -.31 -1.00 -.52 Government Borrowing [Increase (-) l -4.24 -.35 -2.60 1. 37 .oo -.11 -. 71 -.90 
--
Non-balance Items Affecting Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 





















TABLE XXX (Continued) 
1. Merchandise Trade: 
Exports, f.o.b. 
Imports, f.o.b. 
2. Services and Transfer 
Current Balance 
3. Long-term Capital 
Basic Balance 
4. Short-term Capital Including 
Errors and Omissions 
Liquidity Balance 
5. Balance of Payments (or Financing) 
Reserves 
Change in Sterling Holding 




Non-balance Items Affecting Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(December, 1971 = 100) 
Dollar Exchange Rate* 
























































































Source: Bank of England, Quarterl¥ Bulletin, June, 1976 and earlier issues; 

























































economic recovery was underway in 1975, the outflow for 
investment abroad re~umed. On.balance, investment overseas 
by the U.K. was more than the inflow from abroad during the 
period of 1971 through 1973 and in 19j5, while the position 
was reversed in 1974. Thus the changes in the basic balance 
followed the same general pattern as the''cuirent adcount. 
. I 
After a substantial surplus between 1969 and 1971, the basic 
balance has been deteriorating since 1972 despite the con-
' 
tinued depreciation of the pound. 
On the foreign exchange market, after the sterling was 
allowed to float in June, 1972, it depreciated through the 
first quarter of 1974, interrupted by •an improvement in the 
first half of 1973. The pound recovered in l974:II but it 
weakened for the remainder of the year. The level of the 
exchange rate, however, at the fourth quarter of 1974 was 
higher than the level at the beginning of the year. During 
the first quarter of 1975 the pound showed slight improvement 
over the preceding quarter, then it depreciated further 
throughout the rest of the year. At the fourth quarter of 
1975, the exchange rate of the pound against the dollar had 
dropped by 19 percent from the December, 1971 level, compared 
with a fall of almost 30 percent against the average of major 
currencies for the same period. 
To further examine whether the depreciation of the pound 
has improved the basic balance, a simple regression was run 
by regressing the quarterly change in the basic balance (B) 
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on the lagged level of the pound exchange rates (X) , cor-
rected for autocorrelation, the estimated result is: 
B = 3097.1- 1023 X - 2507 X 
t (1.13) (0.48) t-l (1.24) t-: 2 
R2 = .155, D-W = 2.275, L = .6, n = .10. 
The t ratios are in parentheses. All the coefficients are 
not statistically significant at the .05 level, although the 
signs are correct. The lagged independent variables explain 
bnly 15 percent of the total variations. The value of the 
D-W statistic indicates the absence of autocorrelation. 
Figure 10 illustrates the movements of the pound ster-
ling exchange rate and the change in the basic balance. It 
can be seen that the depreciation of the pound has not fully 
corrected the imbalance. 
To finance the deficit in the current as well as long-
term capital accounts, private and public sectors are urged 
to borrow from the international money markets, particularly 
in the eurocurrency market. As listed in Table XXX, in addi-
tion to reserve changes, the major sources of funds to fi-
nance the deficit are the increase in sterling liabilities 
to oil exporting countries and other monetary authorities, 
changes in banks' short-term external position, and central 
government borrowing, including the U.K. public sector borrow-
ing under the exchange cover schemes. 10 
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figure 10. The United Kingdom: The Market Rate of the 
Pound Sterling and the Change in the Basic 
Balance · 
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Throughout the 1970s reserves were added to the official 
balance more than they we~e used to finance the deficit. In 
1971 alone, the enormous gain in reserves was more than suf-
ficient to pay for the reserves lqss that occurred in 1972 
and 1975. The sterling balances held by oil exporting 
countries and other monetary authorities excluding the IMF 
recorded a fair amount of the increase. However, whenever 
the sterling was considered to be uncertain, the switch from 
the sterling holding to other foreign currencies occurred 
during the period of 1971 prior to the floating of the pound 
in mid-1972; another reduction occurred in 1973:III resulting 
partly from the uncertainties of the future of the pound 
(9, December, 1973, p. 414). The reduction in the sterling 
holdings during the second half of 1975 was partly explained 
by a high rate of expenditure by some oil-exporting countries 
(9, December, 1975), p. 328). In other quarters, the ster-
ling liabilities showed a net increase. 
Another avenue of obtaining foreign currencies is 
through the banking system. Between 1971 and 1973 commerical 
banks' short-term liabilities were relatively high, then they 
declined in the second half of 1974. The net liabilities 
rose again by an unusually large $1.98 billion in 1975:II 
probably because 
... a large payment of oil revenues was delayed from 
the first quarter, the banks apparently switched 
heavily into sterling, and U.K. residents resumed 
borrowing in foreign currencies to finance invest-
ment abroad (9, September, 1975, p. 214). 
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The reduction of banks' liabilities in the remainder of 1975 
partly reflected an increase in deposits of U.K. residents, 
mainly oil companies 9, March, 1976, p. 12). 
Additional sources of funds consist of government bor-
rowing from monetary institutions in the form of foreign cur-
rency deposits and assistance with a sterling counterpart, 
and other official swaps. In June, 1976, the Bank of England 
received a standby credit in excess of $5 billion from the 
Group of Ten countries and Switzerland, arranged by the Bank 
for International Settlements (9, June, 1976, p. 163). Fur-
thermore, the U.K. public sector also borrows from financial 
markets under the exchange cover schemes. On balance, the 
loans received through financial markets together with the 
increase in sterling liabilities to non-residents and inter-
national institutions have helped to finance the deficit. On 
several occasions the borrowed funds more than offset the 
deficit, so that on the whole between the 1971 and 1975 per-
iod reserves actually rose. 
Table XXXI presents the percentage changes in reserve 
level during the period of 1969 through 1976:II. Prior to 
the pound floating in late June, 1972, an enormous inflow of 
reserves was recorded, particularly during 1971 as a result 
of the surplus on current account. After the pound was al-
lowed to float freely, the changes in reserves in 1973 and 
1974 were relatively small in comparison with those in 1971. 
The small changes in reserves were reflected in the increase 
in liabilities incurred by the government and the public 
TABLE XXXI 
THE UNITED KINGDOM: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN 
RESERVES, EXPRESSED IN PERCENT 
Quarter 
Year I II III IV 
1969 1. 98 1.05 .45 3.86 
1~70 7.24 2 .'99 4.48 6.04 
1971 17.30 9.17 38.53 31.25 
1972 7.47 9.20 21.16 7.27 
1973 6.89 16.18 9.00 1. 47 
1974 .49 4.14 7.11 3.46 
1975 5.55 12.82 8.27 6.79 
1976 8.39 10.39 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 












~ector. In 197S reserves changes were beginning to exceed 
the preceding year. Thus it can be stated that the evidence 
is incortclusive concerning the use of reserves under the 
flexible exchange rate system in this instance. 
The United States 
As the world's ·largest economy the average of the total 
value of exports artd imports suipasses that of any other 
country~ However, as a percent of ~DP, the shar~ of foreign 
trade sector was approximately four percent during the 1960s, 
then it rose tq seven percent in 1975 .. The trends of exports 
and impol:"ts in the past decade can be summarized as· follows: 
Th.e United States has a comparative trade advantage in capi-
tal goods and chemicals and is·a net importer of many con-
sufuer goods and other non~agricultural industrial supplies 
anci materials, with automotive products remaining on the 
margin (14) ~ The loss of competitive advan.fage in consumer 
goods and textiles began in the late 1950s. In some indus-
trial stipplies ~nd materials-~fuels and iubricants, basic 
mater~als for iron and steel, and their products--the United 
States was a net· exp~rter before World War II and became a 
net importer thereafter. With respect to her bilateral 
·trade,_ the United States has a close economic relation with 
Canada. . ·A small surplus on· the trade account was recorded 
before· 1967 and a deficit of some $2 billion annually there-
after. rrade with Japan also_exhibited a pattern similar to 
'. . 
the Canadian case except the turning point from a surplus 
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position to a deficit occurred in .1965, three years sooner. 
Trade with countries in the Economic Community taken as a 
whole and with the developing countries excluding oil-
exporting countries, the United States has been a net ex-
porter to these countries. In all, during the first half of 
the 1960s the total value of exports exceeded import~ by a 
·.wide margin; the gap gradually narrowed in the second half. 
On account of service earnings, net receipts on payments 
for royalties and fees as well as investment incomes are the 
major sources of infl?w, while the offsetting outflows are 
expenditures on foreign travel and others including private 
remittances and government tr~nsfers. On the while, the 
service accounts have been sources of net income throughout. 
The sum of the trade and service accounts recorded a large 
surplus in the first half of the 1960s. The surplus then was 
drastically reduced in 1966 and 1967 as the trade account was 
deteriorating, combined with a rising outflow on unilateral 
transfers and a reduction of service earnings. From 1968 
onwards a deficit on the current account emerged. 
The basic balance adds the net movements. of direct in-
vestments and government capital transactions to the balance 
on current account. Portfolio investment is consolidated 
under the short-term capital account since recent empirical 
work on long-term portfolio investment--purchases and sales 
of long-term financial instruments--suggests that the trans-
actions are sensitive to changes in interest differentials, 
which are the nature of short-term capital flows (13). 
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During the 1960s, movement in the direct invest~ent balance 
was due mainly to changes in U.s. investment. Foreign direct 
investment in the United State~ wa~ sm~ll, averaging ab~ut 
; ' ' 
$140 millibn annually,_. .. and. .steadily flUctuating between 
i 
zero in 1963-64 and $300 million in 1968. However, in 1969 
and 1970 foreign investment in1 the un{tea States rose to $800 
, I ' 
I i 
million and $1 billion, respectively. ' This jump improved the 
I 
net direct investment balance ~n 1969 'and held it in 1970 at 
1 I 
about the 1964-65 level as U.~. outfl~ws rose from $3.2 
billion in 1969 to $4.3 billio'n. 
After reaching a peak su~plus of;$2 billion in 1964, 
the basic balance fell to a deficit of $5.5 billion and $6.2 
billion in 1968 and 1969, respectively. The decline was 
interrupted only by the recession of 1967. In 1970 the cur-
rent account improved by $1.7 billion. 
Table XXXII presents the United States balance of pay-
ments and the dollar exchange rate against the avera~e of 
major cur.rencies in world trade. The presentation· of the 
U.S. balance of payments follows the recommendation given by 
the Advisory Committee on the Presentation of Balance of Pay-
ments Statistics in response to the recent changes in the 
international monetary environment (69, June, 1976). The 
new format is now being incorporated in the quarterly publi-
cation of the balance of payments by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 
Business. 
TABLE XXXII 
THE UNITED STATES: EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971-1975 
(in billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted) 
1971 1972 1973 
I II III IV I II III IV I II 
1. Merchandise Trade: .23 -.76 -.30 -1.42 -1.70 -1.60 -1.54 -1.58 -.94 -.25 
Exports, f.o.b. 10.99 10.96 11.65 9.75 11.79 11.70 12.49 13.40 15.42 16.96 
Imports, f.o.b. -10.76 -11.72 -11.95 -11.14 -13.49 -13.30 -14.03 -14.98 -16.36 -17.21 
2. Services and Transfer -.40 -.20 -. 71 -.38 -1.10 -1.04 -.68 -.56 -. 26 -.68 
Current Balance -.17 -.96 -1.01 -1.80 -2.80 -2.64 -2.22 -2.14 -1.20 -.93 
3. Direct Investment (Net) -1.08 -1.31 -1.84 -.67 -1.34 -.12 -1.16 -.53 -2.09 -.39 
4. Government Capital Transactions -.65 -.58 -.61 -.55 -.30 -.13 -.38 -.37 -.36 .02 
Basic Balance -1.90 -2.85 -3.46 -3.02 -4.44 -2.89 -3.76 -3.04 -3.65 -1.80 
5. Non-banks' Net Position -.41 -.16 -.26 -.03 -.26 .07 -.07 -.02 -.57 -.15 
6. Change in U.S. Banks' 
Assets -.24 -.36 -1.39 -.99 -1.08 .19 -1.06 -1.56 -2.99 -.76 
Liabilities -2.96 -2.64 -1.26 -.05 .70 1.67 .41 1.97 -1.67 2.26 
7. Foreign Purchases of U.S. 
Treasury Securities .18 1. 86 -.79 -1.27 .00 -.08 -.01 .06 -.12 -.18 
8. Securities Transactions (Net) .15 -.17 .28 .92 .58 .64 .92 1. 74 1.77 .40 
9. Discrepancy -. 89 -2.08 -5.11 -1.53 .76 -.39 -1.34 -.82 -2.77 .so 
Inflow (+) or Outflow (-) to be Financed -6.07 -6.40 -11.99 -5.97 -3.74 -. 79\ " ' -4.91 -1.67 -10.00 .77 
Balance of Payments (or Financing) : 
Reserves .86 .83 1.37 -.01 .61 -.05 .12 .07 .22 .02 
Change in u.s. Liabilities 5.23 5.57 10.62 5.98 3.13 .86 4.74 1.60 9. 77 -.79 
Non-balance Item Affecting Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 




TABLE XXXII (Continued) 
1973 1974 1975 III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
1. Merchandise Trade: .72 1.38 -.15 -1.49 -2.33 -1.40 1.44 3.25 2.10 2.19 Exports, f;o.b. 18.46 20.57 22.46 24.21 25.04 26.60 27.02 25.85 26.61 27.65 Imports, f.o.b. -17.74 -19.19 -22.61 -25.70 -27.37 -28.00 -25.58 -22.60 -24.51 -25.46 2. Services and Transfer -.14 .20 -.01 -.31 .86 1.23 -.02 .65 1.14 .sa Current Balance .58 1.58 -.16 -1.80 -1.47 -.17 1.42 3.90 3.24 3.07 3. Direct Investment (Net) .45 -.26 .17 .23· -1.87 -3.54 -1.03 -1.55 -.82 -.46 4. Government Capital Transactions .41 -.74 1.45 .42 .06 -.86 -.46 -.42 -.40 -.45 Basic Balance .62 .sa 1.46 -1.15 -3.28 -4.57 -.07 1.93 2.02 2.16 5. Non-Bank's Net Position -.05 -.58 -1.76 -.20 .51 .68 .12 -1.11 -.92 6. Change in u.s. Banks' 
Assets .30 -2.53 -5.24 -7.58 -1.94 -4.73 -3.70 -3.82 -.43 -5.29 Liabilities .98 3.13 4.47 4.17 3.76 3.61 -2.46 .78 1.63 .70 7. Foreign Purchases of U.S. 
Treasury Securities -.20 .29 .14 -.24 .20 .60 .75 -.42 2.16 .16 a. Securities Transactions (Net) .98 .22 .11 .09 .05 -1.62 -1.58 -.59 -.16 -1.14 9. Discrepancy -1.71 1.87 2.17 .76 -.92 2.55 3.75 .13 -1.42 2.14 Inflow (+) or Outflow (-) to be Financed .92 2.98 1.35 -4.15 -1.72 -4.32 -2.63 -1.87 2.69 -2.19 
Balance of Payments (or Financing): 
Reserves -.01 -.01 -.21 -.35 -1.00 .14 -.33 -.03 -.34 .09 Change in U.S. Liabilities -.89 -2.95 -1.14 4.49 2.73 4.17 2.96 1.91 -2.35 2.09 
Non-balance Item Affecting Payments: 
Effective Exchange Rate 
(May, 1970 = 100) 79.30 81.80 85.70 82.60 84.30 84.00 81.30 81.40 85.20 86.20 





In Table XXXII, earnings from merchandise exports con-
tinued to grow from the 1960s but at ~- slower pace during 
1971 and 1972, then the rate was accelerated in the following 
three years. -The growth was interr~pted only by the reces-
sion in continental Europe during the first three quarters 
of 1975. Imports too rose rapidly between 1971 and 1974. As 
a result, a trade deficit (seasonally adjusted) appeared for 
the first time in the second quarter of 1971. The deficit 
continued for nine consecutive quarters then it reverted to 
a small surplus in the second half of ,1973. The consequence 
of oil price increases is reflected in the reappearing of 
the deficit on the U.S. trade account throughout 1974. How-
ever, in 1975 the tremendous increase in exports combined with 
the decline in imports yielded almost $9 billion surplus for 
the year as a whole. 
To further examine the impact of the dollar devaluation, 
Table XXXIII shows U.S. trade with her trading areas during 
the 1971-1975 period. After being a net exporter to the 
Economic Community during the 1960s, net trade was almost in 
balanc.e in 1971. However, in 197 2 the United States became a 
net importer from the EC for the first time. In the follow-
ing three years, the United States regained her position as 
a net exporter. In fact, the surplus has been rising very 
rapidly since 1973. The United States has imported more than 
she exported to Japan since 1965, but the deficit was sharply 
reduced between 1973 and 1975, after a record trade deficit 
was reached in 1972. Trade with Canada also showed a reverse 
TABLE XXXIII 
U.S. TRADE BY AREA* 
Economic Community Ja:ean 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Exports 10.4 11.4 16.8 21.8 22.8 Exports 4.1 5.0 8.5 10.7 9.6 
Imports -10.0 -12.0 -15.8 -19.2 -16.5 Imports -7.3 -9.1 -9.7 -12.4 -11.2 
Net Trade . 4 -.6 1.0 2.6 6.3 Net Trade -3.2 -4.1 -1.2 -1.7 
Canada Other Developed Countries 
1971 1972 1973 1974 
--
1975 -· 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Exports 10.5 12.7 15.6 21.8 23.5 Exports 4.9 5.5 6.8 10.2 
Imports -12.2 -14.5 -17.2 -22.4 -21.8 Imports -3.9 . -5.4 -5.7 -7.2 
Net Trade -1.7 -1.8 -1.6 . 6 1.7 Net Trade 1.0 .1 1.1 3.1 
Developing Countries :Eastern Europe 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Exports 12.5 13.4 20.1 32.1 37.4 Exports . 4 . 9 2.6 1.7 
Imports -11.9 -14.4 -20.8 -41.5 -41.4 Imports -.2 -.4 -.7 -1.0 
Net Trade . 6 -.9 -.7 -9.4 -4.0 Net Trade . 2 . 5 1.9 . 7 
*The values of trade are in billions of dollars. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 














position begihning in 1974, after an annual deficit of almost 
$2 billion between 1968 and 1973. U.S. exports have been 
gaining strong positions in other developed countries 
(Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and other Western 
Europe) and Eastern Europe. The United States is also a net 
exporter to the developing countries thoughout the entire 
period but, as shown in Table XXXIII, a trade deficit has 
been recorded since 1972 due mainly to the higher payments 
for oil. Thus the dollar devaluation has helped the United 
States to strengthen her trade position, where it was pre-
viously weak, and to improve her trade position vis-a-vis 
Jap9-n. 
The fluctuations in the invisible account are mainly 
due to repatriation of earnings from abroad, while the out-
flows are government transfers which show a steady increase 
at a rate of some $100 million annually. The small net 
surplus on the service account between 1971 and 1973 was 
more than offset by the outpayments of unilateral transfers. 
The invisible account thus was in a deficit during that 
period. But in 1974 a marked increase in the inflow of in-
come from direct investments abroad contributed to a surplus 
of the invisibles. The repatriation of earnings in the 
following year fell back to the level attained in 1973. The 
further increase in the surplus on invisibles was due to 
higher receipts from tourists and a reduction in payments 
for transport services as a result of lower imports. In 
all, the current balance recorded a deficit between 1971 
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and 1972, and was in equilibrium in 1973. The cutrent bal-
ance was in the red again in 1974 mainly because of higher 
oil payments, followed by a huge surplus as exports contin-
ued to rise, combined with .a cutback in imports resulting 
from the slowdown in economic activity at home. 
As stated earlier, the direct investment abroad and 
U.S. government capital transactions are relatively less 
sensitive to the interest rate differentials between home 
and abroad, therefore, the two balances are added to the 
current balance to obtain the·basic balance .. Government 
capital transactions are primarily government loans and 
repayments. This balance exhibits a stable net outflow of 
some $400 million annually~ Foreign direct investment in 
the U.S. was small from 1971 through the first half of 1973. 
It fluc·tuated from zero in 1971 to almost $1 billion inflow 
during the first six months of 1973. In the following four 
quarters direct investment in the U.nited States rose signif-
icantly to an average of some $1 billion quarterly, then it 
fell sharply afterwards in response to the U.S. recession. 
It rebounded to a level of $1.2 billion in the final quarter 
of $1975. The United States direct investments abroad, on 
the other hand, show a consistent outflow throughout. Be-
tween 1971 and 1973 the outflow on the average was a little 
over $4 billion annually, followed by a further increase to 
a level of $7.7 and $6.3 billion in 1974 and 1975, 
respectively. The tremendous outflow of capital in 1974 
followed the termination of capital controls in January, 
1974. 11 
The movements of the basic balance showed a similar 
trend to that of the trade balance. The deficit in the 
basic balance continued from the late 1960s to the early 
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part of the 1970s, reaching a recorded level of $14 billion 
in 1972. But in 1973 the balance showed an improvement; the 
deficit was cut substantially in the first half as a result 
of the improvement in the trade account. As the trade ac-
count improved further, the-basic balance moved to a surplus. 
In 1974:1 the basic balance showed a surplus of $1.5 billion, 
while the trade account was in balance, due mainly to repay-
ment of loans (in rupee) previously extended to India (69, 
June, 1974, p. 27). The balance dropped back to a deficit 
from the second through the fourth quarter of 1974 resulting 
from the deterioration in the trade account. The basic bal-
ance was in equilibrium in the first quarter of 1975, fol-
lowed by a surplus of $2 billion quarterly through the last 
quarter. 
--·--·--·---
11 capital controls were instituted in the early 1960s. 
The controls consisted of three measures: the Interest 
Equalization Tax (lET) designed to discourage foreign port-
folio investment by U.S. residents, the Voluntary Foreign 
Credit Restraint (VFCR) implemented to limit the value credit 
extended to foreigners by specifying absolute ceilings on the 
amounts domestic financial institutions may lend abroad, and 
the Foreign Direct Investment Program (FDIP) created to limit 




.in the foreign exchange mar~et, th~ value of the dollar 
is reflected in the. fluctuations of. currencies of the major 
European countries .. After the dollarwas first devalued in 
1971 and the subsequent realignments of the European cur-
rencies, th~.effective value of the dollar went down by 
three .percent from the level of May, 1970. During the course 
of 1~72 major Europeari·currencies were.allowed to float on 
several ~hort nc6a~ions ~xcept Britain, which has adopted 
. . 
managed floating since June, 1972. The effective exchange 
rate of the dollai dropped another seven percent in 1972. 
After the fixed exchange rate ~ystem was dismantled in ~he 
early 1973 the dollar dep:r:eciated further by about ten per- · 
cent between 1972 and the third quarter of 1973, and then 
appreciated.byabout·five percent from 1973:IV through 
1974:I. During the last three qti~rters of 1974 the effec-
' 
tive~r~te o~ the dollar ·change~-~ery little; it stood at a 
level of.84 (May, 1970 = 100). After a drop of about three 
percent from 197 4 :·IV to 197 5: I the effective value of the 
dollar remained unchanged in the first.six months of 1975, 
then it gradually appreciated from 1975:I!I through 1976:I 
as a result of general depreciation of major European cur-
rencies. The effective value. of the dollar in the first 
.quarter of 1976 depreciated by thirteen percent from the 
. . 
level in May, 1970. 
Other accounts that being recorded "above the line" are 
non-banks' net change in transactions with foreigfiers, 
changes in u,. S ~ banks' assets and liabilities, foreign 
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purchases of U.S. Treasury securities, net change in secur-
ity transactions, and statistical discrepancy. The net out-
flows, mostly in short-term claims, to unaffiliated 
foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanks fluctuated widely and 
were on a rise. The net outflow recorded $860 million for 
1971, then it was reduced in 1972, followed by a further 
increase in the outflow to a level of $1.4 billion and 
$1.6 billion in 1973 and 1974, respectively. The swing 
from a net lender to a net borrower in the first six months 
of 1975 was due to net sales of U.S. bonds by the U.K. and 
international organizations (69, September, 1975, pp. 38-43). 
The ·reverse to a net lender position occurred in the second 
half. 
U.S. liabilities reported by banks (increase in borrow-
ing from abroad) and foreign purchases of U.S. Treasury 
securities, both formerly classified as liquid liabilities, 
recorded large outflows during 1971 in response to the ex-
pectations of a dollar devaluation. The swing from lending 
to borrowing abroad occurred in the following year and 
resulted from banks' transactions with Canada and Japan, and 
higher interest rates in the United States than in those two 
countries (5, 1973, p. 92). Foreign purchases of U.S. Treas-
ury securities showed a small increase in l972:IV offsetting 
sales in the earlier quarters. As the value of the dollar 
was uncertain during 1973 private foreign holders of U.S. 
Treasury securities disposed of their assets; U.S. banks 
also stepped up their lending abroad in February, before the 
171 
dollar devaluation, and in early March, before the currency 
adjustment (5, 1973, p. 92). The flight from the dollar took 
place despite a substantial improvement on current account. 
During 1974 banks' liabilities were at an extraordinary high 
level; most of the increase was to the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), followed by a sharp 
reduction due to rising U.S. short-term interest rates. For-
eign purchases of U.S. Treasury securities started to in-
crease from the second half of 1974 through 1975; most of 
the increase came from purchases by the OPEC members. On 
the asset side, little change in claims on foreigners oc-
curred between 1971 and 1972; they stood at a level of some 
$3 billion outflow annually. The outflow was accelerated in 
1973 in response to expectations of exchange rate changes. 
The marked increase in claims or assets which occurred in 
1974 was due to the role of U.S. banks as international 
financial intermediaries to help other oil-importing coun-
tries paying for higher oil prices (69, 1974, p. 27). In 
1975 the outflow was reduced somewhat as oil-importing 
countries turned to borrow from international organizations. 
The balance on security transactions other than Treas-
ury issues showed net purchases of U.S. securities by for-
eigners from 1971 through l974:III. The reverse trend 
occurred during the 1975 period as Canadian banks, the World 
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank floated new 
bonds in the U.S. market due to the relatively low cost 
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of borrowing in the United States compared with most other 
leading countries (69, June, 1975, pp. 19-23). 
The financing of the huge outflow of funds was accom-
plished mainly by borrowing foreign official holdings, in 
addition to the reduction in reserves. Between 1971 and 
1972 the United States increased its liabilities to foreign 
official accounts by $27.4 and $10.3 billion, respectively, 
as a result of the runs on the dollar. In the first quarter 
of 1973 the net official position of the United States 
deteriorated by a further $10 billion, of which $9.8 billion 
took the form of a continued rise in official liabilities; 
most of the deterioration occurred in the crisis month of 
February (5, 1973, pp. 125-127). The turnaround to a net 
lender during the 1973:II-1974:I period was a result of the 
net inflow of funds through the banking sector combined with 
the strengthening of the dollar in the latter period. In 
the remaining months of 1974 the u.s. liabilities to foreign 
official holdings increased to the total of $11.4 billion, 
most of which was in the account of the OPEC members. Re-
serve assets, on the other hand, showed an increase of $1.2 
billion due mainly to other countries' drawings of dollars 
from the IMF (5, 1975, pp. 109-110). The U.S. reserve posi-
tion at the IMF continued to improve during the course of 
1975, but the major changes occurred on the liabilities side, 
when foreign official dollar holdings rose by $4.6 billion, 
an increase of only one-third of the 1974 figure. 
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Table XXXIV presents quarter-to-quarter changes in U.S. 
liabilities to foreign offibial creditors from 1969 through 
1976:I; the change is expressed as a percentage comparison 
with the preceding quarter. Reserve changes are not the 
only alternative to exchange rate changes because the United 
States intervenes in the foreign exchange markets by varying 
its liabilities to foreign official creditors. Reserve 
changes were insignificant and consisted mostly in foreign 
official drawings on U.S. reserve positions at the IMF, 
particularly SDRs. Furthermore, U.S. reserve assets are 
mostly composed of gold, which has ceased to be used for 
official settlements since the U.S. announcemeni in 1971 of 
abolishing gold convertibility. 
After the runs on the dollar in February and March, 1973 
the increase in u~s. liabilities to foreign official cred-
itors was relatively small during the rest of the year, 
followed by another sharp increase in liabilities throughout 
1974 mostly in the accounts of the OPEC members as a result 
of higher oil pri~es. The average of the changes in U.S. 
liabilities· during the course of 197 5 was low compared with 
the preceding years. If the reduction in liabilities in 1973 
and 1975 as an indicator of a shift from official interven-
tion to a greater role played by the market mechanism, then 
it can be concluded that the introduction of managed float-
ing floating of the dollar has reduced the pressure on U.S. 
officials to interv~ne heavily in the foreign exchange 
markets. 
TABLE XXXIV 
QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGES IN U.S. LIABILITIES 
TO FOREIGN OFFICIAL CREDITORS, 
EXPRESSED IN PERCENT 
Quarter -----
Year I II III IV 
1969 3.56 9.51 7.10 l. 75 
l-970 l. 46 l. 89 l. 24 2.27 
1971 4.34 11.77 16.74 6.05 
1972 4.72 4.21 7.74 3.97 
1973 9.62 l. 43 .27 .57 
1974 3.57 8.71 6.44 7.48 
1975 .63 l. 88 l. 30 l. 98 
1976 2.87 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 













In the early part of this study, four key variables 
were identified as potential factors that could have ex-
plained the fluctuation of the exchange rates of the Group 
of Ten countries plus Switzerland. Those variables are: 
the relative price inflation rates between the country in 
que~tion and trade-weighted price inflation rates of its 
trading partners, the ratio of domestic short-term interest 
rate to the three-month eurodollar rate, the ratio of value 
of the country's exports to its imports, and the economic 
growth factor measured by the index of industrial production. 
Regression techniques were applied to test the statistical 
relationship between the changes in the rate and those key 
variables. The results were dominated by the existence of 
serial correlation, which leads to the biased estimates of 
the variances of the coefficients. After correction for 
serial correlation it turned out that these factors in gen-
eral were not statistically significant to determine the 
rate changes. When the exchange rate with one period lag 
was added to the model as an explanatory variable, the out-
come of the analysis was that expectations based on the past 
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rate are of crucial importance in the determination of the 
exchange rate. 
The second part of the study was an analysis of the im-
pact of exchange rate adjustments on the country's underlying 
international position, the basic balance. The regression 
results, corrected for serial correlation, of the linear 
realtionship between the change in the basic balance and the 
one and two quarter lag level of exchange rates were not 
statistically significant for all countries except the 
Netherlands. The result is not surprising since the key 
factor was oil prices which caused a shift in the trade ac-
counts uncorrelated to the changes in the exchange rate. 
There are several reasons for it. First, the worldwide 
economic boom combined with a jump in the prices of primary 
commodities in 1973 contributed to important shifts in the 
trade accounts. For instance, the U.S. trade balance swung 
to a surplus in the second half of 1973 from a deficit in 
the early 1970s as a result of a spectacular rise in the 
volume of agricultural exports, whereas the Japanese trade 
surplus was reduced sharply resulting from higher payments 
for primary products. Italy and the United Kingdom, on the 
other hand, experienced a huge deficit in spite of the fall 
in the sterling and the lira exchange rates. Another ex-
. ample is the case of West Germany, where the trade balance 
registered a record surplus of $14 billion and the effective 
rate of the D-mark appreciated by about 12 percent from 1972. 
Second, the quadrupling of petroleum prices in 1974 has 
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sharply increased the cost of imports and most countries 
experienced a tu~naround from a surplus to a deficit in their 
trade accounts; only the German trade surplus rose further 
despite an appreciation of the D-mark by some six percent 
from 1973. Third, the worldwide economic recession during 
1974 and early 1975 caused a slowdown in exports, while the 
payments for imports remained about.the same level or were 
somewhat lower ~han in 1975, due mainly to a high share of 
oil.pay~ents. An exception was the case of the United States 
and West Germany. For the United States, an improvement in 
the trade account came primarily because of a high income 
elasticity in the demand for imports, while the German trade 
surplus was as large as one year earlier. 
This study then examined policy measures adopted by 
the monetary authorities to adjust to the imbalances (sur-
plus or deficit) in the balance of payments. Two main 
developments occurred during the 1971-1975 period. One of 
these was the disequilibrium in payments prevailing until 
1973, which was characterized by a recurring weakness in 
sterling and a deterioration in the United States balance of 
payments compared with the surpluses of Japan and Continen-
tal Europe. To control the influx of capital, Japan induced 
the commercial banks to increase lending abroad and liber-
alized foreign real estate investments, West Germany intro-
duced limitations· on capital imports, Switzerland tightened 
up the regulations on foreign deposits in the Swiss banks 
including inte~e~t .charged on the deposits, the United 
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Kingdom controlled capital transactions outside the sterling 
area. The second cause of disequilibrium was the effect of 
higher oil prices in 1974. The period was characterized by 
dramatic shifts in the surplus of trade accounts from oil-
importing countries to oil-exporting countries. The unex-
pected jump of payments for oil imports caused a reduction 
in reserves of all industrialized couhtries. The reversal 
of capital import controls began in 1974. The United States 
discontinued the controls on capital exports in January, 
1974, France extended its controls on outward capital move-
ments, West Germany terminated many of its controls on capi-
tal .inflow programs, Italy tightened up the controls on ex-
ports of banknotes, Japan restricted the resident purchases 
of foreign bonds and stocks and withdraw the financing pro-
gram of real estate investments abroad, the United Kingdom 
put strict controls on tourist expenditures abroad, 
Switzerland is the only country that experienced an inflow 
of capital, which contributed to the upward pressure on the 
Swiss franc. 
The final section of this study was concerned with the 
question: Have the floating exchange rates contributed to 
a lesser use of reserves than under the fixed rate regime, 
as suggested by the advocates of the greater exchange rate 
flexibility? A criterion used to answer this question is 
the change in official reserves from one quarter to the 
next regardless of whether the change was an increase or a 
decrease, since from a theoretical point of view, the 
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reserve changes will approach zero. It is difficult to 
evaluate how extensive national monetary authorities inter-
vened in the exchange market since some countries intervened 
for a period of time and then reversed their policy. For 
countries that have their exchange rate policy adhering to 
the "joint float," the experience of West Germany demon-
strated a substantial reduction in the fluctuations of 
reserve assets. Although the quarterly changes in reserves 
were large for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, there 
was a tendency of moving towards a smaller use of reserves. 
As the French franc was floating independently, the average 
of quarterly percentage changes in reserves during 1974 was 
the lowest. When France was in the "joint float" during 
1973 and from July, 1975 to March, 1976, quarterly changes 
in reserves became significantly larger. Italy and the, 
United Kingdom, whose exchange rates were suffering downward 
pressure, were reluctant to use their limited reserves; they 
sought,credits from central banks, apart from the credits 
drawn from the IMF, so that these two countries experienced 
witle fi'uctuations in their reserves. Switzerland reversed 
her policy of non-intervention during the 1973-74 period, 
and therefore witnessed wide reserve changes. Japan inter-
vened heavily in the exchange market during 1973, then 
reversed her policy during 1974-75. The Canadian reserves 
have fluctuated between the range of 2 to 3 percent annually 
since the adoption of the loating in mid-1970. The United 
States authorities did not attach importance to the level of 
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reserves; her liabilities to foreign official accounts de-
clined substantially in 1973 and 1975 separated by a moder-
ate increase in liabilities to the OPEC members in 1974. 
The experience of major industrialized countries with 
floating exchange rates is well described by the Bank for 
International Settlements in its annual report in 1976 (5, 
1976, p. 104): 
In the situation as it was in March, 1973, as well 
as during the three years since then, it is hard 
to see what practical alternative there has been 
to floating exchange rates. And looking at the 
longer run trends of major industrial countries• 
exchange rates, they have, fairly clearly, been 
in the right directions. Moreover, some earlier 
payments imbalances have in the process been cor-
rected; others, however, still remain troublesome, 
or have even assumed larger proportions. Floating, 
while it may be inevitable, therefore needs to be 
managed not only in the narrow sense of exchange-
market intervention but, more importantly, through 
domestic financial and economic policies. Beyond 
that, however, much remains to be clarified about 
both the theory and practice of managed floating. 
The study has shown that floating exchange rates alone 
cannot stabilize or keep a balance of payments in balance. 
Currency reserves are still badly needed because autonomous 
events continue to overshadow monetary adjustments. The 
doubling of wheat prices, the quadrupling of oil prices, the 
progressive inflation in some countries with governments 
that have only minority control have delayed the adjustments 
in the balance of payments, and the changes in the rates 
have helped to reduce the pressures on government officials 
to intervene heavily in the foreign exchange markets. 
Neither fixed nor floating rates are able to overcome the 
powerful economic and political influences that have dis-
torted the results in the past. If other, more potent 
economic devices can be adopted, only time will tell. 
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